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Glossary and abbreviations used in the thesis. 
 
Allege: State to be the case (without evidence.)  
 
Bureaucracy: The organization in municipal Government, usually staffed by officials 
selected on the basis of experience and expertise, responsible for carrying out the 
policies of the executive, the Council. 
 
Conflict of Interest: A situation in which a person is in a position to derive personal 
benefit from actions or decisions made in their official capacity. 
Corruption: the abuse of power by a person in a position of trust for personal gain. 
Council Corruption: Mismanagement by knowingly and consistently using an 
unreasonable practice or policy in the conduct of Council business which did not 
conform to the implied duty to act with competence and integrity. 
 
Defalcation/embezzlement: The illegal use of money by a person who has 
responsibility for it, for example by a municipal official whose duties included the receipt 
of payments from ratepayers. 
 
Ethical: Morally correct, honourable. 
 
Insider trading: The practice of members of a municipal council entering a contract to 
supply goods or services to the council, contrary to the provisions of section 12(1) (c) 
of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. 
Integrity: The ability to make wise choices and intelligent moral decisions. 
 
Moral: Concerned with accepted rules and standards of human behaviour. 
Morality: Compliance with a code of moral conduct. 
 
Nonfeasance: Failure to perform an act required by law. 
Officer: An employee of the Council employed to carry out the services provided by 
the Council. 
Official:  An employee of the Council whose role in providing the services of the Council 
including an advisory or developmental aspect. 
 
Systemic Corruption: The conduct of government where corruption becomes the rule 
rather than the exception and is exempted or immune from punishment or 
recrimination.  
Venal:  Corruptible; prepared to do dishonest or immoral things in return for money. 
Venial:  A  sin or offence that is excusable or pardonable, as opposed to an offence  
involving immorality. 
Vested Interest: A situation where a person or a group of persons have a very strong 
reason for acting in a particular way, for example to protect an interest such as the 
reputation of the Council or the interests of property owners. 
 
VI 
AMC:   Association of Municipal Corporations. 
MCA:    Municipal Corporations Act. 
LGB:   Local Government Board.  
ILP:      Independent Labour Party. 
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Abstract.  
 
This thesis provides a contextualised study of the behaviour of municipal government 
in the municipalities of Manchester and Salford during the late Victorian period, when 
the work load of both Councils was increasing in both volume and complexity, and the 
necessary expertise to deal with this workload was not always available.  
 
This thesis addresses one main question: why did the two Councils of Manchester and 
Salford prove incapable of avoiding situations where both their competence and at 
times their morality were brought into question?’ The evidence used to assess how the 
two Councils conducted their business relies heavily on the reports and commentaries 
detailing Council behaviour provided by the contemporary local weekly press. These 
were a factor in moving public opinion towards the need to improve the standard of 
integrity which was expected of local government. The mindset and resulting attitude 
of both Councils to municipal government, which in many cases was derived from 
commercial practices, has been explored. The result of this attitude led to a failure to 
take effective action to deter behaviour which had previously been tolerated, and to 
deal fully with councillors and officials responsible for this behaviour; damaging the 
reputation of the Council for integrity. The failure of the Councils to recognise the need 
to act to improve the standard of integrity has also been discussed; this was the reason 
for the delay in implementing changes such as improvement in audit procedures. The 
final chapters of the thesis bring together evidence which explains why the proposition 
in the main question was valid. 
 
 This thesis argues that the majority of allegations of Council corruption were merely 
cases of mismanagement by incompetence, or ignorance. These actions, which 
involved misfeasance, fell short of Council corruption, with the implication that the 
actions of the Council lacked integrity. There were however cases where the behaviour 
of the Council did constitute an abuse of power and by present day standards would 
be regarded as Council corruption. Nevertheless, the evidence of this thesis suggests 
that whilst criticism in these cases concentrated on castigating the Councils for their 
actual behaviour, allegations of Council corruption were usually absent. The Victorian 
Councils of Manchester and Salford in the late Victorian period were thought to have 
done a ‘good job.’ 
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Corruption in municipal government in the late Victorian 
period, (1871 – 1902).  
A study of the conduct and attitude of the Councils of 
Manchester and Salford to delivering government with 
integrity, and the extent to which allegations of 
malpractice made by critics were warranted. 
 
Part One The content and context of the thesis. 
 
Chapter One. - Introduction. 
 
1.1. The aim of the thesis.  
 
This thesis is a study of Manchester and Salford municipal corporations during the late 
Victorian period, - to examine the validity of the allegations that the conduct of government 
in the two municipalities lacked integrity. Samuel Norbury Williams, an Elective auditor, 1 
writing about the conduct of the Manchester Council generally in managing Council 
business, was an exemplar of the view that the Council was guilty of corruption. This was a 
view later shared by James Moore, who in 2007 referred to the behaviour of Manchester 
Council as ‘a byword for corruption’. 2 Salford Council also attracted allegations of 
misfeasance when conducting Council business. A major and long- running scandal, which 
blew up in the 1880s, led to the sacking of the Gas manager Samuel Hunter. It drew 
attention to a system of government in the borough where it was alleged that 
mismanagement and sleazy practices were condoned. R. L Greenall writing in the year 
2000, headed his account of the Hunter affair as ’Gas and corruption.’ 3 This study will, 
therefore, consider the validity of allegations that both Councils were guilty of corrupt 
practices.   
                                               
1    .. Norbury Williams, Letter Manchester Examiner and Times, 12 April 1890. The generality of this allegation, 
which was seen by the Council as implying that the Council was corrupt, was the reason the Council took action 
for libel against him. Norbury Williams was chairman of Manchester Ratepayers’ Association; he was elected 
as an. Elective auditor for Manchester Council in 1894,and continued  to act in that capacity  for 34 years until 
1927. He died in 1929 at the age of 77.  
2   The phrase ‘byword for corruption’, was used by James Moore in the article ‘Municipal corruption and political 
partisanship in Manchester 1885-1895,’ James Moore and John Smith, (editors) Corruption in Urban Politics 
and Society, Britain 1780-1950. (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2007, p.95.) The statement was not qualified.  
3  R. L. Greenall, The Making of Victorian Salford (Lancaster: Carnegie Publishing) Chapter 9, ‘Gas and 
Corruption’. 
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The aim is to build up a picture of the Victorian world; the problems which municipal 
governments faced, the resources which were available to deal with them, and the attitude 
of the Councils and officials to government with integrity. This was at a time when municipal 
corporations faced increasing pressures to deal with the serious environmental and public 
health problems arising from rapid urbanisation. The analysis used recognises that 
contemporary perceptions about what constituted integrity in public life at this time were 
significantly different from present-day values, but were changing, and the assessment of 
the integrity of the conduct of municipal government is therefore based on a contextualised 
study, because our argument will be that whatever corruption arose must be understood in 
this time-located context.’4 
This thesis examines factors which had an impact on the ability of the municipal 
corporations of Manchester and Salford to provide governance with competence and 
integrity. These factors include the increasing volume of the duties which the two councils 
were required to provide, the lack of expertise to undertake the variety and technical 
complexity of many of these duties, and the absence of a mechanism in the constitution of 
a municipality for coordinating the services provided by a municipal corporation. It is 
however the contention of this thesis that the competence and integrity of the two Councils 
was significantly influenced by the attitude and mindset of councillors in the two 
municipalities, many of whom had obtained experience in the commercial field, and believed 
the practices used in commerce were the practices which should be used by municipal 
government. As audit practices in commerce were lax, the result was a failure of both 
Councils to recognise the need to improve the standards of audit used in conducting Council 
business, to ensure the probity of the borough accounts. The behaviour of the Councils 
dealing with Council business was based on the belief that the commercial experience that 
many councillors had obtained meant that the Council itself and its committees had the 
resources to take on the actual management of the day-to-day services provided by the 
Council. The consequence of this belief was the failure to set up a management system 
which would make available to all Council Departments when needed, the resources of 
expertise which did exist within the municipality. It is argued that the result of these patterns 
of behaviour led to an unfavourable public perception about the integrity of the conduct of 
the two Councils and inferences by critics that the two Councils had a reputation for 
corruption. 
 
                                               
4   L. P. Hartley summarised the situation when he stated: ‘The past is a foreign country:  they do things differently 
there.’ (Prologue. The go-between (1953)).  
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1.2. The scope of the thesis and selection of subject matter.  
 
No substantial study has been carried out on the subject of municipal corruption in the late 
Victorian period.  The municipalities of Manchester and Salford, chosen for this study, are 
situated on either bank of the River Irwell. Both had to deal with the same legacy of urban 
squalor resulting from rapid urbanisation and population increase; with the consequence 
that mortality rates in both boroughs were amongst the highest in England. 5 6   The starting 
date selected (1871), was the date when the Local Government Board (LGB) took over the 
public health and local government responsibilities of the Home Secretary and the Privy 
Council.7 This was the beginning of a period when the duties required of municipal 
corporations had expanded considerably. The Public Health Act of 1875, unlike previous 
legislation in the public health field, was mandatory, and legislation such as the Artisans 
and Labourers’ Act, (1875) also included mandatory requirements to improve public 
housing. As a result, it was obligatory for Councils to implement environmental 
improvements which were both costly and could involve technically complex solutions. This 
task was made more difficult because of the need to comply with the Borough Funds Act 
1872, which imposed a more complicated and administratively demanding system for 
seeking government loans to carry out improvement schemes.  These increased duties 
occurred at a time when the two Councils and their committees needed to develop 
structures and modes of operation capable of meeting these challenges, both to manage 
and deliver these new services with competence and integrity, and to deal with major public 
health problems such as sewage management when the technical knowledge and expertise 
necessary to provide solutions were not available. 
The late Victorian period was selected because this was also a time the local arena was 
‘intensely visible’, even absorbing to its inhabitants, so too were the local and political elites 
inhabiting this ‘arena’,8 and ‘local self-government’ was still believed to be the primary 
objective of municipal government, which was to be defended. Manchester had a vibrant 
daily press with titles such as the Manchester Guardian, the Manchester Times and the 
Courier, 9 which carried both national and local news, including information about the 
Council meetings in the two municipalities. The affordable ‘penny per week’ local press 
                                               
,5   F. Engels, (editors W. O.  Henderson & H. Challoner.) Condition of the working class in England (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press.1958).  
6   In 1831, the population of Manchester was 182,000; the figure for the three townships in Salford was 50,810. 
By 1871, Manchester’s population was 351,000 and the population of the Salford municipality had increased to 
124,801. During the period selected for this study, the population of both municipalities continued to 
increase...Manchester’s population in 1901 reached 544,000; Salford’s population had grown to 220,957. 
(Census figures). 
7   The LGB was created by the Local Government Board Act 1871, (c. 70). 
8   John Garrard, (editor) Heads of the Local State; Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters since 1800 (Ashgate: 
Aldershot, 2007.) p. 12. Garrard made this statement about the period 1880 until 1914. 
9   A fuller discussion of the role newspapers which gave detailed reports about the conduct of municipal. 
business in Manchester and Salford is given in Chapters 2.4, 3.2 and 3.3. 
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became widely accessible in the second half of the nineteenth century, when it enjoyed a 
‘golden’ period. By the 1870s there were three ‘titles’ published in Salford, and one in 
Manchester, all of which included detailed information about the conduct of Council 
business. It is highly likely that as this was the only source of information available to the 
public other than word of mouth, this information was a major factor in determining public 
attitudes to practices used by the two Councils and their members, which had previously 
been tolerated, but were no longer regarded as acceptable.  
 
The date ‘1902’ was chosen as the end-point because this was a key date when the impact 
of central government legislation on local government increased dramatically The Education 
Act 1902,10 which abolished locally-elected School boards and passed the authority over 
schools to borough Councils, had added greatly to the scope of local government and 
provided a new and very different set of challenges for municipal Councils, which is outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
. 
The analysis used here to explore the validity of this conclusion is based on investigating 
one main question:  
 
to what extent did the Councils of Manchester and Salford prove incapable of 
avoiding situations where both their competence and at times their morality were 
brought into question? 
 
Three subsidiary questions have been used to explore the proposition inherent in this 
question. These are: 
 
1. What was the source of criticism and the nature of the behaviour of the Councils 
of Manchester and Salford Councils which was being identified by contemporaries 
as incompetent, and /or ethically dubious or corrupt?  
2.. How far was the criticism of the Councils warranted in terms of their actual 
behaviour during the late Victorian period?  
3. What was the attitude of the two Councils to the management and delivery of 
Council business and why did this lead to frequent incidents of mismanagement and 
allegations of corruption? 
 
The thesis consists of four parts.  
Part One consists of two chapters. The first chapter which deals with the content of the 
thesis, the historiography and key questions, also includes the sources available, and the 
                                               
10   The Education Act 1902, which became known as the ‘Balfour’ bill, led to intense wrangling in both Councils 
about the nature of the education which should be provided under the legislation.  
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methodology used. The second chapter includes the context relevant to the conduct of 
municipal government during the late Victorian period, with emphasis on the increase in 
both volume and complexity of the duties to be provided by municipalities. 
Part Two, entitled ’Corruption in municipal government?’ contains three chapters. Chapter 
Three, entitled ‘Assessing the integrity of the Council,’ deals with the first subsidiary 
question.  It considers what the Victorians meant by personal corruption and council 
corruption, and then examines the sources and nature of the allegations of mismanagement 
reported in the local press. The chapter concludes by giving examples of the types of 
allegation and the inferences of corruption made by critics about the behaviour of the two 
Councils. Chapter Four entitled ‘The validity of the allegations,’ considers the second 
subsidiary question by examining how attitudes to previously tolerated practices were 
changing, and the extent to which many of the allegations made about the lack of integrity 
of the two Councils were really complaints about mismanagement. The final section of the 
Chapter which considers embezzlement, notes how the investigation of these cases led to 
a focus on mismanagement by the two Councils, and how cases of mismanagement formed 
the causal underpinning of council corruption. 
Part Three of the thesis entitled ‘Municipal government; a machine out of joint? contains 
three chapters which examine how in practice municipal services were managed, by 
focussing on the manpower and methods used by the two Councils. This part deals with 
subsidiary question Three. 
 Part Four of the thesis entitled ‘A reputation for corruption?’ consists of three chapters 
which brings together the findings of Parts Two and Three to address the key question 
posed by the thesis. Both Chapter Eight entitled (‘Morality and governance’) and Chapter 
Nine (‘The interests of the community’) explore situations which illustrate why the behaviour 
of the two Council could call into question not only their competence and integrity, but could 
also suggest that their behaviour at times lacked morality. The final chapter Ten includes a 
summary of the findings of the thesis and the contribution which the thesis makes to the 
historiography of corruption in municipal government in the late Victorian period 
 
One area which has been associated with corruption in local government is not included in 
this study; and that is policing and the role of the Watch committee, which was concerned 
with the management of the Police force. The establishment of law and order was seen as 
a priority by central government and the establishment of a ‘Watch’ committee was a 
mandatory requirement of the Municipal Corporations Act (MCA) 1835, which made policing 
a compulsory local government service. It provided that the powers of the local Watch 
committees were subject to central-government control, and although the Watch Committee 
6 
was appointed by the Council, its proceedings on the policing side were not subject to 
Council review.  There were serious complaints against the police, concerning the personal 
conduct of police officers, such as drunkenness or consorting with prostitutes, and some 
criminal actions by members of the force, which did damage the reputation of the two 
Councils. 11  These matters have however been omitted because they lie outside the main 
theme of this thesis, which concerns the actions of the two Councils in carrying out the 
business of dealing with improving public health and the environment.  
 
1.4. The historiography and its limitations.12 
 
Although the conduct of national and local government during the Victorian period has 
attracted considerable academic attention, the areas of political and commercial corruption 
have proved more attractive to historians than to investigate the extent to which, as a result 
of the increased demands on local-authority resources, and failures to meet local 
expectations of integrity, criticism, which could be expressed as allegations or inferences of 
corruption, misfeasance or mismanagement was valid.  
 
Prior to the 1950s, a number of authors published books and articles on the structure and 
operation of local government. The book by Joseph Redlich The History of Local 
Government in England’ originally published in 1903, but updated by Bryan Keith-Lucas, 
was written about the development of local government in England from the standpoint of 
an Austrian who had studied the attempts to develop a democratic system of governance 
in European countries by revolution. 13   His succinct historical review of the development of 
the English constitution is still useful.  Herman Finer’s book, English Local Government 
published in 1933 and revised in 1945, provided a text for students of government. 14 
Although he discusses the structure of local government in the nineteenth century, it is as 
a backdrop to a detailed account of the structure and operation of local government and its 
relationship to central government at the time of publication. There is some useful detail 
and criticism about the development of the ‘amateur’ committee system. The book by E. L. 
Hasluck Local Government England published in 1936, was also written as an introduction 
to local government.15 Writing from a national viewpoint, he provides a brief outline of the 
operation of local government, intended to act as an introduction to more advanced texts.  
                                               
11   J. Platt, A History of Salford Police (Salford: Salford Corporation, 1945). 
12   Members of the  European  Association of Urban Historians have published papers on municipal politics and 
civic culture, for example, Doyle, B. & McElligott, A, ‘The rise and fall of European municipal power since 1800.’ 
International Journal of Regional and Local History, Volume 7, 1-2, p. 9-37, (2011).  
13   Joseph Redlich & Francis W. Hurst, The History of Local Government in England (London: Macmillan. (2nd 
edition, Bryan Keith-Lucas, 1958)).  
.14   Herman Finer, English Local Government (London: Macmillan 1933; second edition 1945).   
15   E. L Hasluck, in Local Government England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1936,) p.72.  
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He stated that his aim was to draw attention to ‘problems and controversies arising out of 
the local government system’. He devoted only one page to jobbery which he described as 
‘favouritism in the appointment of local government officers.’ Many of the other problems 
which he identified were directly relevant to the late Victorian period, but as he was mainly 
concerned with identifying the problems, rather than exploring causes, he did not discuss 
any of the issues which he raised in any detail. Unfortunately, the book is not referenced 
.and does not contain a bibliography. He is the only author writing during this period to 
identify the type of problem which could beset a system of municipal government set up 
using the provisions of the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act, some of which were relevant 
to the late Victorian period.  The single volume Methods of Social Study by Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb described how they conducted their investigations into social history.16 Their 
description and commentary about municipal government, compiled on a short visit on 
Manchester and Salford in 1899, provides useful insights into the difficulties of providing 
government with competence and integrity. 
 
Two books, two of which deal with Manchester Corporation, which were written to celebrate 
the one hundredth anniversary of the implementation of the 1835 Municipal Corporations 
Act, focussed on the achievements of local government. The multi- authored work edited 
by Laski, Jennings, and Robson, A Century of Municipal Progress was published in 1935 
under the auspices of the National Association of Local Government Officers. This book is 
a eulogy for the collectivist philosophy, which the authors see as the basis of the services 
of municipal government. Manchester, which received praise as the first municipality to 
supply gas, and to include in a local act of 1867 provisions leading to a slum clearance 
program, was stated to be a leader in forwarding this philosophy. 17 18 The treatment of the 
history of local government is variable; some chapters, for example the chapters on the 
Council and committees describe only the situation in 1933, other chapters, for example on 
housing, policing and education, give information about the development of the services; 
but the struggles of Councils during the Victorian period both to develop new services and 
adapt the system of governance to meet new challenges were not considered. The 
achievement of the book is that it reveals how the role of local government expanded over 
the period. Only a few chapters give footnote references and there is a very brief 
bibliography for each chapter.  
 
The History of Local Government in Manchester by Arthur Redford which is in three 
volumes, was written to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of Manchester’s ‘Charter 
                                               
16   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study (London: Longmans Green & Co.,1932). 
17   Harold J. Laski, W. Ivor Jennings & William A. Robson, A Century of Municipal Progress (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1935.) E. D. Simon, ‘Housing and city planning,’ p. 204.    
18   Ibid., William A. Robson ’Public Utility Services, p. 303. 
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of Incorporation’, but the history of the Manchester is actually described from medieval times 
to 1938. 19  The second and third volumes cover the late Victorian period. The material used 
to trace development of the municipality was taken mainly from the ‘Proceedings of the 
Council’; the ‘Minutes of the Committees of Manchester Council’ or the ‘Epitomes of the 
Council. There are occasional references to books and articles written by councillors and 
ex-councillors and extracts from relevant official reports are included. There are also a few 
references to the daily Manchester newspapers, mainly the Manchester Guardian; the local 
weekly press was not cited. Redford provides a factual account of the problems experienced 
by Manchester Council in dealing with environmental and the technical problems, and the 
resulting public health issues. Although the intent was to show the achievements of the City 
during the period, the author did also discuss some major incidents of mismanagement 
which occurred in the last decades of the nineteenth century, which he attributed primarily 
to the structure of the Council committees and their relationship to the Council. 20 He alludes 
to other problems arising from the lack of expertise of members of the Council and officials, 
and the difficulty of coordinating and managing Council services but he does not discuss 
the impact of these factors on the extent to which this resulted in allegations of corruption. 
Redford’s volumes II and III were a major reference source for this study. Shena Simon, in 
A Century of City Government, also written to celebrate 100 years of municipal governance 
in Manchester, gives a largely uncritical account of the operation of the Council. She does 
give useful data on aspects of the Corporation’s services, and as an ex-member of the 
Council she is able to provide some insights and comments on the implementation of 
Council policy. 21 There are no comparable histories of municipal government in Salford.  
 
It was not until the late 1960s that historical interest focussed more specifically on the 
problems associated with the government in urban municipalities. A number of published 
studies examined the development of municipal governance in urban authorities, usually 
emphasising a different facet of the organisation and function of the Council in a particular 
municipality. G. W. Jones, in Borough Politics written in 1969, analysed the membership of 
Wolverhampton Borough Council between 1888 and 1963, looking at ‘who they were…and 
what they did.’22 However Jones did not deal with either the growth of services or the 
administrative history of the municipality, but instead he examined inter alia, whether, and 
to what extent the background of a councillor was a factor in determining the contribution 
made to Council business.  E.P Hennock’s  Fit & Proper Persons. Ideal and Reality in 19 c. 
Urban Government, written in 1973, considered the qualities needed by those who serve 
                                               
19   Arthur Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, ‘Borough & City.’ Volume III.  
‘The last half century.’ (London: Longmans Green & Co.,1939). 
20   Ibid., Volume II, Chapter XXIX: ‘Administrative Machinery.’  
21   Shena D, Simon, A Century of City Government (London: George Allan & Unwin Ltd, 1938). 
22   G. W. Jones, Borough Politics (London: Macmillan 1969). 
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on a Council if it was to command public respect.23. He examined in detail the operation of 
two Councils, Birmingham and Leeds, and the extent of their success as a weapon for 
promoting community welfare, but he did not explore how in practice the two Councils 
carried out Council business. John Garrard’s study Leadership and Politics in 19c Salford, 
a Historical Analysis of Urban Political Power, used the background of Salford councillors 
to test the hypothesis that the process of political change in the borough could be correlated 
with changing membership of the Council when there was a slow decline in Council 
membership of those ‘with social and economic power’, and an increase of those ‘lacking 
proprietorial standing’. 24 As a part of this study he considered how much power councillors 
had, and what determined that power. In a later study, Leadership and Power in Victorian 
Industrial Cities 1830-1880, he examined the factors which influenced the exercise of the 
power by councillors in the municipalities of Rochdale, Bolton and Salford, noting inter alia 
factors such as how far the proprietorial weight was a central determinant of power amongst 
councillors, the growing numbers and expertise of municipal professionals, and external 
factors such as the influence of neighbouring areas. 25  Derek Fraser in the first of two books 
on Victorian local government, Urban politics in Victorian England, stated that he was 
‘searching for a general model of urban history.’26 He concluded that the structure of politics 
in Victorian urban municipalities was determined by the local need for policies which would 
lead to environmental control, and this requirement in turn limited the policies which an 
authority could pursue. In his second book, Power and Authority in the Victorian City 
published in 1979, he examined the role of the ‘municipalisation’ of local government, noting 
how the central government legislation of the 1830s, which was concerned with the political 
and administrative reform of local government in urban municipalities, also provided a 
system which enabled municipalities like Manchester and Salford to tackle local social 
priorities. 27 He commented that, whilst central government encouraged these initiatives by 
permissive legislation, improvements in public health during the last half of the nineteenth 
century were largely achieved by local private acts, which were to form the basis for national 
legislation. He noted that by the late Victorian period, English municipalities were all 
pursuing similar policies for the improvement of public health.  Although he examined how 
the priorities were determined in different urban municipalities, he did not address the 
practical problems experienced by a municipal Council in delivering Council services with 
                                               
23   E. P. Hennock, Fit & Proper Persons. Ideal and Reality in 19 c. Urban Government (London: Edward Arnold 
1973). 
24   John Garrard, Leadership and Politics in 19c Salford, a Historical Analysis of Urban Political Power, Salford 
City Politics Research Series (Salford: Salford University ?1967).  
25   John Garrard, Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Cities 1830-1880 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1983). 
26   Derek Fraser, Urban Politics in Victorian England (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1976).  
27   Derek Fraser, Power and Authority in the Victorian City (Oxford: Blackwells, 1979).  
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competence and integrity, which could result from factors such as a lack of appropriate 
resources or expertise. 
None of the studies which discuss local government in the Victorian period, deal in any 
detail with the subject of fraud and corruption committed by members of municipal 
corporations. Redford recognised that weaknesses in the organisation and management of 
services provided by Manchester Corporation could and did lead to corruption. He cites 
problems on the Waterworks Department and the Borough Surveyors Department but does 
not develop this theme. Shena Simon’s book, A Century of City Government, Manchester 
1838 -1938. referred to ’echoes of municipal corruption’ in Manchester.28 She mentions that 
‘one or two Councillors had retired after charges were investigated by a committee of the 
Council,’ but gives no details. She added that the Council ‘were jealous of its reputation for 
integrity’ and failed to accept that there was a serious problem of corruption; dismissing the 
allegations of Norbury Williams because they were ‘never on a scale to justify an inquiry.’ 29 
Two books published in the twentieth century did examine aspects of corruption in local 
government.  R. L. Greenall’s book, The Making of Victorian Salford published in the year 
2000 consists of a series of studies about aspects of Salford’s Victorian history. 30 He 
included a chapter dealing with the so-called ‘Gas scandal,’ where the Gas Committee of 
the Council was shown to be incompetent, and the Gas Engineer pleaded guilty to offences 
which amounted to corruption.  A collection of papers edited by John Smith and James 
Moore, entitled Corruption in Urban Politics and Society Britain 1790-1950, which dealt with 
corruption in urban politics and society, was published in 2007.31 The editors’ introductory 
chapter noted that franchise reform and the reform of municipal corporations represented a 
new phase in urban political development, which they refer to as ‘urbanisation’; a period 
when, they stated, new interests might challenge existing institutes and practices in urban 
political development. They noted that this led to practices which had previously been 
tolerated becoming unacceptable and commented on the inadequacy of attempts to 
legislate to prevent abuses such as insider trading. Moore and Smith also stated ‘that some 
consensus did develop’ about the ethical standards necessary for the conduct of public life, 
but do not provide any information about the nature of this consensus. 32  No evidence has 
been found suggesting that there was a generally accepted code of ethics, and although 
both Councils condemned practices such as jobbing of contracts, many of these practices 
                                               
28   Shena Simon, A century of City Government, Manchester 1838 -1938 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1938), p.404.   
29   Samuel Norbury Williams, Letter: Manchester Examiner and Times, 12 April 1890. 
30   Greenall, The Making of Victorian Salford.  
31  James Moore and John Smith, (editors), Corruption in Urban Politics and Society Britain 1790-1950 
(Aldershot: Ashgate 2007), p.6.   
32   Ibid., p.8. It is not clear what the authors meant by ‘consensus’. There were certainly no attempts to enunciate 
a policy on ethical standards either at a national level or local level. 
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continued throughout the Victorian period. 33 Any assessment of the extent of corruption in 
municipal governance in the late Victorian period is faced with the problem of identifying 
what were considered to be the ethical standards necessary for the conduct of public life, 
and how these were changing.  There is little guidance in the literature, although Alan Doig’s 
book, which is a survey of cases of corruption and misconduct in political life post 1945, 
includes an historical perspective which considers the reasons why, with the exception of 
electoral corruption, there was no criminal legislation to deal with municipal corruption until 
1889. 34  He noted that the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 did provide the sanction of 
disqualification for councillors who were guilty of entering a contract with their Council, but 
did not discuss the reasons why the sanction was not used. John Garrard examined the 
changing attitudes to the practice of commission-taking in the municipal gas industry. 35 He 
noted that allegations of corrupt practices used in tendering for coal, which revealed the 
extent of commission taking, led to the dismissal of Salford’s Gas manager and a changing 
attitude to the acceptability of the practice. In a fuller account of the scandal, Garrard 
discusses more fully the factors opening the way for municipal corruption, including the role 
of grievances and the growing self-confidence of municipal professionals.36 James Moore 
also examined municipal corruption and political partisanship in Manchester.’37 The major 
focus of his article was the political manoeuvring in Manchester Council to obtain a voting 
majority during the period, and the role of aldermen in decision-making in the high spending 
departments of the Council. He accepted at face value the allegations of misfeasance and 
inferences of corruption which had been made in the 1874 report by Joseph Scott, who 
censured the behaviour of Manchester Council. 38  
During the last quarter of the twentieth century and the recent years of the present century, 
incidents of corruption in public life which were highlighted in the media, have led to a 
resurgence of academic interest in the subject. Whilst the historiography continued to 
emphasise the impact of corruption on the integrity of governance both at a national and 
international level, the more recent analyses have been focussed on the effectiveness of 
anticorruption measures. Jens Ivo Engels. 39 reviewed a widely held theory , why corruption 
occurred in Europe in the early modern era (1500-1800) This theory argued that early 
modern societies were very corrupt because there was no separation between public and 
                                               
33   The Municipal Corporations Act 1882 contained the provision that if a councillor entered a contract or 
employment ‘with by or on behalf of the Council’, this was grounds for being disqualified from Council 
membership. (section 12). This sanction was not enforced.  
34   Alan Doig, Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
1984), p.66. In discussing attitudes to corruption in the early nineteenth century, he also noted that the attitude 
was that ‘corruption is bribery and bribery is corruption.’(p. 25). 
35   Garrard, Manchester Regional History Review, Volume II no 2 1988/9,12. 
36   Garrard, The Great Salford Gas Scandal 1887 (Altrincham: British Gas North Western, 1989).  
37   James Moore and John Smith, Corruption in Urban Politics and Society p.95.  
38   Joseph Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor (Manchester: Manchester City News, 1884).  
39   Jens Ivo Engels, Die geschichte der korruption. von der frühen neuzeit bis ins 20. jahrhundert 2014. (The 
history of corruption from the early modern period to the 20th century). Jens Ivo Engels is professor of Early 
modern history at Darmstadt University Germany.  
12 
private interest.  The result was that patronage, clientelism, nepotism and the use of public 
office for private and family benefit were commonly accepted. This were seen to be a 
consequence of tradition and privilege, and not the result of moral wrong-doing, a theory 
has continued to be accepted. Engels suggested that this has affected our understanding 
of corruption in the modern era (1800-now). In the UK, the Municipal Corporations Act 
(1835) set up a more democratic form of government, with an elected Council albeit with a 
limited franchise. No research has been undertaken to explore whether or to what extent 
this removed any corrupting influence which might have been attached to, and exerted by 
holders of various public offices which existed in the pre- incorporation period.   
Engel’s second book, published in German,40 reviews the work of authors whose interest 
was in how power was exercised in the modern era, in towns and cities in Europe and 
beyond. He commented that although these studies were not necessarily directed towards 
uncovering specific practices which might commonly be regarded as corruption, there were 
cases where these occurred but were not being recognised as such.  Action was, 
nonetheless, needed and taken to combat these practices. His conclusions suggest that in 
determining when behaviour was seen to be corrupt has to be seen in the context of the 
time, when factors such as urbanisation played their part in attitudes to integrity. The degree 
to which this conclusion is relevant to the study of the attitude of Manchester and Salford 
Councils and their critics to behaviour which lacked integrity, will be examined.in the 
upcoming thesis  
The trend of more recent publications which has been to examine corruption and hence 
anticorruption in an historical context and as an international problem. Mark Knights, in a 
blog entitled Old Corruption – what can Britain’s past tell us today?, argued that the growth 
of the state is both part of the problem, because it facilitates corrupt access to enlarged 
resources and power, but is also the solution, since it offers the best means to curb, restrain 
and punish corrupt behaviour.41  In the book   Anticorruption in History. From Antiquity to the 
Modern Era,  42  James Moore’s chapter entitled ‘Corruption and the Ethical Standards of 
British Public Life. National Debates and Local Administration, 1880-1914’ summarised his 
                                               
40   Jens Ivo Engels, Stadt-Macht-Korruption (Beiträge fur Stadtgeschichte und Urbanisierungsforschung, 
2017 (Short title, City, Power, Corruption).  
41   Mark Knights is Professor of History at Warwick University. The reference to the blog entitled ‘Old Corruption 
– what can Britain’s past tell us today?’ is blogswarwick.ac.uk/historyofcorruption, dated 10 November 2016. 
42   Anticorruption in History. From Antiquity to the Modern Era, editors Ronald Kroeze, André Vitória, Guy 
Geltner (Oxford: Oxford University Press University Press, 2017). This book contains papers written by   
participants in ANTICORP, a research initiative funded by the European Commission with the objective of 
investigating the factors that promoted or hindered the development of effective anticorruption policies. The 
research was carried out between 2012 and 2017. The editors were members of the research group at the 
University of Amsterdam, which participated in the project.  
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arguments by noting that that despite the implementation of anticorruption legislation, 
corruption remained a problem in municipal government.43 
The extent to which reports of mismanagement, which often resulted in overspending, 
fuelled allegations that corruption may have played a part in these incidents, has not been 
examined in the literature.  Peter Jones’ book, From Virtue to Venality examined three cases 
of corruption which occurred between 1930 and 1995.44 Jones argued that the only check 
on corruption is a strong civil society engaged in urban life. Where there was effectively 
unchallenged one-party rule, this could allow corruption to flourish. Suess Law writing about 
Manchester politics during the period 1885-1906 saw a slightly different aspect to the 
problem. 45 Although he agreed that the Liberal party dominated Manchester Council in the 
mid-nineteenth century, he saw the problem as a deficiency in understanding the needs of 
the municipality and an incapacity to design solutions to meet those needs. The result was 
a failure to take steps to reform the relationship between the Council and its committees, 
and hence ensure greater control of the conduct of Council business. In a wide-ranging 
review of the development of local government during the nineteenth century, James Moore 
and Richard Rodgers focussed on the nature of the knowledge network available to local 
authorities, which could be used to obtain information about the different options which were 
available to Councils having to dealing with the environmental and public health problems 
of urbanisation.46 Although the authors do not discuss corruption, they comment that the 
expertise necessary to provide some municipal services could lead, de facto to the 
management of a service by an official with the necessary expertise. This was the situation 
in Salford which Samuel Hunter, Salford’s Gas manager was allowed to exploit, because of 
the failure of the Gas Committee to control the tendering system for ordering the coal and 
cannel used in the Gasworks.  
Two studies address in detail the events which led to corruption in the Metropolitan Board 
of Works, (MBW), and the situation which was said to have resulted in the passing of the 
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act in 1889. David Owen examined the MBW case in the 
wider context of governance in London in the period 1855-1889;47 Gloria C Clifton examined 
                                               
43   James Moore, Ibid., Chapter 18. Dr Moore is a lecturer specialising in Modern British Social History in the 
Department of History, Leicester University.  
44   Peter Jones, From virtue to venality. Corruption in the City (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 
p.117.  
45   G. Suess Law, Manchester’s Politics 1885-1906 (Unpublished PhD. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania. 
.1975).   
46    James Moore and Richard Rodger, ‘Who really ran the Cities?  Municipal Knowledge and Policy Networks 
in British Local Government 1832-1914.’ Jahrbook Für Europaïsche Verwaltungsgeschichte XV (2003), 37-69. 
47   David Owen, The Government of Victorian London, 1855–1889: The Metropolitan Board of Works, the 
Vestries, and the City Corporation (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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why the corruption occurred. 48 The legislative consequences of the MBW scandal are 
considered in this study. 
  
The changes in Victorian society produced by the development of a professional middle 
class have been discussed by several authors.49  Harold Perkin noted the rise of a class, 
which subscribed to the belief that anyone with energy, if so minded, could become a 
success, for example by gaining professional status.50  Many municipal officials who were 
members of this professional middle class, believed that their possession of expertise 
should lead to both status and appropriate financial reward. John Garrard focused on the 
status and lifestyle expectations of Samuel Hunter. Salford’s Gas Engineer, a middle-class 
professional, who regarded himself, and was regarded, as the equal of business men on 
the Council.51  The extent to which these men possessed a mindset based on the attitudes 
in commerce is an important aspect of the analysis of how Manchester and Salford 
municipal Councils conducted business. 
The problems of agreeing acceptable audit practice in commerce which was also relevant 
to municipalities, were discussed in the Routledge Companion of Accounting History.52  H. 
M. Coombs & J. R, Edwards, who noted that Councils defended the use of the system of 
audit by amateurs, commented that private accountants, who wanted to obtain contracts to 
undertake municipal audit, were therefore keen to find reasons to censure the system used 
by municipalities.53  The failure to specify and implement more rigorous audit procedures in 
commerce has parallels in the attitudes of councillors to the audit of municipal accounts by 
Councils; which will be explored in this thesis.  Areas where the two Councils had to find 
solutions to ‘new’ problems included the need to define a system of ‘Best practice’ for use 
in municipal accounting, particularly where Councils undertook municipal trading activities. 
Tom Sowerby noted the problems of providing a system of accounts to deal with a funding 
method which was unique to municipalities. 54  
                                               
48.   Gloria C. Clifton, Professionalism, Patronage and Public Service in Victorian London: The Staff of the  
Metropolitan Board of Works, 1856–1889 (London: The Athlone Press,1992), p.167.   
49   For example - Harold Perkin, The Rise of the Professional Society England since 1880 (London:  Routledge, 
1989), and The Origins of Modern English Society 1780-1880 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); W J 
Reader, Professional Men, Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth Century England. (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1966), Geoffrey Millerson, The Qualifying Associations. A Study in Professionalism 
(New York: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1964).  
50    Perkin commented that attitudes propagated in books such as ‘Self Help’ by Samuel Smiles, were in fact 
very successful propaganda by the middle class to justify itself. (The rise of the Professional Society, p.225). 
51 ...John Garrard, The Great Salford Gas Scandal 1887 (Altrincham: British Gas North Western, 1989). 
52    S. Walker, Routledge Companion to Accounting History (London: Routledge, 2008).  
53   H.M. Coombe & J. R, Edwards, ‘The audit of municipal corporations - a quest for professional dominance.’  
Managerial Auditing Journal. Volume.19, No.1 (2004), .71. 
54   Tom Sowerby, The History of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance, 1885-1985 (London: CIPFA, 1985). 
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1.5 The sources available to the researcher and the methodology 
used. 
 
This thesis relies heavily on contemporary local material. Although there is a dearth of 
private papers which shed light on the activities of members of local government in the two 
municipalities during the late-Victorian period, the exceptions are three diaries of Bosdin 
Thomas Leech, who was elected to Manchester Council in 1880; became an alderman in 
1891 and was a director of the Manchester Ship Canal, and The Passfield Papers, which 
contain the private papers of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 55 The Webbs, who visited 1899 
to assess the extent to which reforms in Council practices had been undertaken, made 
notes after they interviewed senior aldermen in the two municipalities.56  There are also the 
papers relating to the defalcations of two Salford Council officials, Samuel Hunter the Gas 
Manager and John Graves, Salford’s Town Clerk.57  
There are a few contemporary pamphlets which were published to comment or criticise 
aspects of Council policy or action. As early as 1875 a widely-circulated pamphlet, 
questioning the quality and cost of gas in the municipality and written by a Salford councillor, 
alleged malpractice in the management of the Salford Gasworks.58 The series of reports 
published in 1884 by Joseph Scott, giving details about the day to day spending by 
Manchester Corporation, provide information which Scott alleged, demonstrated 
mismanagement, illegality, and some incidents of corruption by individual members of the 
municipality. 59There are no corresponding, and independently published critiques about the 
conduct of Salford Council. The Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society, which 
were published annually after 1853, contain papers given by members of the Society, who 
were not statisticians in the modern technical sense, but were in many cases leaders of the 
community.  60  A limited number of their papers provide insights into contemporary thought 
about local issues, relevant to the conduct of local government. An important contribution 
to the debate about the problems with the management of Manchester Council services 
was provided in a paper by T.C. Horsfall.61  
The wide scope of the subject matter used in this thesis has involved the use of particular 
issues of a small number of professional journals which are referenced in the text and the 
                                               
55   The Leech diaries, Chetham’s Library Manchester (LCH Collection - Shelf position: Mun.A.8.10). 
56   The Passfield Papers, (Local Government Collection), volume 156-160 Lancs. 20), held in Imperial College 
Library, London. 
57   The Graves papers, Ref. No L/CS/CL38 and the Hunter papers, Ref. Parcel 1, Box no. 90.are both held in 
Salford Local History Library.  
58    J.T. Mandley, Why is our gas so bad and yet so dear? (Manchester: John Heywood, 1875).  
59    Joseph Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor (Manchester: Manchester City News, 1884). 
60   T.S. Ashton, Economic & Social Investigations in Manchester 1833-1919. A Centenary History of Manchester 
Statistical Society (London: P. S. King & Son Ltd.1934).  
61   Ibid., Transactions of Manchester Statistical Society. 1895-6, p.1. 
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bibliography. A number of Royal Commission reports which had an impact on the policies 
of the Councils, are also included in the bibliography. 
Any examination of the integrity of municipal government relies on an understanding of how 
the business of municipal government was conducted. A vital resource for this study is the 
‘Proceedings’ of both Councils, which give the agendas for the various Council meetings 
and the business which was discussed. They also include the reports from standing and 
special committees. These are available for the period of interest. The ‘Epitomes’ published 
by Manchester Corporation and the ‘Synopses’ published by Salford Council, are also 
available; these give a list of all resolutions passed in committee meetings held since the 
previous Council meeting. There are very few ‘minutes’ books of Manchester Council 
committees; none of the ‘minutes’ of the committees in Salford are available. 
The other main source of information about the conduct of the Councils is provided by the 
local papers. The daily Manchester papers, such as the Guardian, the Courier and the 
Examiner, all published during the Victorian period, provide selective reporting of the actions 
of the both Manchester and Salford Councils and discussion of local issues. More 
importantly, the local weekly papers, (the three Salford papers, the Weekly the Chronicle 
and the Reporter and Manchester City News) provide reports of Council meetings, and 
some public meetings, and often include a commentary or an editorial about some aspect 
of Council policy or behaviour, as well as an occasional independent report on some aspect 
of Council actions or proposals for developments. The local papers also contain comment 
columns which provide ‘gossip’ about members of Council or the actions of the Council, and 
letters from readers, which often contained critical comments about aspects of the matters 
discussed by the two Councils, or allegations of mismanagement. Although the microfilm 
sets of the local papers cover the period, a number of the microfilmed copies of some issues 
of the papers of the Salford are in a poor condition and unreadable, and microfilmed copies 
of some issues are missing. The quality of the microfilming of some of the pre-1875 editions 
of Manchester City News are also unreadable, nonetheless these local weekly papers have 
been a very important source of the information used in this thesis.  
The methodology of this thesis which uses a contextualised approach to the study of 
municipal corruption, necessarily requires an understanding about what critics in the late 
Victorian public meant by corruption. Whilst it was clear what the Victorian critic regarded 
as corruption when dealing with the behaviour of an individual,62 it is less clear what critics 
meant when the term was used about the behaviour of the Councils.  A preliminary 
examination of the subject of this thesis identified that the causal underpinning of corruption 
in municipalities was mismanagement. This suggested that a workable system is to classify 
                                               
62   Personal corruption was seen as abuse of power by a person in a position of trust for personal gain. The 
Victorians saw personal corruption as behaviour lacking morality. 
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the behaviour of the two Councils into one of two categories, as misfeasance or council 
corruption. The definition used for the term misfeasance is ‘mismanagement which was the 
consequence of unacceptable actions by the Council, which were the result of 
incompetence or ignorance.’ The term ‘council corruption’ is used to describe 
‘Mismanagement by knowingly and consistently using an unreasonable practice or policy in 
the conduct of Council business which did not conform to the implied duty to act with 
competence and integrity.’ 
The attitude of the two Councils to the management and delivery of council business has 
been studied by examining the factors which determined the ability of the two councils to 
deliver services with competence and integrity. The attitude of the two Councils to factors 
such as managing the increase in the volume and complexity of the workload, the problem 
of the lack of the availability of expertise and the problems of constitution set up under the 
1835/1882 MCAs are considered. Many of the councillors serving on the two councils had 
gained their business experience in commerce where attitudes such as ‘laissez faire’ and 
‘caveat emptor’ continued to hold sway. This thesis examines the extent to which the 
conduct of council business in the two Councils was influenced by these attitudes and was 
to lead to the questioning by the public of their integrity. There is no direct way of assessing 
this information, there were no surveys dealing with public attitudes to Council actions 
during the late Victorian period. The methodology in this thesis uses contemporary evidence 
provided by the local press to build a picture of the two different factors, how the municipal 
councils conducted Council business and the reaction of contemporary commentators and 
critics to the standards of integrity with which Council business was conducted. 
One difficulty for the historian in dealing with the evidence of contemporaries, as reflected 
in the local press during this period, is that this evidence will be from members of the public 
who had a stake in what they were saying; and how they expressed their views reflected 
that stake. In this study of municipal government, a major source of criticism was from 
ratepayers and their representatives, which included the editorials in the press which 
reflected local concerns. Their criticism was mainly directed to the implications of the cases 
of mismanagement, and the extent to which an individual ratepayer might be affected by 
increased costs, the usual outcome of these cases, although the wider interests of the 
community were increasingly recognised. Although their indictment of the failure to provide 
competent government was influential in identifying the need to improve the standards 
integrity in local government, whether or not the two Councils were thought to be guilty of 
council corruption or misfeasance was not often identified. On the other hand, the evidence 
of Elective auditors, whose role was to carry out audit on behalf of the ratepayers, has to 
be examined by taking in to account that in some cases their role was used to pursue a 
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political agenda, achieved by damaging the reputation of the two Councils by criticism which 
was couched using the rhetoric of corruption.  
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Chapter Two – Context.  
 
This chapter examines the context to two important facets of this study; how the constitution 
of the two municipalities of Manchester and Salford developed, and the means whereby the 
information about the performance of the two Councils was disseminated. The main features 
of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, and the subsequent legislation of 1882 are vital to 
understanding the powers of a municipality and how the limitations of powers provided by the 
Act became evident as the duties of a municipality, driven by the need to deal with 
environmental and public-health issues, increased in both volume and complexity. The 
chapter also studies the development and role of the local press which, by providing a spotlight 
on how the two Councils carried out municipal business, directed attention to the need for 
greater integrity and openness in their conduct.  
The constitutions of Manchester and Salford. set up using the template provided by the 1835 
legislation are analysed. As a result, it is argued that it was the failure of this template to 
recognise that the inevitable increase in the workload of a municipality would require also the 
setting up of an administration capable of managing and coordinating municipal services, as 
well as a system of financial management and audit capable of ensuring the probity of the 
municipal accounts.  
. 
This section explores the nature of the powers devolved by central government to the 
boroughs of Manchester and Salford, using the template provided by the Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1835; and the ability of the structure of municipal government derived from 
the implementation of these powers to deliver government with competence, efficiency, and 
integrity at a time when demands for improvements in the fields of Public Health and the 
environment were increasing. 
 
The relationship between local government in urban authorities such as Manchester and 
Salford, and central government in the Victorian period, was characterised by the struggle of 
both municipalities to retain local self-government by preventing the encroachment of central 
control over local autonomy. 63   Despite this, both Councils found that in practice there was 
increasing need to get approval for new powers and loans from Parliament or the Local 
                                               
63   Elizabeth Gaskell, North and South, (London: Wordsworth Editions Ltd.,1994), p.309. In this novel, John 
Thornton, the Manchester mill owner expressed a widely-held view in the Councils of Manchester and Salford, 
when he said to a business man Mr Bell, ’We hate to have laws made for us at a distance. We wish that people 
would allow us to right ourselves instead of continually meddling, with their imperfect legislation. We stand up for 
self-government and oppose centralisation.’ ‘North and South’ was published in 1854/5.  Gaskell was reflecting the 
importance with which Manchester Council, like Salford Council regarded local self-government; i.e. as a 
prerequisite in their relationship with central government. 
20 
Government Board, (LGB) the arm of central government which was set up in 1871 to manage 
central- local matters.64  The drafters of the 1835 MCA, which was primarily intended to reform 
the 178 existing municipal corporations, were aware of the need to take account of local 
sensitivities, and accepted the argument of urban authorities for local self-government; that 
only by vesting power and accountability at local level, could the needs of local inhabitants be 
met. The 1835 Act which was therefore a compromise to ‘encourage’ the acceptance of the 
legislation. It accepted the principle of local self-government by providing a system in which 
powers were to be exercised locally, allowing municipalities to develop services to meet local 
priorities. The 1835 MCA was superseded by the 1882 MCA, a consolidating Act which 
brought together some 40 statutes, or parts of statutes with amendments, passed since 1835 
which were applicable to Municipal Corporations.65 The sections of the 1835 Act dealing with 
the constitution and governance of a borough were, however, reproduced without change in 
the later legislation. These sections specified that the powers obtained from Parliament should 
be vested in an elected Council, whose members were subject to re-election every three 
years.  A candidate for election to the Council had to be on the burgess roll, the qualification 
to vote, which involved both a residence requirement and a property qualification. To avoid 
the loss of experienced councillors, (as re-election every three years was mandatory), the Act 
provided that the Council itself could elect aldermen either from their own number or any 
person qualified to be a councillor. An alderman could serve for 6 years before there was a 
need to stand for re-election. In practice, in both Manchester and Salford, an alderman, once 
elected, served until death or resignation.66  
 
The new municipal Councils were empowered to delegate decision-making to a series of 
committees, however s.22 of the 1882 Act confirmed the provision of the earlier legislation, 
that any decisions made in committee had to be confirmed by the Council to take effect. Only 
one committee was mandatory in the 1835 MCA and the later 1882 legislation, a ‘Watch’ 
committee which dealt with policing and public order.  Early municipal corporations were 
answerable to rate-paying burgesses as trustees, whose main duties were administering 
corporate property, employing corporate revenues, and dealing with matters such as the 
administration of justice and the conduct of Parliamentary elections. In urban authorities like 
Manchester and Salford, the responsibilities for functions such as sewering, paving, lighting, 
and duties in the public health field were previously carried out by Improvement 
                                               
64   The LGB was set up by central government in 1871 ‘for the supervision of the laws relating to the public health, 
the relief of the poor and local government.’ The Board took over the public health and local government 
responsibilities of the Home Secretary and the Privy Council. 
65   E.L. Hasluck, Local Government in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1936), p.176.  
66   Whilst this provision did provide some continuity of experience, there were problems with having aldermen on 
the Council who were not subject to re-election. These problems are discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Commissioners and similar bodies, using statutory powers obtained prior to incorporation. 
There was clear evidence by 1835 that municipalities set up under this legislation particularly 
urban municipalities such as Manchester and Salford, would need to take on the difficult and 
complex role of providing new services and undertaking expensive and technically schemes 
to deal with the public health problems arising from urban squalor Despite this, a major 
weakness of the new legislation did not specify the need include in the constitution of a 
municipality a mechanism which would facilitate the overall management and coordination of 
the services provided by a Council.67  It did provide that the Council should elect annually one 
of their number to be the Mayor, the ‘first citizen’, to act as Chairman of the Council and 
undertake both judicial responsibilities and duties associated with parliamentary and local 
elections.68 It seem that the Mayor as chairman of the Council was expected to undertake this 
role. 
The provisions in the legislation for the management and audit of the finances of a municipality 
also failed to take account of the increase in the spending and the complexity of the budget 
as a result of the developing role of municipal services.69. There were provisions in the 
legislation for the appointment of a treasurer (MCA 1882 s18), and there was a procedure for 
the submission of the accounts of the municipality to the Local Government Board (LGB), 
every 6 months. (MCA 1882s27). There was no requirement that a Council should appoint a 
Finance Committee, although both Manchester and Salford did appoint a committee with the 
remit of dealing with the finances of the municipality. A further failure of the legislation was 
however the inadequate arrangement made for the audit of the municipal accounts (s25, 
MCA1882), which specifies that the audit should be conducted by two amateur auditors to be 
elected annually.  
Both Manchester and Salford applied for and obtained ‘Charters of Incorporation’ under the 
MCA 1835, enabling the two boroughs to obtain the powers available to a municipal 
corporation. In urban authorities like Manchester and Salford, the responsibilities for functions 
such as sewering, paving, lighting, and public health, previously undertaken by Improvement 
Commissioners and similar bodies, were transferred to the two municipalities upon 
incorporation; and became core activities of municipalities in succeeding years.  
                                               
67  The primary purpose of this legislation was the reform of existing corporations many of which were corrupt. 
When this reform was undertaken it was already clear that the role of local government had changed. The use of 
municipal trading operations had already been recognised as a method which a municipality could use to increase 
its income. By 1835 Manchester and Salford, for example, were already involved in the supply of water and gas on 
this basis. 
68   MCA 1882 s.15.  
69   Sections 2.2 and 2. deal with aspects of the funding of Council services; Chapter Seven which reviews in more 
detail how the finances of the two municipalities were managed, Chapter 7.2  deals with audit of municipal accounts. 
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 The Manchester charter of 1838 initially resulted in a complex structure for the six townships 
within the municipality. Part of the powers to act in services such lamp and scavenging and 
paving remained a local concern, but the powers to act in fields such as the suppression of 
nuisances, and sanitation, were transferred to a central Borough Council.70 By 1875, 
considerations such as efficiency savings and the need to deal with problems such as sewage 
management over a wider area, led to the consolidation of the administrative machinery. The 
result was that Manchester Council was responsible for all services within the Borough 
boundary.71 Further additions of townships to the Manchester ‘Charter of Incorporation’ took 
place in 1885 and 1890; the consequence was that between 1838 and 1894, Manchester 
Borough Council increased in size from 64 to 104 members. 72  This led to the various Council 
committees, which had to be seen to be representative of the Council membership, also 
increasing in size.  The result was that the task of convening meetings and communication 
between the Council and the members of committees became more difficult. Important 
decisions were therefore taken by ‘chairman’s action’ on the grounds of expediency.  As the 
work of committees became more specialised, each saw itself the only source of information 
about how business referred to it by the Council should be discharged. By the late Victorian 
period, the result was that each committee acted autonomously, resenting any intrusion by 
the Council. In practice, many of allegations of mismanagement, misfeasance or Council 
corruption were the result of actions by a committee.73 
Salford’s situation was more complicated.  By 1835 it was apparent that there was need to 
reform the constitution of the Borough by obtaining a ‘Charter of Incorporation’ to provide the 
necessary legal status to apply for powers to tackle serious public health problems. 
Overcrowding and the results of industrialisation led to Salford Township, one of the three 
townships which formed the Salford parliamentary constituency, having one of the worst 
mortality rates in the UK.74 The first application for a Salford charter submitted in 1843 
proposed that the boundaries of the municipal corporation should be co-extensive with the 
boundaries of the Parliamentary constituency, which therefore also included the townships of 
                                               
70 ...Legal provision for these transfers was contained in the Manchester Police Act 1844. Although these services 
were provided locally, the various townships were accountable to the central borough Council for both the standards 
of the services and the use of resources. 
71   Manchester Corporation Waterworks & Improvement Act. (1875).   
72 ...The incorporation of Bradford; Harpurhey and Rusholme in 1885 was given legal effect in Manchester City 
Extension Act (1885). A further extension Act of 1890 saw an additional 7 townships amalgamate with the Borough. 
Additional extensions of the boundaries of the city took place in the twentieth century.   
73   How the constitution in Manchester developed to lead in autonomous committees and the extent to which this 
led to an increase in allegations made about the integrity of the Council is discussed in Chapter 6.4, p.133 which 
discusses the failure of both Councils to develop an administrative structure.  
74   The national average mortality rate for 1845 was 21.6 per thousand. The corresponding rate in Salford Township 
was 30.9. and in Pendleton Township 24.4 per thousand. In Broughton, a middle-class residential area, the 
mortality rate of 16.3; this was on a par with suburban or rural areas.  (R. L. Greenall. Local Government in Salford 
1830-1853, Unpublished M.A. University of Leicester (1970), gave information from the ‘Health of Towns’ report 
(Lyon Playfair 1845).  
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Pendleton and Broughton. This provoked bitter opposition from Pendleton ratepayers, who 
feared that Pendleton rates would be needed to subsidise the cost of improvements in Salford, 
and Pendleton councillors would be outnumbered and outvoted in Council. As a result, the 
Charter of Incorporation, granted in 1844 included only Salford Township.   
 
By 1851, the populations of both Pendleton and Broughton had doubled, and it became clear 
that the sanitary conditions in Pendleton and Broughton could only be tackled as part of a 
wider scheme to cover all three townships. To allay fears that Salford, with the largest 
population, would be able to outvote the other two districts, the new charter of incorporation 
included a federal arrangement, in which the number of councillors in Salford did not exceed 
the sum of the numbers in Pendleton and Broughton, and all three townships were to have a 
district Council with autonomy over local matters such as scavenging, lighting, paving and 
sewering, which met in separate and specially-built town halls. Each of the district Councils 
had a set of district committees including a Finance committee, which set its own rates to 
cover the expenditure on these local services. There were also General committees dealing 
with services provided across the municipality. As the membership of the General committees 
had to have the same proportions of Salford, Pendleton and Broughton members, who each 
saw their duty to the district as paramount, arguments were likely to break out about the level 
of the service provided from the general budget to the different districts. The consequence  
was that 
the intricate ‘borough’ and ‘district’ arrangements made improved local government 
services difficult. Borough finances took on Byzantine complexity, inter-district 
jealousies over finance, gas, and water were virtually in-built, and it may be doubted 
that sanitary improvement of the borough, the main reason for incorporation was well 
served by these arrangements.75 
 
The result was an executive which was often unable or unwilling to take decisions; a situation 
which continued until 1891 when the case for unity on the grounds of increased efficiency 
finally prevailed, and a local Act uniting the Salford districts was passed, finally leading to the 
abolition of the district committees.76  
 
 
 
                                               
75   R.L. Greenall, The Making of Victorian Salford, (Lancaster: Carnegie Press, 2000) p.58. 
76   Salford Improvement Act, 1891.  
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2.2. Obtaining additional powers and funding for capital projects.77  
This section considers the steps which the Council had to undertake to fund and carry out the 
schemes necessary to meet the mandatory duties specified in the Public Health Act 1875 and 
other necessary environmental improvements.  
The powers obtained by a newly-incorporated municipality were only those already held by 
the borough under Acts of Parliament obtained pre-incorporation.  For both Manchester and 
Salford, the legal authority conferred by the existing ‘private’ Police Acts was limited to 
enabling the Police Commissioners to undertake some basic services such as street lighting, 
scavenging, sewering, and paving, which did not involve major capital expenditure, and could 
be either charged to the rates or to householders. By the 1840s concern about mortality 
figures, and an alleged lack of priority in urban areas to improve sanitary conditions, led 
Parliament to pass a Public Health Act in 1848, which established a central Board of Health. 
The Act included additional duties dealing with the responsibility of municipal boroughs for 
drainage, water supplies, removal of 'nuisances', paving etc. but these were not mandatory. 
Both Manchester and Salford had already added to the powers obtained pre-incorporation to 
make some improvements in the public health field, and both had appointed a medical officer 
in 1868; John Leigh in Manchester and J. E. Syson in Salford. The Public Health Act, 1875 
which consolidated the provisions set out in previous legislation, contained a range of 
mandatory requirements dealing with matters to improve the environment and public health.78  
Although a municipal corporation might have the necessary powers, the capital needed to 
undertake a development still had to be obtained. By the 1870s there were two main routes 
for obtaining capital funding, and any additional powers to undertake a particular scheme; a 
‘local private’ bill or a ‘Provisional Order’. The procedure for obtaining a private act involved a 
complex, lengthy and regulated procedure to obtain parliamentary consent. 79  There were no 
special concessions for the fact that local authorities were representative bodies; instead a 
municipality was subject to the same adversarial committee procedures as any other promoter 
of a bill. It was a costly procedure; and because of a court ruling in 1872, any expenditure of a 
municipality associated with a private bill could not be charged to the municipality’s Borough 
Fund.80 The Municipal Corporations (Borough Funds) Act (1872) did enable municipal 
                                               
77  Appendix 1, p.190, gives a table of the numbers of private acts and provisional orders obtained by the two 
municipalities in the Victorian period. 
78   Under this Act, municipal corporations were also given the means to obtain the necessary powers to appoint 
medical officers, local sanitary inspectors to look after slaughterhouses; to prevent contaminated food being sold; 
and to meet the requirement that sewers were covered and kept in good condition, a supply of fresh water was 
supplied to their citizens, street lighting was provided and rubbish collected.  
79   Christine Bellamy, Administering Central-Local Relations 1871-1919 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988).  
80   This arose from the ruling in the legal case ‘Sheffield Waterworks Co v Sheffield Corporation’ where it was held 
that Sheffield Corporation, which opposed the plans of a private company which wanted to develop reservoirs in 
Sheffield, could not charge the costs of these proceedings to the Borough Fund.  
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corporations to promote or oppose parliamentary bills at the expense of rates, but conditions 
were imposed. This Act specified that in addition to the absolute consent of the Council to a 
proposal, the consent the ratepayers and owners of rated property must also be obtained. 
Notice of the scheme had to be advertised in the local press, and as municipalities did not 
hold a register of property owners, ‘borough fund’ meetings, which were difficult to organise, 
had to be arranged to get the necessary consents.  These meetings could be hijacked by an 
individual or group with a particular interest, and since the Act also provided that if a single 
request was made for a ballot of ratepayers and property owners, this had to be arranged, 
causing additional costs and providing a method of delaying a scheme.81  The failure to accept 
that a simple vote by  the elected Council alone should define the measures required in a 
municipality, was seen to be an attack on the principle of ‘local self-government,’ and an 
unwarranted encroachment of central government in local matters. The widespread opposition 
of municipal corporations to the Act led to the formation of the Association of Municipal 
Corporations (AMC) in 1873, set up: 
to protect the interests, rights and privileges of Municipal Corporations as they may be affected 
by public Bills and Legislation …and to take action in relation to any other subject in which 
Municipal Corporations may be generally interested. 82 
The passage of private bills through Parliament was a lengthy procedure involving a first and 
second reading, followed by a crucial committee stage prior to third reading, giving plenty of 
opportunity for obstruction and amendment on behalf of local special interests. In some cases, 
there was an alternative method of proceeding, by using the ‘provisional order’ procedure, 
administered by the Local Government Board, (LGB). The availability of a provisional order 
had to be specified in an enabling act. The Public Health Act 1875, the Tramways Act 1870, 
and the Local Government Act 1888, all authorised the making of provisional orders covering 
aspects of the legislation. Other types of orders available from the LGB covered a limited 
range of applications, but could be used to extend borrowing limits of authorities and could 
sanction amendments to local acts. Even where legislation allowed a local authority to obtain 
an order, the procedure could be onerous, but was often used because it was more likely to 
be successful than the alternative, a private bill. To obtain a provisional order, the local 
authority had to apply to the LGB with evidence to justify the making of the order, and if funding 
was required, provide evidence about the financial position of the authority. The procedure, in 
most cases, required a local inquiry to be held before the order could be made. This was 
conducted by an Inspector of the Local Government Board, who had powers to examine 
whether the purpose of the scheme was justified and the request for funding was reasonable.  
He had considerable discretion in dealing with a request for an order; he could refuse to agree 
                                               
81   Bellamy, Administering Central- Local Relations 1871-1919, p.201.  
82   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester. Volume II, p.298.   
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to a scheme or accept and fund only part of the scheme.83 The inquiry also gave an opportunity 
for objections to the scheme to be considered. If the inspector’s report was favourable, the 
proposed order had to pass a Parliamentary Committee stage, which was the same as a 
private bill; this again provided an opportunity for proposers, objectors, and expert witnesses 
are heard, and if necessary, the Inspector who carried out the public enquiry. If the order 
passed this stage, it was then added to a schedule of other orders in a ‘Provisional Orders 
Confirmation Bill’ to be approved on the ‘floor’ of the House.  Rejection of a bill at this stage 
was very unusual.  If the provisional order procedure was not available or could not be used, 
or the municipality required powers to carry out a number of smaller actions, these could all 
be included in a single ‘private’ bill.  Even where the ‘provisional order’ procedure could be 
invoked, the private bill could be preferred because it allowed more flexible repayment terms 
to be negotiated for any loan which had been agreed, avoided delays in the processing of the 
request by the LGB and gave the local authority more control over the implementation of the 
powers. A private Act also had the advantage that its title could link the name of the 
municipality with a prestigious project, which could be felt to be more in keeping with the dignity 
and pride of a large urban authority.  
 
2.3. The funding of Council services. 
 
 A major part of the income of a municipal corporation during the Victorian period was raised 
by the levying a rate, a tax on the ownership of real property.84 This was based on the rateable 
value of   the property; where the definition of the ‘rateable value’ of a particular property was 
stated as:   
...the rent which could reasonably be expected after deduction of the average annual 
cost of repairs insurance and other expenses if necessary, to maintain the property in 
a state to command such a rent…85  
The actual tax paid was calculated by multiplying the rateable value of the property by the rate 
payable in the particular borough, which was stated as a ‘charge per pound’ of the rateable 
value. The process for calculating the rate payable involved the various departments of the 
corporation drawing up estimates of their expected expenditure for the following year. The rate 
in the pound was calculated from the total estimated spend divided by the sum of all the 
                                               
83   Any qualifying scheme, for which the Council needed permission to undertake and to fund, had to use this 
procedure. The request for funding of the Wilton House scheme in Salford (which will be described later) to provide 
a permanent infectious diseases hospital had the request for a loan of £10,000 refused by the LGB inspector. 
Instead a loan of £2,500 for a temporary facility was offered. 
84   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume Ill; Epilogue.  
85   Parochial Assessment Act 1836.  
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rateable values in the municipality. The role of the Treasurer and the Finance Committee in 
setting the borough rate, and the reasons why wrong estimates of future spending led to 
overspending and mismanagement, are considered in Chapter Seven.86 
The number of duties imposed on municipal corporations by central government legislation or 
adopted in private acts in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, resulted in the need for 
municipalities to increase their income.87  The shortfall in funding the cost of the services 
provided by both Corporations could not reasonably be met from the rates alone. Both 
Councils were sensitive to criticism from ratepayers about the level of the rates; councillors in 
both authorities, concerned about being re-elected, would not support any increase which 
would alienate ratepayer-voters. Local authorities had to look for other methods of raising 
income and therefore enthusiastically embraced the method of generating income by 
‘municipal trading,’ whereby a municipal corporation acted as the monopoly supplier of a utility. 
Both Manchester and Salford used the method, originally supplying water and gas; profits from 
these operations being used for public purposes. Manchester was a pioneer, building the first 
publicly-owned gas works, initially in order to meet the demand for gas to power street lighting. 
Thomas Fleming, who in 1818 persuaded the Police Commissioners to build a gas works, also 
recognised that the profit from gas production was a means of funding the building of a Town 
Hall, and subsidising other local developments. This initiative, which required a private Act of 
Parliament, was to establish ‘Municipal Trading’ as a viable part of municipal government. 
Salford was the first municipal authority to municipalise gas supplies by the purchase of a local 
private gas works in 1831. Therefore, besides having responsibility for the conduct of the 
business of the municipalities, each of the two Councils was also therefore responsible for the 
management of these large ‘manufacturing’ operations within their respective boroughs. 
A system of ‘Grant in aid,’ ad-hoc payments from central government, had been introduced in 
the 1830s to relieve the burden on the ratepayers, by allegedly compensating corporations 
which had been required to implement costly changes as a result of additional legal duties 
imposed on authorities. The only apparent rationale for making particular payments seems 
initially to have been to promote acceptance of legislation; for example, payment was made 
towards the salary of poor law medical officers to encourage acceptance of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834.88 Later payments were made to encourage the development of local 
services, such as a contribution to the salary of the medical officer of health, and to the cost 
of providing education.  The demands from local authorities for new or increased grants, for 
example, the costs of highways, or to support the implementation of a police superannuation 
                                               
86   Section  7.1, p.141, discusses the problems of ‘keeping the books’ in a municipal corporation. 
87   The shortfall in the cost of services in Manchester compared to the monies raised by the rates had reached 
£103,468 by 1901 and rose steadily thereafter. 
88   Bellamy, Administering Central-local Relations 1871-1919, p.25.  
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scheme, caused concern to central government about rising costs, and led to demands from 
Parliament that spending on local and central finance should be separated.  As a result, 
changes were made in 1888 to the central government budget. The local taxation account, 
which had been set up to meet the cost of grants in aid and had been the subject of an annual 
vote by Parliament. was changed. 89  Instead, certain revenues, received by the government 
as excise duties, and a portion of the probate payment receipts were paid into the account. 
This was distributed to the various authorities, who could also retain the revenue arising from 
certain local taxation licences. As a result, the exact settlement from central government to 
municipalities was delayed, and when the revenue from the scheme fell, the local authority 
income was reduced, complicating the task of making the estimates of the borough rate which 
needed to be charged to meet the projected borough expenditure. Although the yield from this 
source of income in the last decades of the century was small compared with the total 
expenditure of Manchester municipality, these changes still required new and costly 
administrative arrangements to be made. 90  
By the last half of the nineteenth century, Councils were having to deal with the increasing 
complexity of the administration necessary to raise the monies which were needed to fund the 
routine services of municipal government. Additionally, there was the problem of coping with 
the financial and administrative complexity of implementing the major capital and revenue 
schemes needed to improve public health. This occurred at a time when officials with the 
necessary managerial expertise to deal with these problems were in short supply, and the 
development of a system of book keeping which took account of the special problems of 
municipal accounting was taking time to evolve. The availability and the role of the local press 
in determining contemporary attitudes to the reputation of the councils both for competence 
and integrity during this period is a theme of this thesis. The development and character of the 
local press is considered in the next section. 
2.4. The development of a local press.  
 
By the early nineteenth century, the Manchester and Salford public had already developed a 
taste for local news; particularly news which affected the public as individuals, such as the 
conduct of local government and the how this affected the individual ratepayer. The vicinity of 
Manchester had an extensive periodic press. 91  This provided news about local issues and 
                                               
89   The Local Government Act 1889, section 121. 
90   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume Ill; Epilogue, gives the figures for the yield 
of these grants. In 1880-1, it was £1,338: 1890-1, £3,162: 1900-1, £20,568. In 1900-1, the cost of services in 
Manchester was £1.007 million.  
91   Michael Powell and Terry Wyke, ‘Charting the Manchester tributary of the golden stream: Leary’s History of the 
Manchester Periodic Press.’ Manchester Regional History Review, Volume 17ii (2006). 
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opinions and published detailed reports about the conduct of the Council.92  The influence and 
importance of a local press, particularly in its support for the principle of local autonomy, was 
recognised by the middle of the century. Abel Heywood, the Manchester publisher and 
wholesale news agent,93 commented in evidence to a Select Committee on Newspaper 
Stamps, that the abolition of Stamp Duty in 1855, which would result in the publication of more 
local newspapers, would lead to a more stable society in Manchester. 94  He stated that as 
local people tended to discount the views of London editors and publishers, ’if they bought 
papers from parties whom they knew in their own locality, the influence upon them would be 
greater than it can possibly be from reading London papers.’ John Garrard also commented 
on the importance of the local newspapers in encouraging local identity and community 
‘democratic virtues’ by detailing local concerns and local priorities, and …‘were capable of 
producing and reinforcing liberal democratic virtues like the independence of the state, 
attachment to liberal freedoms, political participation and debate.’95 The local press, with its 
focus on matters such as the conduct of municipal government also provided a forum for 
discussion about the standard of integrity of municipal government in Manchester and Salford. 
Despite the cost, Garrard stated that the yearly national circulation of newspapers, estimated 
from the receipts from stamp duty, totalled 25 million copies by 1826.96 
The cost and availability of newspapers changed dramatically by the 1860s. The abolition of 
stamp duty in 1855; the lower cost of newsprint, and improvements in the technology of 
newspaper production when the rotary press became available, all resulted in a reduction in 
the cost per copy of a newspaper, usually to 1d. The demand for newspapers in the 
Manchester region during the late nineteenth century was met by a large number of locally-
produced titles. The titles of newspapers included in this section do not demonstrate the full 
diversity of the Manchester suburban press or the types of publication available to the 
Manchester and Salford readership, but are examples of the daily press in the Greater 
Manchester Region. During the period 1872 to 1902, readers had access to a number of daily 
newspapers which provided full coverage of national issues, but also included coverage of the 
local news. The ‘Manchester Courier and Lancashire Advertiser,’ originally a weekly paper 
supporting the Tory cause, started publication in 1825; it became a daily paper in 1855. The 
Manchester Guardian was founded in 1821; by 1857 it was a daily paper costing 1d per day. 
By 1861 the Guardian had 7 reporters, enabling it to provide detailed reports on national 
                                               
92   Lucy Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).   
93   Elected to Manchester Council in 1843, Abel Heywood was elected as an alderman in 1853 and served Mayor 
for the years 1862-3 and 1876-7. 
94   Select Committee on Newspaper Stamps, P.P. 1851, 558, XVII (1) (Minutes of Evidence) p.2481-2613, quoted 
by Margaret Beetham, ’Healthy Reading.’   A. J. Kidd & K. W. Roberts, City Class and Culture: Studies of Cultural 
Production and Social Policy in Victorian Manchester (Manchester: Manchester University Press (1985)), p.170. 
95   John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain, p.126.  
96   The figure does not therefore include the unstamped press. 
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issues.97  The 25-year old C. P. Scott 98 was appointed to the post of editor of Manchester 
Guardian in 1871; under his editorship the paper supported a radical Liberal programme. He 
became the paper’s proprietor in 1907. The Manchester Times, which started publication in 
1828 to support a liberal Cobdenite agenda, had a chequered history, suffering from circulation 
problems and finally closing in 1894.99 The rail link with London meant that papers published 
in the capital could be on sale in Manchester in the morning. As a result, London papers such 
as The Times founded in 1785 as The Daily Universal Register, which was renamed in 1788; 
and the Daily Telegraph which was published on 29 June 1855 as first penny newspaper in 
London, were available to the Manchester reader.100 There was also a Manchester satirical 
Press, publishing titles such as City Lantern, City Jackdaw, Sphinx and Free Lance, whose 
epigrams drew attention to misfeasance by the Council. The avidity of the Manchester 
readership for news attracted the Daily Mail to start a print run in Manchester in 1898, and in 
1900, a new paper the Daily Dispatch, which was to achieve a circulation of 500,000 copies, 
was also printed in Manchester. There were two evening papers; the Manchester Evening 
News first published in 1868 and noted for the space devoted to advertisements, and the 
Manchester Evening Chronicle which was published in 1897, both titles costing 1/2 d per issue.  
The 1860s also saw a rapid rise in the number of local ‘penny a week’ publications. These 
weekly newspapers became economically viable after 1855; their labour costs were relatively 
low; much of the general material was syndicated, and the ‘staffing’ would often consist of an 
editor, one reporter and one junior with the compositor in the next office. Many townships had 
a local paper; the weekly and independent Manchester City News for example, which was 
founded in 1864, claimed to have the ‘the largest circulation of any paper, daily or weekly in 
Greater Manchester.’ There is no independent validation of this claim, which was made in an 
advert printed on the back of the booklet by Joseph Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ 
Auditor, which was itself published by Manchester City News. (MCN.) It was edited by John 
Howard Nodal from 1871 to 1904, who campaigned to get improvements made in the 
competence, efficiency, and accountability of how the Council conducted its business. 101  He 
turned the MCN into a campaigning newspaper; publishing, inter alia, the reports of the 
                                               
97    Lucy Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).  
99    C. P. Scott, was a journalist, publisher and politician. He was the editor of the Manchester Guardian from 1872 
until 1929 and its owner from 1907 until his death in 1932. A life-long liberal Scott argued that "comment is free, 
but facts are sacred.’ He was made a freeman of Manchester in 1930. 
99   The Manchester Times changed its name between 1875 to 1893 to Manchester Examiner and Times. For the 
last few months before closure, when it had circulation problems, it was called simply the Manchester Examiner. 
100 The availability of a national press did play a part in setting national standards for what constituted integrity in 
public life; for example, the reporting of cases of electoral corruption strengthened the need for electoral reform, 
and it did help to publicise the extent of commission taking, which eventually led to legislation. 
101  John Howard Nodal (1831–1909,) was first President of the Manchester Literary Club and Chairman of the 
Manchester Arts Club. He edited two of Manchester’s satirical journals, Free Lance and Sphinx, becoming editor 
of the Manchester City News from 1871 to 1904. He greatly expanded its coverage and turned it into a campaigning 
newspaper.   
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Elective auditors, Joseph Scott, 102 Frank Hollins,103 and S. Norbury Williams 104  and the 
reports of the Manchester Ratepayers’ Association on the mismanagement of the Victoria 
Hotel scheme by the Improvement Committee of Manchester Council.  Salford did not have a 
district press until 1859 when the Salford Weekly News, which supported the Liberal party, 
was published. It closed in 1891.  The first issue of Salford Chronicle which supported the Tory 
party, was published in 1868, the Salford Reporter which first appeared in April 1879 claimed 
to be politically neutral but in 1892 switched allegiance to the Liberal party. All the Salford 
weekly papers and Manchester City News were published on a Saturday costing 1d. per issue. 
Although all three papers included brief reports on the outcome of parliamentary debates and 
international affairs; the emphasis of the reporting was on local news.  Manchester daily 
newspapers did report Council matters and local controversies, but their reports are more 
valuable when dealing with local government issues where there were matters of principle at 
stake: they did not in general get involved in comment on the nitty-gritty of Council behaviour. 
All three Manchester daily titles had a correspondence column which attracted readers’ letters. 
Very occasionally a local matter would attract coverage in the national press. The Hunter 
embezzlement in Salford, which dealt with commission taking in the gas industry, did attract 
coverage not only in the national press, but also in trade papers, for example ‘Gas World.’  
The publication of information about practices in public life which had previously tolerated did 
lead to some changes in attitude during the Victorian period about what was acceptable 
behaviour.  Attitudes did change to a more rigorous expectation of the standard of integrity 
expected in public life, and led to some previously accepted practices being regarded as 
scandalous.105 The integrity of the Council in exercising its powers or authority was also 
questioned, and although many of the decisions were made in a committee, the Council as 
the executive of a municipal Corporation was held responsible for mismanagement resulting 
from the actions of a committee. 
                                               
102   Little is known about the life and career of Joseph Scott. Apart from his period as Elective auditor for 
Manchester in the 1880s, and the notoriety he gained from his attempts to expose what he saw as corruption and 
waste in the City Council, he played little part in the public affairs of the city.  He failed to be elected Elective auditor 
in 1882, but succeeded in 1884, serving for two years until 1886. His nomination forms for 1884 identified him as 
an estate agent, of 100 Stretford Road. He apparently later became a provision merchant; and his business 
remained a substantial one into the 1930s, when he retired to Wilmslow.  (© Martin Hewitt 2002-2005). 
103   Frank Hollins served as Manchester’s Elective auditor with Joseph Scott for the years 1884/5 and 1885/6. and 
with Wallace McGuffin Greaves in the years 1886/7 and 1887/8. His role as an Elective auditor is considered below.  
104   Samuel Norbury Williams, an accountant, was chairman of the Manchester Ratepayers’ Association. He was 
elected as one of th two Manchester Elective Auditors in 1893, and served as an elective auditor for 34 years until 
1927. He died in 1929 at the age of 77. 
105   John Garrard, ‘Scandals: a tentative overview, p.23-41, in ’Corruption in Urban Politics and Society, Britain 
1780-1950, editors James Moore & John Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007).  This chapter examines the role of 
scandals in changing public perception about what constituted unethical behaviour. 
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Findings and précis of Chapter Two. 
 
This chapter has examined the constitutions of the municipalities of Manchester And Salford 
set up by using the template provided by the MCAs of 1835 and 1882. The period selected for 
this study started less than thirty-five years after both Manchester and Salford Councils 
obtained a ‘Charter of Incorporation.’ The findings of this research show that although this 
legislation provided for a system of democratic government, (albeit with a limited but 
expanding franchise), it failed to recognise the enormous expansion both in the diversity of 
duties and in the increase of spending which a municipal government in the late Victorian 
period would be required to undertake. The first problem was that the legislation did not specify 
the need include in the constitution of a municipality a mechanism which would facilitate the 
coordination services provided by Council.  The second problem was that as the service of a 
municipality expanded and the spending on Council services increased, the system of amateur 
audit, provided by the 1835/1882 legislation became increasingly unable provide confidence 
about the integrity the accounts published by the two Councils. How the impact of these 
omissions affected the conduct of the two Council and their reputation for competence and 
integrity is an underlying theme of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
These developments occurred at a time when the local weekly press in Manchester and 
Salford was enjoying a golden age providing reports about the behaviour of the two Councils. 
How the local press developed and became the main source and shaper of public opinion 
about the conduct of the local councils is also discussed in this chapter.  
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Part Two. Corruption in municipal government? 
 
 The aim of this part of the thesis is to analyse the extent and nature of corruption in municipal 
government. The two chapters in this part therefore address two of the subsidiary questions 
posed by this thesis, 
Chapter Three entitled ‘Assessing the integrity of the Councils’ considers question one.  
 What was the source of criticism and the nature of the behaviour of the Councils of 
Manchester and Salford Councils which was being identified by contemporaries as 
incompetent, and /or ethically dubious or corrupt?  
Chapter Four entitled ’The validity of the allegations’ deals with the second question. 
How far was the criticism of the Councils warranted in terms of their actual behaviour during 
the late Victorian period?  
 
Chapter Three.  Assessing the integrity of the Councils. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand what was meant by term ‘corruption’ when used in 
the late Victorian period, whether about an individual or the Council itself. It examines the 
nature of the reporting of Council business by the local press, and the extent to which the 
objectivity and thoroughness of reports in the press about the behaviour of the two Council 
provided a valid basis for the assessment of critics about the integrity of the two Councils. The 
final section of the chapter gives examples of the range and nature of the criticism and 
allegations made about the conduct of the two Councils. 
This chapter will argue that the local press by focussing attention on the conduct of municipal 
government. played a pivotal role in drawing attention to the need for improvements in the 
standard of integrity of both Councils in when conducting municipal business. 
3.1 The changing language of corruption.  
 
Private benefit from being a member of a Council, for example by ‘helping the Council out,’ by 
supplying goods or services needed by the municipality; and electoral corruption where the 
vote was seen as private property, available for sale to the highest bidder, were accepted 
practices in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Only bribery, the use of inducements 
or rewards to influence actions of public servants, particularly the judiciary, was regarded as 
corruption. Alan Doig noted that:  
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Victorian legislators faced with the prospect of distinguishing transactions which they 
wished to outlaw from the multitude of innocent dealings chose (in general) 106 not to 
legislate against specific transactions.107 
 
He commented however that rather than formalising and codifying general standards of 
behaviour expected of public servants, a difficult task, the approach of Parliament was to use 
legislation to deal with specific abuses; offences which were seen to be damaging to the 
democratic process. As a result, bribery, where the concern was bribery of the judiciary, 
continued to be regarded as a criminal matter, and legislation was enacted to deal with 
electoral corruption which interfered with the free and fair conduct of the ballot. In both of these 
situations there were therefore provisions in the criminal law to prosecute offenders. Offences 
such as conflict of interest, or misusing Council facilities, both examples of behaviour lacking 
integrity which fell short of the behaviour expected of a public official, were considered to be 
acts of personal criminality, for which there was no statutory criminal sanction.108  Instead the 
emphasis was on the type of person being elected to serve in public office who needed to 
have integrity, ‘the right moral values,’, and this involved having personal honour and rectitude. 
The only definition of the qualifications needed by a councillor is given in the early sections of 
the Municipal Corporations Acts of 1835 and 1882 which deal with the constitution of the 
Council. 109 Section Nine sets out the requirements which a burgess, to be eligible to serve on 
the Council of a municipal corporation, must meet. He must own ‘qualifying property,’ have 
paid the rates due on this property, have not received ‘parochial relief or other alms’ and was 
not disentitled under any Act of Parliament, (and this included personal bankruptcy.) The 
available evidence suggests that this section of the Act was adhered to; a number of members 
of the Council and officials resigned when they were made bankrupt or when bankruptcy 
proceedings had been initiated. 
 
In the late Victorian period, the local weekly press included reports of individual cases of 
corruption by councillors and Council officers, persons in a position of trust who abused their 
position for personal gain. Their behaviour was seen to be the result of spiritual or moral 
impurity110 or deviation from the ethical values expected of such a person. 111  The court case 
                                               
106   The qualification in brackets has been added to the Doig quotation. 
107   Alan Doig, Corruption & Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics. (Penguin Books: Harmondsworth 1984), 
p. 25. 
108   The Common Law provided criminal sanctions for offences such as embezzlement and fraud, the former being 
used to prosecute those committing embezzlement within a municipality. The Common Law definition of fraud was 
not considered to be applicable to offences committed by municipal officials such as insider trading or conflict of 
interest.  It was not until Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act in 1889 that a criminal sanction became available for 
these offences. This Act is considered in Section 4.3. p.68. 
109   MCA 1882 s.9. 
110   The word ‘immorality’ as used by the Victorians inferred moral depravity. 
111   The modern usage of the word ‘corruption’ places emphasis on ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in 
power,’ typically involving bribery, but does not imply depravity.   
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of Manchester Corporation v S. Norbury Williams, where the defendant had accused the 
corporation of ‘corrupt practices’, supported this association. 112  The Court’s judgement which 
was based on whether the definition of personal corruption could be applied to a corporate 
body, held the corporate personality cannot be guilty of corruption……’it does not have the 
wherewithal;’ i.e. the capacity for spiritual or moral impurity which was considered to 
characterise personal corruption.  
The local weekly press seized every opportunity to report malpractice of individuals involved 
in local government which was good for circulation, but despite the hostility of some of the 
criticism, even when these allegations were made or inferred, the use of the word ‘corruption’ 
was avoided. Instead reports which contained allegations of wrongdoing which was also 
illegal, tended to use the legal term ‘embezzlement’, or ‘bribery’, not corruption, possibly 
because it was thought to be easier for the reading public to relate to these legal terms.113 The 
word ‘corruption’ may have been avoided because it contained the inference of the spiritual or 
moral impurity of the offender , a character trait, which might be more difficult to attribute to 
councillors who gave their time to carry out the duties of the Council. There was also the risk 
that an allegation of corruption could leave the accuser open to prosecution for libel. The result 
is there are very few allegations where the word corruption was used to describe situations 
where there was malfeasance by individuals, although the import of the wording of the criticism 
was often clear.  
 
The expectation of improvements in the standards of integrity required of an individual. were 
reflected in an expectation of an improvement in the behaviour of the Councils. The publication 
of information about practices used by both Councils which had previously been tolerated, but 
were increasing seen as unacceptable, mirrored changes in attitude to practices in other areas 
of public life, for example, electoral corruption. 114 John Garrard discussed the effect of the 
publicity about a scandal in Salford which revealed that the Gas manager, Samuel Hunter, 
had been receiving commission payments from suppliers of coal to the municipality. He noted 
that although the practice of commission taking was common and widely accepted in the 
commercial and professional world; when publicised in the press it came to be seen to be 
                                               
112    Solicitors Journal, 21 January 1891.’Comment’ p.200.  
113   The only offence considered to be corruption which was not covered by statute or the common law, was the 
taking of commission. This offence was covered by the wording of the Public bodies Corrupt Practices Act (1889) 
which is discussed in section 4.3. 
114   Attitudes to electoral corruption, which had also been tolerated in the early nineteenth century, also changed 
in the Victorian period. A number of factors might have contributed to the pressure for this change, for example the 
attitudes held by the ‘new’ middle class and the free churches. These changes in attitudes were however reinforced 
by legislation; for example, the Electoral Petitions Act (1868) which provided that election petition trials were to be 
heard in the Courts instead of the House of Commons, with decisions reported in the Press, resulting in the naming 
and shaming of the corrupt constituencies.  
36 
unacceptable and in conflict with the standard of behaviour expected in public life.115 A Council 
was deemed to have accepted the implied duty to provide governance with competence and 
integrity, having regard to the interests of the community.116 The findings of this research 
suggest that mismanagement, which was the consequence of actions by the Council and were 
the result of incompetence or ignorance, was seen as misfeasance. Deliberate behaviour by 
the Councils, the result of pursuing a policy which failed to meet appropriate standards of 
competence and integrity when acting an official capacity, was seen as an abuse of power, 
and was regarded as Council corruption.117. This was a damaging allegation implying a 
deliberate pattern of behaviour by the Councils, which was not seen to be in the interests of 
the community. The problem in assessing the integrity of the Councils is therefore to determine 
whether the actions of the Council arose from mismanagement; unwitting behaviour which 
was the result of incompetence or ignorance; or whether the Council knowingly pursued a 
policy of unreasonable behaviour which was a breach of the implied duty to act with 
competence and integrity; an  abuse of power which  amounted to Council corruption.118 119 
The types of reports about how the Councils conducted their business and the sources and 
nature of the allegations inferring unacceptable standards of integrity are considered in the 
next sections of this chapter. 
 
3.2 Governing in the public gaze. How the local Press reported Council 
business. 
 
Although the detailed reports and commentaries in the local press about the actions of the 
Councils provided a basis for the reader/critic to form an opinion about the integrity of the 
Councils’ conduct, this section examines the extent to which the press was able to provide full 
and objective coverage of the conduct of the two municipal Councils.  Scandals could be 
                                               
115   John Garrard, ‘The Salford Gas Scandal of 1887’ Manchester Regional History Review, Volume II no 2 1988/9, 
p.12. The biography of Samuel Hunter is given in Chapter 6.3, p.126 ‘Lifestyle choices, the aspirations of officials 
and members of the Council.’ 
116   There was no formal statement of the principles on which public life should be based until the publication of 
the report by the Nolan Committee, (published on 31 May 1995), which set down seven principals which should 
apply in public life. These are: Selflessness; Integrity; Objectivity; Accountability; Openness; Honesty and 
Leadership.  
117    The word ‘unreasonable’ used in the definition of the abuse of power, Council corruption, is used in the sense 
of actions which are beyond the limits of acceptability or fairness. 
118   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.13. An example of when this was implied was the practice 
of supplying periodicals and journal to members of the Council which were clearly for personal use, a practice 
which was apparently accepted by the Council. Scott, who stated that his purpose throughout ‘Leaves’ was to draw 
attention to ‘the need to reform Council corruption,’ (p.52) did not actually use the word ‘corruption’ in any of the 
ten chapters dealing with the behaviour of different committees, but his wording in the summary of his findings 
suggest that he regarded the condoning of this practice by the Council was corruption.  
119   Although the ruling in the Norbury Williams case stated that a Council cannot be guilty of corruption, because 
it could not take decisions based on moral choices, the word was used to describe the behaviour of Councils to 
imply an abuse of power. The phrase Council corruption is used in this situation.  
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‘promoted’ by individuals or groups with a special interest in damaging the reputation of the 
Council, even where mismanagement, which had resulted from honest ignorance, was the 
cause of the problem.120  Scandals made good copy; and the press did provide detailed reports 
about matters which would appeal to their readers.  Hennock,  discussing the incidence of 
misfeasance and corruption,  particularly the jobbing of  contracts in local government, 
commented that reports of  these incidents ‘are rarely found in the official histories, but those 
who go to the newspapers will come across them’.121  This was undoubtedly true; after a dearth 
of detailed information about the conduct of municipal corporations in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the local newspapers became the main source of information about the 
organisation and management of local government both to the reader and to the historian.  
 
All three local weekly newspapers in Salford included very full reports of Salford Council 
meetings. Manchester City News published similar reports of Manchester Council meetings 
and also reported Council proceedings in Salford.122 These reports covered the items on the 
agenda directly relevant to the conduct of municipal business. All the local papers included in 
their reports discussions which dealt with the services provided by the Council; including for 
example planned or in-progress schemes of work; and reports prepared by a special 
committee or external enquiries carried out on behalf of the Council. Although editorials in the 
local press covered a wide range of subjects from international affairs and the conduct of 
national government, matters which did appear in editorials about municipal government do 
provide a useful indicator of the issues which were of concern to the readership. The editorial 
voice often provided a commentary on items discussed in the Council and reported in the 
particular issue of the paper, and although the comments made could be very critical about 
the competence of the Council or individual councillors by highlighting departures from 
acceptable practice, allegations of corruption were avoided. Editorials commented on 
allegations of incompetence and mismanagement made by critics about the conduct of the 
Council, but did not, in practice, see their role as being a mouthpiece for critics who inferred 
that the Council was corrupt. Although their criticism of the actions of the Councils could be 
robust, their stance in dealing with allegations or inferences of corruption was to comment on 
the reasons why actions complained of had occurred, and to recommend the steps which the 
Council needed to take to prevent recurrences. Complaints in the press could also be more 
general. Salford Chronicle campaigned for improvements to be made in how the Council 
                                               
120   The problems relating to sewage management attracted criticism, although there were no satisfactory methods 
of dealing with sewage waste, but some criticisms of delays in undertaking feasible schemes for minimising hazards 
were fully justified. 
121   Hennock, Fit & Proper Persons, p. 297.  
122   The local weekly press did give full reports of the debates giving verbatim some of the exchanges between 
members of the Council about contentious matters.  
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presented its accounts, commenting repeatedly about the practice of the Council using capital 
monies for revenue purposes, and vice versa, which could disguise overspending. This ‘no 
further attitude’ was probably fostered by the need for editors of the local weekly press to 
maintain good relations with the Council, as the newspaper relied for ‘inside’ information, 
particularly about the business carried out in committees, and the advertising income from the 
Council which published in the press for example, adverts for tenders to provide Council 
services  which was a valuable income. 
 An editorial in Salford Chronicle expressed approval that arguments in Council meetings 
purely on party political grounds were generally avoided, commenting that: 
It is always pleasant to see partisanship dropped in the Council discussions, and we 
must say in the Council’s discussions there are very few manifestations of it. The 
elections are managed through political organisations but partisanship is merged in an 
effort to promote the good of the community. 123 
 
Although the Salford Weekly News expressed allegiance to the Liberal party and the Salford 
Chronicle to the Tories, party politics did not intrude into the objectivity of the reporting of 
Council Proceedings. This did not however prevent statements and actions of individual 
councillors made outside the Council chamber being treated by the press according to the 
party label. Editorial comment could have a party bias in the period before local or national 
elections when reporting favoured the party to which the newspaper owed allegiance or when 
it involved speeches or actions made outside the Council. When the performance of Salford’s 
MPs at Westminster was discussed; this was strictly on party lines. In 1868, when Salford, for 
the first time, returned two Tory MPs, the Liberal Salford Weekly News wasted no opportunity 
to criticise and oppose the statements and policies of the two members, Messrs. Charley and 
Cawley, whether made in local meetings or within Parliament. The demonstration of allegiance 
to the party label was also shown in matters such as the reporting the meetings and the social 
programme of the relevant political association, and at election time, detailed descriptions 
were published of the candidates representing the party and standing in the municipal or 
national elections.  Although each councillor stood for election on a party label, there were 
differences in emphasis which cut across party lines, for example between the economisers 
and the spenders, their objectives overall remained the same.   Despite the fact that each 
councillor stood for election on a party label, Garrard noted that in Salford, after the franchise 
extension of 1867: 
                                               
123    Ibid.,14 June 1884, editorial, p.2. 
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it became increasingly difficult, except in the most middle- class wards to appeal to 
voters simply on the grounds of celebrity and economic substance. Such appeals had 
to be supplemented by declarations of position on an increasing range of issues’…124 
He commented that although political parties participated in the organisation of elections, 
councillors did not bring to the Council meetings party political programmes or party discipline.  
Individual pledges, which were often ambiguous, tended to get ‘easily lost once the councillor 
passed through the gates of the Town Hall.’ He cited Councillor Bonsor who stated that: ’The 
proper duty of the councillor was to drop his politics before he entered the chamber and leave 
them outside in the Town Hall square to dry.’ 125  
Whilst this was true of party politics, partisanship in Salford was based on the district 
representation, which did affect discussions when the division of monies between the 
individual districts was involved, particularly relating to gas matters and the level of the rates. 
For issues such as flood prevention which affected Salford Township only, sensible action was 
frustrated by the unwillingness of the representatives of other two townships to agree to the 
spending necessary to mitigate the problem. 
  
Seuss Law, who studied Manchester politics between 1885 and 1906, noted that although 
younger Liberal members of Manchester Council wished to make municipal politics more 
partisan, many of the older leaders ‘still strong in influence and rich in experience,’ continued 
to view municipal politics ‘as belonging to a mode of administrative action as opposed to either 
partisan or ideological action.’126 Although councillors identified themselves with a political 
party, many policies pursued by the Council did have support from both parties. 127  Party 
politics did have an influence in both Manchester and Salford, in a few situations, for example 
in the election of aldermen, where the aim of each party was to achieve a voting majority, and 
membership of committees where many important policy decisions were made. Suess Law 
also identified an additional number of other issues where partisanship occurred in 
Manchester, for example about the succession to  Joseph Heron, the Town Clerk when he 
retired, and the election of those members of the Council who would serve on the Board of 
the Manchester Ship Canal.  
                                               
124   John Garrard, Leadership and Politics in 19c Salford, a Historical Analysis of Urban Political Power, Salford 
City Politics – Research Series (Salford: Salford University 1967), p. 69.  
125   Salford Chronicle, 21 November 1874, p.4.  
126   G. Seuss Law,’ Manchester’s Politics 1885-1906. Unpublished Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania (1975), -
p.281. A major theme of this thesis was the extent that partisanship played in decision making by Manchester 
Council. i.e. when did the voting indicate that the parties were split on the basis of policy? In pursuit of this objective 
he examined the voting pattern in 279 recorded divisions in Manchester City Council between1 November 1885 
and 31 October 1906. His conclusions which are based on an analysis which involved looking at the voting pattern 
and political attribution of every member of the Council suggested that half the divisions where voting was on a 
party basis occurred when the matter related to one of the issues identified in the main text above. 
127   John Garrard commented that the absence of party politics meant that without an established opposition party 
it was less likely that actions lacking integrity would be held up as disgraceful. Since no party could be seen to be 
responsible, there was no deterrent to prevent Councils being ‘cosily corrupt.’  
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For the majority of the municipal year, editorials dealing with local government in the weekly 
newspapers of Manchester and Salford and based on the information in the Council 
proceedings, provide useful commentaries on the decisions made by the two Councils, and 
insights into the reasons for or against a particular course of action. The local press supported 
the cause of public debate and accountability in local government; the exposure of cases of 
incompetence and mismanagement can be seen as a part of that campaign. All newspapers 
were also commercial enterprises, which had to compete for business; reports of misfeasance, 
mismanagement or actions which were seen to lack integrity by the Councils were seen as a 
successful way of attracting readers. 128  As a result, the tendency of the press was to publish 
in great detail, major scandals and any alleged incidents of wrong-doing by the Council or 
councillors. Criticism by the ratepaying public, when incidents of mismanagement by the 
Council resulted in a waste of public money, led to concerns that that this would reflect badly 
on reputation of the two Councils for government with competence and integrity. As a result, 
both Manchester and Salford Councils made deliberate attempts to prevent these occurrences 
coming to public notice in Council meetings.  The agenda for Council meetings which would 
enable the reader to assess how efficiently the Council dealt with the business of the meeting 
was not published in the press. Motions for discussion in Council, including those put down by 
maverick councillors reflecting disquiet about some aspect of the way the Council conducted 
its business, which were the last items on the Agenda, were often not discussed as meetings 
ran out of time. Motions which were not debated were not automatically forwarded to the next 
Council meeting but had to put down again by the proposer for discussion at the next meeting. 
It could take determination get such a matter debated; and controversial motions criticising 
Council policy which were on the agenda often never reached this stage. 129 
Information available to the press about committee deliberations, or other matters which might 
have been considered by the various committees, was limited.  130 Motions on the agenda of 
Salford Council, asking for reporters to be admitted to the General Purposes Committee were 
always defeated,131  although there was support for the idea from some members of the 
Council. Manchester did allow reporters to attend the meetings of the Manchester General 
Purposes Committee, although this committee was rarely convened. Motions seeking 
                                               
128   All three Salford weekly newspapers and the Manchester City News were published on Saturday; the detail in 
which scandals were reported was no doubt seen as an important factor in attracting readers.  
129   The Agenda and the resolutions dealt with at a particular Council meeting are included in the ‘Minutes of the 
Council,’ published in the annual collection of the ‘Proceeding of the Council’ for both municipalities.  
130   The epitomes in Manchester or synopses in Salford which were intended to inform members of the Council 
about decisions made in the various council committees, were given to the press but contained only the resolutions 
which were passed. The usefulness of these in promoting greater efficiency in conducting Council business is 
considered in Section 5.4, p.109. 
131   Salford Chronicle, 8 June 1872, Proceedings of Salford Council, p.3.  A resolution to admit journalists to the 
meetings of the General Purposes Committee was rejected by a vote of 24 to 15.  The membership of the Council 
was 64; 25 members were either absent from the meeting or chose not to vote. 
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agreement that reporters should be admitted to other committee meetings were all rejected; 
the majority view being that it was important that councillors should be able to express their 
views in committee freely, before decisions were made, without their actions being scrutinised 
and analysed retrospectively. The result of the rejections to admit reporters to committee 
meetings was to give the impression that committees must have something to hide. What 
happened in practice was revealed in a report with a by-line of ‘not reliable’. Manchester City 
News commented sarcastically in 1898 that:  
Reporters gather information of public doings, especially of matters of grave concern, in a most 
precarious fashion.  An official is just the person they may not approach when hunting for 
news… The reporter has to buttonhole members of the committee as they leave the committee 
room and rely on their loquacity for a few scraps of information. …. There may be many things 
in committee which ought not to be divulged; but surely the good sense of the higher officials 
can be relied upon to supply to reporters such information on matters of public interest as may 
with advantage be known. 132 
Nevertheless, it was accepted in Salford that the Mayor should be able to agree to the release 
of information from committees to the press.133  In 1892, a motion was passed allowing the 
various committees of the Council to appoint the Town Clerk as the authority to supply  
 
from time to time, personally, or through his Department such information to the public 
of the proceedings of such committees as may be expedient; such authority to be of a 
general character except so far as it may be limited from time to time by special 
resolution of the committee concern.134   
 
Salford Chronicle in ‘Comments on local matters’ referred to this as a ‘good move,’ despite 
the qualification ‘as may be expedient’. Access to information about the deliberations of 
Manchester Council committees was more limited, leading inevitably to suspicions that the 
Council must have something to conceal.  
3.3. The sources and nature of the criticism. 
 
This section provides a selective overview of the sources of the reports made about the 
conduct of two Councils over the period of this study. including the types of incident and the 
sources of the criticism where the behaviour of the two Councils was being identified by 
contemporaries as incompetent, and/or ethically dubious or corrupt 135. The language used 
about the conduct of the two Councils covered both insinuations and allegations of 
extravagance, mismanagement, whether by incompetence, ignorance, or simply the absence 
of the necessary scientific or technical knowledge, as well as misfeasance or corruption.  
                                               
132   Manchester City News, 14 May 1898 p.5. This was the report of an article in ‘The Journalist,’ the house 
magazine of the Institute of Journalists.  
133   Salford Chronicle, 21 November 1891 p.5.  
134    Ibid., 5 March 1892 Salford Council Meeting p.4. 
135   A more detailed description of circumstances which gave rise to the main allegations identified in this section 
and the validity of the criticism is given in subsequent chapters.  
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Comments about the behaviour of both Councils ranged from observations of a Council’s 
failure to conduct business in an orderly manner, minor carping about the services provided 
and how ratepayer’s money was spent and accounted for, as well as inferences that the 
Council condoned the unethical actions of individuals.  
 
 Prior to 1870, weekly local papers included letters on a variety of subjects suggesting failures 
by Salford Council to provide council services, such as the failure to maintain the roads; 136 or 
drawing the Council’s attention to the need to improve public health and the inadequacy of 
sanitary laws.137  The reports of the ‘Proceedings’ of the Council were the most important 
source of information about how the business of the Council was conducted. Salford’s 
reputation for poor governance was originally earned in the 1860s, when embezzlement by 
the Treasurer, William Noar, was reported in Salford Weekly News.138 Subsequent reports to 
the Council about the scandal, and editorials in the press revealed the absence of appropriate 
record keeping, and audit; a problem which the Finance committee was alleged to have been 
aware, but had failed to address. The actual reports of a Council meeting revealed clear 
evidence of incompetence and inefficiency.139  
The behaviour of individual councillors could also attract press criticism. Editors could be 
strongly critical about the competence of a particular councillor or the Council, often using 
language which was far from complementary. The reporting of a statement made in debate by 
a senior member of Salford Council provoked an editorial to state:  
There are probably no more untenable arguments than those put forward by Alderman 
Husband. They were puerile; indeed, we may say silly in the most extreme sense of 
the word. They hadn’t either sense or reason.140   
 
The conduct of Councillor Mandley which led to delays in making decisions, and in some cases 
led to the abandonment of the Council business was also criticised. His trenchant and frequent 
criticism of the management of the Salford Gas works led, on occasions, to name calling and 
                                               
136   Salford Weekly News, 20 January 1866. Letter, p.4.  ‘Poor Regent Road,’ complained about the ‘suffering’ of 
those who had to traverse the road.  He suggested that the secret of getting a clean-up was ‘to have a councillor 
living there thence the road will be clean and lighted’.     
137   Ibid., 2 May 1868. Letter, ‘A working man’ p.4. 
138   Ibid., 8 September 1866, editorial p.2. William Noar was the Chief Clerk in the Treasurer’s Department prior to 
his promotion. He was recommended for the post of treasurer when David Chadwick resigned from the post in 
1860. Although there is no record that Noar was guilty of embezzlement when he was Chief clerk, his defalcations 
started from the year of his appointment. How the Noar embezzlement was carried out is considered in detail 
Chapter 7.1. p.141. 
139   Ibid., Proceedings of Salford Council, p.4. 
140   This comment was made in an editorial in Salford Weekly News, 2 October 1876, p.2, a paper which supported 
the Liberal cause. Alderman Husband, who was Chairman of the Salford Finance Committee, was a builder and 
contractor, a Tory property owner and a member of the Salford Property Owners’ Association on the Council.  He 
was elected an Alderman 1874, had chaired the Salford General Finance Committee and served as Mayor for 2 
years, 1881-3.  
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unruly behaviour by some councillors in Salford Council meetings, providing an unfavourable 
picture of the competence and efficiency of the Council. 141  Although Salford appointed a new 
Gas Manager, Samuel Hunter in 1875,142 allegations of misfeasance, and corruption in the 
management of the Gas department, which had preceded his appointment continued to 
dominate the attention of critics. Full reports of the legal proceedings and editorial comment 
in all the Salford weekly press about the trial for libel brought by the Corporation against Ellis 
Lever, a coal merchant, revealed that the allegations made about the corrupt nature of the 
tendering procedures used by the Gas committee were proven.143 The trial revealed the 
ignorance of the Gas committee about how the Gas Department was managed, and 
demonstrated how Samuel Hunter the Gas manager effectively controlled the Committee and 
had been able to negotiate commission payments on all the contracts for the supplies of coal 
needed by the gasworks The aftermath of the Hunter affair continued to attract press comment 
throughout 1888.  
As the reportage of the Hunter affair was dying down, reports of embezzlement by the Town 
Clerk of Salford, John Graves 144were reported to the Council. These led to editorials in the 
press questioning why the embezzlement, which had been over a three-year period, had not 
been detected earlier.145 Despite the improvements made to the financial management system 
implemented after the Noar embezzlement, an overspend of the Borough fund in Salford was 
reported in 1894 when the Council needed to borrow money from Central government to cover 
a deficit. 146  The Council’s own investigation of what became known as ‘The Great Salford 
Muddle,’ revealed a number of shortcomings in the way the accounts were kept in the 
municipality, leading to both censure and ridicule of the Treasurers Department.  
The ’Proceedings of Manchester Council’, published in the press, also provided critics with the 
material to make damaging criticism about the competence of senior Manchester councillors. 
The presentation of the accounts of Manchester by Alderman Thompson, Chairman of 
Manchester Finance Committee led to him being called ’irresponsible’ by a critic, a comment 
which was published by the Manchester City News147.148  Criticism of the Aldermen Husband 
and Thompson, the Chairmen of the Finance Committees in the two municipalities can have 
                                               
141   The biography of Councillor Mandley and the part he played in the Salford Gasworks scandal is given in 
Chapter 4, p.82. 
142   The biography of Samuel Hunter is given in Chapter 6.3, p.126, ‘Lifestyle choices, the aspirations of officials 
and members of the Council.’ 
143   There was full page coverage in Salford Reporter, 24 March 1887. 
144   The biography of John Graves is also given in Chapter 6.3, p.126, ‘Lifestyle choices, the aspirations of officials 
and members of the Council.’ 
145   Salford Reporter, 25 August 1888, p.8. Proceedings of Salford Council.  
146   Ibid., 29 October 1894, p.8. Proceedings of Salford Council.  
147   Joseph Thompson was elected to Manchester Council in1865, and was elected alderman in 1879 After serving 
as deputy Chairman of the Finance Committee he served as chairman from 1979 to 1885.  
148  Manchester City News published the reports by Joseph Scott, who referred to Alderman Thompson as 
‘irresponsible’ on 9 separate occasions. Scott’s role as an Elective auditor is considered in Chapter 4.5.p. 81. 
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done little to reassure readers that the finances of the two municipal corporations were in 
competent hands. 
Editorial comment on the conduct of Manchester Council business highlighted behaviour 
which appeared to lack integrity. Prior to the 1880s there were very few allegations criticising 
the conduct of Manchester Council, and the tenor of the criticism which was made was 
directed to ‘unacceptable’ practices’. In 1865, for example, an editorial in Manchester City 
News commented on a matter raised in Council about monies paid by the Council to 
compensate the Royal Exchange, which had to move to allow for a development scheme, 
were paid to the ’wrong’ people. This led to the statement that some members of Council had 
ensured that their friends had been ‘rewarded handsomely.’149 Although this allegation was 
denied, there was no explanation or follow up about the reasons why the payments made.  An 
editorial of 1875 raised a similar matter that… ‘some members of the Gas Committee had 
conducted themselves in a manner that could not be tolerated’; by entering an arrangement 
to purchase land without the sanction of the Council until the transaction was nearly 
completed. The members were not named.150 No explanation was offered about why the 
Council were not involved in the purchase at an earlier stage. The inference was that as the 
purchase was for a legitimate reason, the failure to get the Council’s approval before 
negotiations were undertaken was not considered as behaviour lacking integrity. 151  
In the 1870s Manchester Council set up two enquiries to look into how the Council conducted 
municipal business, with the aim of disarming critics who raised concerns in the Council about 
mismanagement. A subcommittee set up to consider the way the Council supervised the 
actions of its committees, reported within a month that no change was needed.152 Arthur 
Redford noted that this report was ‘a masterpiece of evasion’ drawn up by a subcommittee 
consisting of the Chairmen of the standing committees, plus two other persons, who were very 
unlikely to see the need for any change.153 A report from the Manchester Finance Committee 
on the audit of the accounts of the Council stated that no changes were needed to the system 
of local audit by amateur elective .auditors which was satisfactory.  154 A Select Committee of 
Parliament also considered the matter. Joseph Heron, representing Association of Municipal 
Councils, opposed the idea of more rigorous district audit of municipal accounts, stating that 
                                               
149   Ibid., 9 September 1865, editorial, p.2, supporting allegation that the compensation payments were unfair.  
150   Ibid., 9 January 1875, editorial, p.2. 
151   An alternative explanation was that the behaviour in both these cases was a hark-back to practices in the early 
period of municipal government when it was accepted that councillors could personally take on the conduct of 
council business on behalf of the council. 
152  Proceedings of Manchester Council, 9 December 1879. The problems which resulted from the failure of 
Manchester Council to control the work of its committees is considered in Chapter 5.3  
153   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume ll p.433.  
154   Proceedings of Manchester Council, 3 December 1874.  
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Manchester ‘audit is complete and efficient.’ 155 Audit of the accounts of the two municipalities 
is considered in more detail in Section 7.2, p.148. 
The 1880s saw a greater focus by critics on the competence of the Manchester Council. The 
first of a number of high-profile incidents, the trial for embezzlement in 1880 of Frederick 
Hepton the chief clerk and bookkeeper in the Waterworks Department, led to a series of 
editorials in Manchester City News.156 The trial uncovered evidence of mismanagement and 
incompetence in how the Council managed the finances of a section of the Department’s 
services.157 The detailed evidence given in the trial also implicated a senior member of the 
Council, Alderman Grave, and the Superintendent of the Department, T. G. H. Berrey, both of 
whom it was alleged had  condoned or even connived in the financial misfeasance in the 
Waterworks Department.  
 
The focus of the press in publishing scandals whether the result of the misfeasance by the 
Councils or the alleged corruption of individual councillors or officials led to an increasing focus 
on how the Councils conducted municipal business.158 The outcome was that criticism which 
identified this behaviour as lacking integrity. also pinpointed other practices of the Council, or 
of individuals who committed offences whilst under the aegis of the Council. Many of these 
related to behaviour which had previously been tolerated but were no longer seen to be 
acceptable, in effect expanding the definition of corruption. The increasing involvement of the 
Council in major schemes of work to improve environmental conditions often led to 
mismanagement which impacted directly on the lives of residents in the two boroughs, 
particularly poor- quality services. Failures to complete public projects on time or to deliver the 
expected outcome which resulted in cost overruns, or delays in implementing necessary 
environmental improvements, led to ever present concerns about the management of finances 
in the two boroughs, and the possibility of an increase in the level of the rates.  
                                               
155   District audit -- the audit of local government accounts by agents of central government. Introduced originally 
to provide more rigor and transparency in the accounts of poor law authorities, its use was extended to a number 
of other authorities including, for example school boards sanitary authorities and highway authorities. The intention 
was to promote public accountability by providing a system of audit conducted by District auditors under the aegis 
of LGB, who could disallow illegal spending and recover deficiencies by surcharging officers and members of an 
authority. 
156   Frederick Hepton had been appointed as Chef Clerk and Cashier of the Waterworks Department in 1873. The 
dual appointment which facilitated the embezzlement was apparently made as an economy measure. 
157   More details about the cases mentioned in this section are given in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
158   Garrard, The Great Salford Gas Scandal 1887, discussed the effect of the publicity about a scandal in Salford 
which revealed that the Gas manager Samuel Hunter had been receiving commission payments from suppliers of 
coal to the municipality. He noted that although the practice was common and widely accepted in in the commercial 
world, but when publicised in the press it was seen to be unacceptable and in conflict with the standard of behaviour 
expected in public life. 
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Findings and précis of Chapter Three 
 
This chapter has explored what the Victorian critic meant by the ‘corrupt’ behaviour in the late 
nineteenth century when using the term about individuals or about the Council itself.  It 
confirmed that the exposure of wrong-doing by members of the two Councils, their employees 
and the Councils, in the local weekly press led to an expectation of improved standards of 
integrity in conducting municipal business with the result that criticisms of their behaviour 
became more severe, however notes the reluctance of critics to accuse councillors of 
corruption. The research, which included an assessment of the objectivity and completeness 
of the information published in the local press, found that although the reporting of Committee 
business was limited, there was sufficiently detailed information to enable critics to assess the 
behaviour both of the two Councils and of the individuals involved in delivering Council 
services and make valid judgements about the probity of the Councils and the integrity of 
individual officers. The concluding section of the Chapter which identified the different sources 
of information available to the critic gives examples of the allegations and criticism made about 
the two municipalities. 
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Chapter Four. The validity of the allegations. 
 
The local press was vital in changing public attitudes about what constituted acceptable 
practices in conducting municipal business. This chapter examines how this was reflected in 
the attitude of critics to practices used by officers and councillors had previously been 
tolerated, and the reaction of the Councils to this criticism. The widespread use of these 
practices in public life led to the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889, which provided 
a sanction for those guilty of behaviour lacking integrity. The chapter examines the reasons 
for the failure of both Councils to use the sanction provided by this Act, or the earlier sanction 
of disqualification from the Council provided by the MCA1835/1882. It considers the reasons 
why both Councils were unwilling to take action and sanction fellow members of the 
Corporation who were guilty of corruption but argues that the alternative of not taking action 
and condoning these offences, did itself damage the reputation of both Councils for integrity.   
The final two sections of the Chapter which deal with the attitude of critics to proven cases of 
embezzlement, argue that although there was no attempt by the two Councils to mitigate the 
punishment for this offence, the loss of income to the Council from this cause could be 
significant. This led to criticism focussing on the reasons for the mismanagement by the 
Council which facilitated the embezzlement. The thesis argues that although the Elective 
auditors did rightly identify mismanagement by both Councils which amounted misfeasance, 
or even Council corruption, the rhetorical language used by some Elective auditors who had 
a political objective to pursue, could lead to cases of mismanagement being understood to be 
Council corruption. 
4.1 Customary practices  
 
The incidents described in this section deal with practices dating back to the early days of 
municipal corporations, when councillors themselves ‘helped the council out’ by providing the 
services at a time when the council itself lacked the resources to undertake this role. Many of 
these practices dealt with behaviour which was seen as both normal and perfectly acceptable 
in the commercial field. Joseph Scott’s investigation into the spending by the Departments of 
Manchester Corporation reflected the attitudes which he felt should apply to the behaviour of 
the members of the Council and their officials in the late Victorian period. 159 His focus, in the 
early reports in ‘Leaves’ was on extravagance, particularly the spending on ‘customary 
practices’ which had been seen as acceptable charges on municipal funds. There are two 
                                               
159   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor.  
48 
aspects to his allegations: the inference that those who accept Council largesse were 
personally corrupt, but also that the Council was guilty of corruption by effectively condoning 
profligacy. Scott placed special emphasis on the spending on entertainment, particularly 
expenditure on wines spirits and cigars, which he regarded as extravagant and wasteful. 
Although he did not use the word ‘corruption’ he made it clear in the conclusion to his reports 
that that his aim was …‘to indicate to the ratepayers where corruption was to be found.’ .160 
He spiced the criticism with words like, ‘smoking or taking away during the year 3,500 cigars 
costing sixpence each and wine enough to fill a small reservoir.’161 This was a damaging 
allegation, which set the tone for his criticism about spending levels on entertainment 
throughout the departments of the municipality.  The allegations were not denied by the 
Council; there were no apologies or attempts to justify this spending.  It appeared that 
providing wine and cigars for councillors when the Council and its committees were meeting 
was a long-established practice. For many councillors who were also businessmen attending 
Board meetings of companies, the provision of wine, spirits and cigars was an expected 
amenity, if not a necessity.  explained that he bought the wine and cigars, and he supplied 
other committees and the Mayor’s cellar.162 These cigars and the wine were also consumed 
when members of the Committee were on Council business in the Lake District. He noted that 
the 18 members of the Waterworks Committee spent more time than any other committee on 
Council business away from Manchester, but despite this, the number of cigars consumed 
over an 18-month period represented 2 cigars per member per week. He did not attempt to 
quantify the amount of wine consumed per councillor. The emotive way Scott presented these 
allegations did lead to letters to the press from the public with strongly worded criticism, 
alleging the extravagance of this behaviour, rather than corruption. This suggests these 
actions were still regarded as customary practices, not undertaken for profit but as a necessary 
accompaniment to the conduct of Council duties and therefore to be tolerated.  As the practice 
was however condoned by the Council, Scott saw this as a breach of the standards of integrity 
expected of the Council.  James Moore, writing in 2007, was more direct; he regarded these 
actions as corruption. 163   
Scott’s account of spending on hospitality by Manchester Corporation departments is replete 
with details of what he considered to be excessive spending on food and entertainment, for 
example the menu and spending on the dinner following the opening of the Osborne Street 
                                               
160   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, ‘Conclusions’ p.53.He did not define what he meant by 
corruption. 
161   Manchester City News, 4 October 1884. Manchester Council Proceedings, p.6.  
162   Henry Patteson, a marble mason by trade was elected to Manchester Council in 1860 and was elected. 
Alderman in 1868. He served as mayor for the year 1879-80, and chaired the Waterworks Committee from1880 
until his death in 1887.  
163   James Moore & John Smith (editors), Corruption in Urban Politics and Society, Britain 1780-1950, p.99. 
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Baths was given in detail. The event was attended by twenty-one people, although the Baths 
Committee had only twelve members. The food cost 15s each, but he noted that the drink 
'consumed or charged’ amounted to 35s per head.164 He disapproved of any event involving 
hospitality, even where the purpose was to celebrate and publicise an achievement, for 
example the presentation of the Royal Institution building to the Council for use as an Art 
Gallery.165  His condemnation did attract support, although the detail of some of Scott’s 
allegations was challenged. Many councillors found it necessary to distance themselves from 
the allegation that they had enjoyed the hospitality of the Council, suggesting that councillors 
themselves were aware that public attitudes to previously accepted practices were changing 
166 There was no challenge to the implication that some of the spending on entertainment was 
extravagant, even exorbitant. This behaviour by Councils was seen by later commentators as 
a necessary and accepted way of confirming Manchester Corporation’s claim to civic 
leadership’; civic rituals like the opening of civic buildings was ‘authority made visible;’ by 
inference this spending was justified. 167  James Moore and Richard Rodger noted that public 
ceremonies formed part of the municipal network, which provided opportunities to meet with 
the invited representatives of other municipalities to share knowledge, and was a practice 
followed in other municipalities.168 For critics it was the lavishness of the spending, which was 
mainly enjoyed by councillors, rather than the holding of such events, which attracted criticism; 
but despite this, there is no evidence that this spending was seen as venial, behaviour lacking 
integrity. 
It was accepted practice that members of the Corporation, travelling on council business, could 
claim expenses. The two municipalities initially used the same formula for reimbursing 
members; first-class rail travel and a guinea and a half per day (24 hours) for other expenses, 
                                               
164   This expenditure has to be seen against salaries and wages during the late Victorian period in the 1880-1900 
period for men in municipal employ. Typical salaries for superintendents and officials such as Hunter and the 
treasurers of the two municipalities were in the £600 to £900 p.a. range. The salaries of the large numbers of 
clerical staff employed by the two municipalities, for junior staff were in the range of £60 -£90 p.a. More senior staff 
were unlikely to exceed a salary of £250 p.a. 
 165   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p. 28, argued that the funding of the event held when the 
Art gallery was opened (a facility which, he said catered for the middle or upper classes) was ultra vires the 
Corporation. He produced full details of the money spent on the event which cost £4.800 to stage, and did show 
that no expense had been spared in the hospitality offered to the guests of the Council).    
166   A series of letters published at the same time corrected other misstatements by Scott about attendance at 
Bath Committee ‘feasts’; for example, Councillor Gibson stated that he did not attend the banquet at the Queens 
Hotel; he was not a member of the committee at the time.’ Councillor Ashcroft, who was also accused of being 
present at one of the Baths committee dinners, stated that he was not on the Council at the time and had never 
dined at the named hotel. etc. 
167   Simon Gunn, The public culture of the Victorian middle class (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000), 
p.163. noted the need Councils felt to provide symbols which demonstrated civic pride. One manifestation of ‘civic 
pride’ was to have an impressive Town Hall. Examples where the Councils accepted this, were in Manchester, 
Bolton and Rochdale, all of which were constructed in the 1860 -1870 period. 
168   James Moore and Richard Rodger, ‘Who Really Ran the Cities? Municipal Knowledge and Policy Networks in 
British Local Government 1832-1914’, Jahrbuch fur Europaische Verwaltungsgeschichte XV (2003), 61. 
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plus cab fares.169 Complaints surfaced in the 1870s, when occasional reports about the 
extravagance of the two Councils were published. The size and cost of the ‘deputations,’ 
alleged to be on ‘Council business’, and the amount of the payments to councillors for their 
expenses were regularly criticised. By the 1880s attitudes were changing, the issue of claims 
for travelling expenses and allegations of extravagance about the numbers of councillors and 
officials who went on these visits had become a regular feature on the agendas of both 
Councils. Criticism about the travel expenses claims of members came not just from letters 
from ratepayers, but also from members of both Councils, where discussion often concerned 
the size of the deputation who should go on visits, particularly those visits involving an 
examination of methods used by other authorities, which could be relevant to problems which 
existed in Manchester and Salford. There was recognition that some visits, referred to as pic-
nics,170 could not be justified on this basis. A regular item on the agenda of Salford Council171 
related to the cost of the visit of the Water Committee to inspect the facilities at Woodhead, 
where both the business need and the size of the group going on the visit were questioned 
and criticised. Councillor Walker in 1872, unsuccessfully moved in Salford Council that the 
size of a ‘deputations’ should be limited to five, ‘unless Council directed otherwise.’ 172 He 
stated that trips to the Woodhead Waterworks were known to everybody as pleasure trips and 
accepted and understood as such. There was no business reason for the Woodhead visit, but 
every year a motion before the Council to abolish it, or at least reduce the size of the visiting 
group, was defeated.  It was felt this had to be a matter for the individual committees; not the 
Council which had failed to intervene to provide guidelines about acceptable practices.173.174 
The Woodhead ‘pic-nic’ became an annual feature of the Salford Council year, and a justifiable 
target for criticism. The visits of the committee members and officials of the Manchester 
Waterworks Department to Thirlmere attracted similar criticism of extravagance in Manchester 
Council, and were a target for Scott’s investigations. His attitude to the expenses claims for 
visits to Thirlmere and Woodhead, which he referred to as ‘pleasure trips,’ coloured his attitude 
to all expenses claims. He stated throughout his reports that he was acting on behalf of the 
ratepayers who elected him, ‘to obtain for the ratepayers the manner in which the public money 
                                               
169   No mention is made anywhere in the Council reports that councillors received travelling expenses for the 
journey from home to Council meetings. Many lived outside Manchester, for example Alderman John Hopkinson 
lived in Alderley Edge, and had to commute into Manchester for meetings.  
170   The term ‘pic-nic’ was used in a pejorative sense. 
171    Salford Weekly News, 19 August 1872, p.2, Salford Council Proceedings. 
172   Ibid., p.2. Councillor J.W. Walker was a pattern card maker who served on the Council for 11 years, from 1868 
to 1879.He cited one trip where 11 members went to East Barnet to inspect a sewage disposal, installation. He 
noted that the party could not discharge their duties until Thursday but arrived in London on Tuesday.  The following 
week, an editorial confirmed that the Epsom Derby took place on the Wednesday. Walker did not however allege 
that the claim for expenses made by members of the deputation included a claim for that day. 
173   This was recognition that the Council were highly unlikely to be able to agree any common policy. 
174   The policy in both municipalities adopted by some committees was to take a large number of councillors when 
inspecting equipment which might be purchased even if the group was accompanied by officials who could carry 
out a technical evaluation of the equipment. This is discussed in Section 6.4, p.136. 
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is being spent by the corporation’.   As a result, he appears to have adopted as the standard 
for the ‘reasonableness’ of the expenses claims, was whether ratepayers would agree that the 
spending was a necessity. Commenting on the size of the ‘deputations, Scott suggested that 
the 21/6 per day plus first-class railway fare. ‘is an offer which is difficult to refuse,’ and asked:  
 
What reason is there why five or ten members should go on a deputation, when one or 
two would represent the wealth, wit, wisdom, and every other necessary qualification of 
the Council? 175  
 
Manchester Waterworks Committee provided Scott with several examples where there was 
mismanagement of parts of the scheme to obtain water supplies from Thirlmere. 176 He cited 
two examples where he claimed the spending on entertainment and travel costs associated 
with the scheme were not justified. The ‘annual trip’ of the Manchester Waterworks department 
to Woodhead included single rail fares for 69 persons, a banquet at 25/- per person for 70 
persons, and carriage back to Manchester by omnibus, clearly gross extravagance and an 
unjustifiable expenditure on the rates, but it had become an annual tradition.177  A ‘pic-nic’ to 
Thirlmere, which lasted for 9 days, and had five  councillors and one official as members, was 
probably justified; the trip was made at a time when the Council were negotiating land 
purchases in the Lake District, and involved entertaining of local land owners.. The party size 
was therefore most likely determined by the extent of the business to be undertaken. Scott 
commented on the large expenditure on wines and spirits claimed for this trip, stating that the 
total cost to the rates was £90.178 Sir John Harwood’s report on the development of the 
Thirlmere scheme provided justification for the business visits to the Lake District made by 
members of the Manchester Waterworks Committee, noting that many councillors 
undoubtedly suffered inconvenience, and in some cases discomfort, in carrying out the 
business of the Corporation. There was general acceptance that as councillors were unpaid, 
they should be able to claim their expenses when undertaking visits on corporation business, 
                                               
175   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.50.  
176   Scott, ibid., cited examples including the cost of maintaining the hotel at Dale Head for use of visiting members 
of the Corporation which was underutilised and lost money, and the failure optimise the income which could be 
obtained from the lease of properties which the Council had acquired as part of the development. 
177   The Victorian equivalent of a ‘teambuilding’ exercise?  Many owners of mills arranged trips as a reward for the 
loyalty of their workers; a tradition in the North West was a day excursion by train to Blackpool. It is not suggested 
as the justification for this trip; the cost was exorbitant. 
178   Strange that Scott should cite this as an example! The statement that wine and spirit charges were added to 
the cost of the trip implies that this was one of the trips to carry out negotiations and meetings with the local 
landlords whose agreement was vital if the Thirlmere scheme was to be feasible.  If the party size was therefore 
justifiable, the total cost of the trip seems modest, assuming that the daily expenses allowance of 11/2 guineas per 
day plus the cost of the rail fares are presumably included in the stated cost. Scott did add that he might not have 
included the entire costs of this ‘royal’ outing as some of the other spending by the Waterworks Committee on 
wines and spirits might also have been consumed by this ‘deputation’. 
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as ‘it would be unreasonable to expect any councillor to pay out of his own pocket for the 
privilege of serving the city.   Nonetheless the system which paid expenses as a fixed sum led 
Scott to ask:   
How many Councillors or even august Aldermen travel first class?......it is generally 
assumed that he ought not to put anything into his pocket out of the hard earnings of 
ratepayers…No exception could or would be taken were the Aldermen and Councillors 
to charge only expenses out of pocket…. Were such a course adopted, I make bold to 
say we should have fewer deputations, and the cost could be reduced nine-tenths…179 
 
Scott’s argument did get support, even in the Councils.  When a motion to adopt a system for 
paying the actual expenses incurred was debated by Salford Council, Alderman Mandley 
noted that ’some members who went on these deputations charged 1st class fares but only 
travelled 3rd class’. When challenged to reveal the names of these councillors or withdraw the 
statement, Mandley agreed to withdraw only when it was confirmed that expenses for half-
day’s absences were paid on the basis of actual expenditure. He added, however that it did 
not alter ‘his knowledge of the facts’. The motion to change the status quo was lost by 39 votes 
to 10. Salford did not change the formula for paying expenses for the rest of the century. 
Scott’s real complaint was justified; there was no policy in place to rationalise the expenditure 
on travelling expenses. 180 He did not allege that there was a widespread practice of ‘fiddling’ 
expense claims by members of the Manchester Council,181 although as a result of the failure 
to control the size of the ‘deputations’ and the length of some visits, he stated that there was 
unnecessary extravagance. 182 He hinted that some councillors seemed to undertake more 
travelling than their colleagues. By publishing lists of the expenses claims of 22 members of 
the Council and 14 officials, which were accompanied by a commentary on some of the claims, 
he left the clear impression that those making the largest claims had something to explain, 
irrespective of whether the expenditure claim could be fully justified by the nature of the 
business undertaken.  His criticism did have some effect. Frank Hollins who wrote the Auditors’ 
                                               
.179 …Scott. Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.18, added that ‘it is a matter worthy of consideration how 
any man can spend a guinea and a half per day and still be in a condition to attend to his duties.’  
180   Ibid., p.19.Scott’s suggestions that only claims which were made for travel to carry out essential Council 
business should be accepted and the number of members of parties involved in these visits should be reduced, 
were not formally adopted by the two councils. The standing orders of Manchester Council were changed to state 
that claims, which should not exceed the one and a half guinea limit per 24 hours, should be for the actual 
expenditure incurred.  
181   Ibid., p.19. He did suggest that a one- day visit could be spread over 3 days with ‘a day’ and ‘a night’. each 
charged at 11/2   guineas but he did not provide any evidence that this had actually occurred. 
182   Salford Weekly News, 10 August 1872 p.2.  Proceedings of Salford Council. There was regular criticism about 
the Salford Water Committee ‘pic-nics’ in the Council.  
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report for the following year, 1884-5 commented that ‘expenses claims are lower. 183’ The 
‘Standing orders’ of Manchester Council’ were changed after 1885 to specify that:   
Members of the Council shall as far as practicable, charge the actual amount expended, but in 
no case shall the amount exceed one and a half guineas per day and night. 
Although the payment of travelling expenses was seen as warranted, the later questioning of 
the fixed-sum method of payment and the subsequent change in practice in Manchester is an 
illustration of changing attitudes to a previously well-established and accepted practice, not 
only by critics but also by members of Manchester Council.  Scott did identify other practices 
which were open to criticism. He brought to public notice the use of the Council’s system to 
purchase goods for councillors which were for their personal use. The justification was that 
these services provided councillors with items which they might need during the day whilst 
they carried out Council business. Scott noted that the paperwork associated with these orders 
which were usually for small items such as combs, mirrors, and  soap, did not identify the 
names of the recipients of the Council’s largesse.184  He also found that Manchester Council 
supplied copies of newspapers and journals to the various departments of the Corporation in 
order that councillors and officials could keep abreast of events and public opinions expressed 
in the press, a practice he accepted was a legitimate charge on the public purse, but he 
regarded the numbers of copies of each title which were ordered as extravagance. 
Nevertheless, when the requests were for titles of newspapers and journals with a content 
which was clearly for private use, and in some cases were delivered to the homes of 
councillors and officials, his language rightly inferred that the recipients were guilty of 
corruption, and the Council, in failing to prevent this abuse was condoning the behaviour. 185 
Scott also identified that this system used for the ordering of for ‘miscellaneous goods’ 
provided opportunities for fraud, but he offered no evidence that councillors abused the system 
by ordering expensive items, yet he saw the practice as unacceptable and he inferred that 
councillors who took advantage of this facility were guilty of corruption. 
 The Council did carry out and published its own review of the Scott findings.186 This made no 
attempt to justify the amount of money which, it accepted, had been spent ‘both illegally and 
                                               
183   Frank Hollins, was a member of a family firm manufacturing leather goods. He served as Elective Auditor with 
Joseph Scott for the years 1884-5, and 1885-6, and after Scott did not seek re-election, he served a further two 
years 1886-7 and 1887-8 with Wallace M Greaves as co-Elective auditor. 
184   The problem of accounting for the income and expenditure in a municipality is considered in Chapter 7.1, p.141 
185   Scott’s criticism of Joseph Heron, Manchester’s Town Clerk, made at several points in ‘Leaves’, amounted to 
alleging that Heron was corrupt.  Scott identified the charging the subscription of a magazine which was for personal 
use to the Council; excessive claims for travel expenditure, and agreeing payments from the Borough Fund, which 
Scott alleged were ultra vires the municipality, when he was still being paid a salary of £2,500 by the Council. 
186   Manchester City News, 29 November 1884, p.5. 
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improperly….by those to whom the government of the City had been entrusted.’187    An 
attempt was however made to mitigate the blame falling on councillors by noting that:  
No excuse can be offered for the silence of previous auditors and neglect of duty. Their 
inefficient and inadequate performance’ in the matter intended by the legislature to 
check municipal irregularities, deserves condemnation. 
This response probably did not impress the ratepayers who had studied the council’s 
behaviour. 
 
There were clear signs that the Scott findings had been studied by members of Salford 
Council.188  Alluding to the Manchester situation, Councillor John Dyson asked about the 
number of newspapers delivered to each of the three Town Halls at Salford, Broughton and 
Pendleton; Councillor John B .Foden asked about the opening of the Pendleton Baths; 
whether there was a pic-nic accompanying the ceremony, and was a silver trowel presented 
to the Chairman of the Baths Committee and who paid for it?  189 190  There was some public 
concern that no in-depth study of departmental spending, and the efficacy of audit had ever 
been carried out in the municipality A correspondent writing to the in the Salford press noted,  
the extraordinary revelations with respect to the Manchester Corporation accounts & 
expenditure have set people wondering why we have heard nothing from the Salford 
auditor.  Are we to believe that our Council and officials are free from the feckless 
system of our neighbours? 191 
 
A letter headed ‘the Salford audit’ suggested that an ‘influential committee’ should arrange a 
meeting at the Town Hall’ to discuss the matter.192  This was supported by a correspondent 
who commented that ‘many people were asking, after the Scott-Hollins disclosures in 
Manchester, which may to some extent be exaggerated, whether it was not likely that Salford 
may be suffering a similar abuse?’ 193  The report of a meeting at Salford Town Hall to discuss 
audit in Salford, turned however on how the Salford Elective auditors conducted audit process. 
The only outcome of this meeting was the disclosure that in practice Salford auditors did not 
always conduct an independent audit, instead were only given time to inspect the papers of 
the Council and were then expected to sign the audit off.  The matter was not followed up; 
                                               
187   The alleged ‘illegality’ appears to relate to the practice of committees to ‘cover up’ incidents of mismanagement. 
Examples of this behaviour are discussed in Section 8.1,p.162. 
188   Salford Chronicle, 4 October 1884, p. 2, Salford Council Proceedings. 
189   John Dyson who served on Salford Council between 1867 and 1885, was a carpet manufacturer; John B 
Foden who was elected 1881-was an auctioneer and valuer. He remained on the Council until 1904. 
190   Ibid.,1 November 1884, p.2. Salford Council Proceedings. Alderman William H Bailey, Chairman of the Baths 
Committee, an engineer, was elected to the Council in 1874 was elected alderman in 1880. He served as Mayor 
for the year 1882-3. He stated that the cost of the pic-nic did not come out of the rates; as chairman he paid for the 
trowel and the picnic himself, and the builders paid for the ceremonial mallet.  
191   Ibid., 27 September 1884, p.2. Letter: ‘Doubtful.’  
192   Ibid., 1 November 1884, p.4. Letter: W. H. Sutton. 
193   Ibid., 22 November 1884, p.4. Letter: Veritas.’  
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Salford critics, unlike their Manchester counterparts, did not apparently regard spending on 
‘customary practices’ as a matter that needed further investigation.  
These cases discussed as ‘customary practices’ provide evidence that as a result of the 
exposure about how the Council conducted its business, the definition of corruption was 
changing, and some previously accepted practices, such as the ordering of newspapers and 
journals for private use, and participation in ‘pic-nics which had no business purpose, were 
being seen by critics as unacceptable, and were practices which lacked integrity,  a view which 
was also shared by some members of the Councils. The underlying problem however in all 
these situations was the failure of both Councils to set down guidance about what constituted 
acceptable practices. It seems probable however that both Councils recognised that it was 
very unlikely that the various committees would be able to agree a common policy or would 
agree to any restriction on the right of a committee to take decisions about its conduct. 194 To 
Scott, this was condoning wrong-doing. 195 
 
4.2. Conflict of interest: insider trading.  
Municipal government in the two municipalities was not immune from acts of corruption by 
individuals, which could occur within any branch of municipal services where opportunities 
existed for conflict of interest to arise.  Both Manchester and Salford employed staff to carry 
out a range of different roles within the municipality, including officers with special expertise, 
whose roles often involved developing and defining services or having executive 
responsibilities. The risk that councillors could influence decisions made in Council to further 
their own interests was recognised; the wording of the MCA para 22(3) provided that:  
A member of the Council shall not vote or take part in the discussion of any matter 
before the Council, or a committee, in which he has, directly or indirectly, by himself or 
by his partner any pecuniary interest….  
G. R. Searle, who noted that even in Parliament where there had been attempts to define a 
member’s ‘duties and obligations,’ there were cases where ministers had profited from 
knowledge obtained whilst undertaking official duties.196 W. Ivor Jennings agreed, writing in 
1938 he noted that, whilst improvements had taken place in central government to reduce 
incidents of corruption, the position in local government was ‘by no means so satisfactory;’ 
and that there were situations where a conflict of interest ‘was inevitable.’ 197  By the last decade 
                                               
194   The problem that committees demanded the right to take decisions independently is considered in Chapter 
5.3, p106. 
195   The practice of condoning or covering up wrongdoing by a Council is considered in Chapter 8.1, p162. 
196   G. R. Searle, Corruption in British Politics 1895-1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987), p.44. 
197   W. Ivor Jennings, ‘Corruption and the public service.’ Political Quarterly Volume 9, no.1, 1938,.37. Jennings is 
referring to a wider problem here, the extent to which the interests of councillors or the Council itself, could have 
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of the nineteenth century both municipalities had recognised that there was a problem in 
allocating members of the Council to particular committees. The development of municipal 
trading organisations to deliver tramways and electricity services, which were managed by the 
relevant Council committee, required a wide range of equipment and support services. 
Although it had been accepted that allocating members to committees which reflected their 
experience was desirable, but here was also a perceived risk this could provide increased 
opportunities for insider trading, and decisions by these committees could be open to 
challenge on the grounds they were influenced by the personal interests of committee 
members.  
Allegations of mismanagement and extravagance made about the Electric Lighting Committee 
led to some soul searching by Salford Council about the appointment to Council Committees 
of men whose private business interests could conflict with the Council’s interests. It was 
suggested that Councillor Barrett, an estate agent, should withdraw from the position of deputy 
Chairman of the Improvement Committee on the grounds that a part of his job involved 
contacts with property developers, a statement which led Alderman William Robinson to ask 
Where would this stop?  Should Councillor Williams, (a builder by trade and Deputy Chairman 
of the Building Committee) have to resign, or should Alderman Thompson be excluded from 
the Watch committee, because of his need to have a licence to conduct his business as a 
pawnbroker?  198 Councillor George Jackson, who had joined the Council in 1893 and was a 
Trade Union Secretary, stated that he had been urged not to take up a position on the 
Tramways Committee because there might be problems about the working conditions of the 
men employed in the service. It was agreed that the matter of barring members from particular 
committees, on the grounds that a conflict of interest that could arise at some future date was 
impractical, and that the matter should not be pursued. As a result of the Committee’s report, 
no general changes were made to the method of appointing members of Salford Council to 
particular committees. Changes in how membership of the various committees in Salford was 
selected did occur in part, because of the ‘Great Salford Muddle’, where committee 
overspending was the major problem.199 Membership of the Finance Committee was changed, 
so that it was composed of a member elected by each of the Salford standing committees, 
thus providing a forum where the spending plans of all the committees could be reviewed in 
the context of the budget of the Council, and conflicts of interest were less likely to occur. 
                                               
an impact on the actions of the Council. This is considered in Chapter 5.2, p.102, entitled ‘Vested interests, a threat 
to integrity?’ 
 198   Salford Chronicle, 8 December 1900, p.8, Proceedings of Salford Council: Report. The objection to Councillor 
Barrett was more likely to have been triggered because he had joined the Council only 2 years previously, and his 
experience was being questioned.  
199   The reasons and consequences of the ‘Great Salford Muddle’ are considered in Chapter 7.1, p.141., entitled 
‘Keeping the books.’ 
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There were some published allegations of conflict of interest, which were concerned with 
how the process of tendering by the Council for the supply of goods was conducted. In these 
it was alleged the process was suborned by the actions of councillors or officials. By the 
1880s tendering was used by both corporations to order goods or services. To ensure 
fairness to contractors submitting tenders, the conduct of the process used to decide the 
successful tender had to ensure that application for tender documents was open, and all 
tenders were treated in the same way, so that the choice of the successful tender was made 
only on the basis of conformity to the tender specification, the quality of the goods and the 
price. Evaluation of the tenders was conducted by the relevant committee, and as reporters 
were not present, the objectivity of the committee making the decision was difficult to 
challenge. The failure to adhere to these requirements could lead to allegations of corruption, 
but the extent of the problem during the late Victorian period is difficult to judge because 
even where the tender process was conducted incorrectly, the evidence could be hidden. 
The few allegations which did surface, giving detail about what happened during the process 
of tender adjudication, relate to situations where there was a complaint that the process used 
had been unfair and the matter was brought to Council notice. These cases suggest that it 
was not difficult to suborn the tender process. A letter from Frank Hollins, the Manchester 
Elective auditor, implied that the way samples which were submitted as a part of the tender 
adjudication by the Manchester Health Committee led to corruption. He challenged the 
conduct of the tender determination dealing with a contract to supply leather belting to 
Manchester Corporation. His family business, which produced leather goods, submitted a 
tender to supply the belting, but was unsuccessful.200 Hollins complained that the way that 
tender procedure was conducted was unfair, because the selection of the successful tender 
was predetermined by how the tender and samples were presented to the decision-making 
committee. He alleged that Henry Whiley, the Departmental Superintendent, who would have 
been in attendance at the Health Committee meetings, knew the reference numbers under 
which various samples had been submitted for assessment, and had been able to use this 
knowledge to influence the Committee’s decision. 201  Hollins claimed that the process used 
was therefore corrupt. When however, he was challenged by the winner of the tender, a Mr 
Burgess, to prove that his sample was both better quality and cheaper, Hollins did not take 
up the challenge.  Whiley stated that the reason for rejecting the Hollins tender was because 
                                               
200   Manchester City News, 3 October 1885, p3.   
201   Henry Whiley was appointed to the post of Superintendent in the Health committee in 1874 Throughout his 
career his position was challenged; he was accused of having other jobs which would interfere with his duties, he 
was accused of stealing the patent for a road sweeping device, and undertaking privately work which should have 
carried out by the Health Department. He survived because he was very good at his job. A, member of the 
Manchester Statistical Society, he gave a paper on the finances of Manchester Health Department in the 1885-6 
session. 
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the samples submitted did not meet the specification in two important respects.202 The 
reasons for the non-compliance were not published. Hollins did not take the matter further. 
The examples of the conduct of the tendering process described above reveal that it was not 
difficult for the process of evaluating tenders to be suborned, particularly when samples were 
submitted as part of the process. What is apparent was the absence in most cases of a 
specification of exactly what was needed, and an independent report about which of the items 
tendered met this specification; so that the decision could then be made by the committee, 
having regard to the cost.  Unfortunately, such an action, which would have at least ensured 
that the Council got value for money, was unlikely to have been accepted by members of the 
Council, who saw their role as arbiters in the decision-making procedure. 
By the early nineteenth century one example of conflict of interest was already recognised as 
needing a specific sanction. Beatrice Webb referring to practices used for contracting for 
goods and services in local government; described the situation pre-1835 as an ‘orgy of 
corruption.’ It was recognised that the practice known as ‘insider trading’203 would be a major 
problem in municipal government, and would threaten the development of an impartial method 
of allocating contracts for goods and services. The 1835 MCA and the subsequent 1882 Act 
both included a provision to try to eliminate the practice.  Section 12(1)(c) of MCA 1882 stated 
that:  
A person shall be disqualified for being elected and for being a councillor, if and while 
he… …has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any 
contract or employment, with by or on behalf of the Council…204  
 
The expansion of the duties faced by the fledgling municipalities set up under the 1835 Act 
meant that many early Councils had to rely on the expertise and input of its councillors to carry 
out the duties required of a municipality. As the business of a municipality was to provide 
services to the community, the role of many commercial businesses, councillors who had 
commercial experience saw their remit wider than merely taking decisions about matters of 
policy, but also being involved in delivering Council services themselves by ‘helping the 
Council out’.. 205  Although this practice of insider trading ran counter to the provisions of 
.section 12(1)(c) of the MCA (1882), it was tolerated as meeting a need, because early 
                                               
202   Hollins suggested that Whiley favoured ‘Mr Burgess’ because he had previously done business with him. 
Whiley did not comment about this allegation.  
203   The practice of members of a municipal council entering contracts to supply goods or services to the council, 
contrary to the provisions of section 12(1)(c) of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. 
204   The earlier clauses in the section, (12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) are considered below. 
205   One practice used was for the employees of a councillor to carry out work on behalf of the Council. As late as 
1896, Councillor Corney resigned when he was accused of insider trading because he was alleged to have 
employed a workman who had carried out work for the Council. Although there were mitigating circumstances in 
this case, Corney resigned after an enquiry found that his behaviour lacked integrity.  
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councils had limited resources. 206 By the late Victorian period, neither Council needed to rely 
on councillors ‘helping the Council out’, and the practice increasingly attract criticism that this 
was behaviour lacking integrity. The use of the word ‘corruption’ was avoided.  
The debate on how to deal with councillors guilty of insider trading came to focus on the 
sanctions which were available to deal with those found guilty of the offence. The idea of using 
the sanction of the criminal law, which would have the effect of convicting an offender of 
corruption and moral depravity, was seen to be overly severe when that action of ‘helping the 
Council out’ was behaviour which had previously been tolerated. Prior to 1889, it was difficult 
to bring a prosecution using the criminal law of fraud, since to succeed there had to be 
evidence that the motive for the corrupt action was to make a profit by defrauding the 
Corporation. As most councillors stated that their motive was ‘to help the Council out,’ it would 
have been difficult to prove that the alleged offence had been committed. In the late nineteenth 
century discussion of insider trading by members of the Council therefore turned on whether 
section 12(1)(c) of the MCA with its sanction of disqualification, had been breached.207 As the 
actions of councillors could be seen as acts of altruism; there was reluctance to pursue even 
this sanction.  
The defence to allegations of insider trading which was offered if challenged, was that the 
goods or services supplied were more specialised, or the materials purchased from the 
Council were surplus to requirements. 208 The actions of both Councils suggest that they were 
prepared to see this was a valid defence within the exemptions provided within Section 12 
itself. This whole section is a part of the MCA 1882 which deals with the constitution and 
government of the borough, and the qualifications needed to be a councillor. The earlier parts 
of  Section12  provide other grounds for the disqualification of a councillor, or disqualification 
from standing for election as a councillor for being, for example, …’any elective auditor, or a 
revising assessor, or anyone holding any office or place of profit in the gift or disposal of the 
Council or is in holy orders or the regular minister of a dissenting congregation’…209   The 
reason for the sanction of disqualification provided by Section 12 (1) was not therefore a 
‘punishment’, but the provision of a power to exclude from the Council those who could be 
perceived to have interests which might be at variance with the interests of the Council. 210 
There are however a series of exemptions to the sanction of disqualification provided by 
                                               
206   Examples of the behaviour of councillors, identified by Joseph Scott, were the supply of an engraved 
ceremonial trowel to the Council or the purchase of by-products of the gas production process.  
207   The attitude of councillors to their fellow councillors who might have been guilty of practices lacking integrity 
considered in Section 5.2, p.102. 
208   The ‘altruism’ was providing the service, but the goods supplied by a councillor were paid for by the Council. 
The purchase of goods surplus to the Council’s requirements, which should have been sold by tender, was for 
materials useful to the purchaser obtained at a favourable price. These were not acts of charity.  
209   Sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b). 
210   The qualification for membership of a Council is discussed in Section 5.1, p.90. 
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Section 12(1)(c) which apply to certain types of contract. Section 12(2) in the 1882 act; 
provides a defence against an allegation of insider trading in certain circumstances. This 
section stated that: 
A person shall not be so disqualified, or be deemed to have a share or interest in such 
a contract or employment, by reason only to his having any share or interest in:  
(a.) Any lease, sale, or purchase of land, or any other agreement for the 
same; or  
(b.) Any agreement for the loan of money, or any security for the payment of 
money only: or 
(c.) Any newspaper in which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the 
borough or Council is inserted; or 
(d.) Any company which contracts with the Council for lighting or supplying 
with water or insuring against fire any part of the borough:  or  
(e.) Any railway company or any company incorporated by Act of Parliament 
or Royal charter, or under the Companies Act, 1862.  
This was a pragmatic approach to a problem that was likely to arise in the early days of 
municipal government when a municipal corporation might find that it would need to contract 
with a member of the Council, because that member owned or controlled one of the interests 
defined in section 12(2), which the Council might need to use in order to protect or develop its 
services. The specific exemptions were therefore to avoid the situation that such a councillor 
would be unwilling to contract with the Corporation if the effect was to be disqualified from 
membership of the Council.  Although section 12(2) is very specific about the areas where the 
sanction in section 12(1)(c) did not apply, the pattern of behaviour of councillors suggests that 
it was believed that the section could be extended to cover any goods or services which could 
be said to be ‘difficult’ for a Council to provide. 211  The result was that the defence of ‘helping 
the Council out’ came to be regarded as an effective way of dealing with all allegations of 
insider trading.  By the late Victorian period, the situation had changed; the development of 
more comprehensive Council services removed the need the councillors to supplement these 
services, and there was recognition that an offender could make a large profit by contracting 
with the Council. The attitude of critics to the integrity of these actions was changing; and 
acceptability of the defence of ‘helping the Council out’, was increasingly questioned.  Despite 
this, there were a number of cases where the requirements of 12(1)(c) were breached, but the 
defence continued to be accepted; hence in effect this behaviour was being condoned by the 
Council.212 Although cases of councillors who had entered contracts with the Council to supply 
                                               
211   Some Acts define the scope of the legislation by giving examples of the type of offences covered by the Act 
and allowing similar matters to be included; the ‘euisdem generis’ rule. If this applies, it has to be specifically stated. 
The rule did not therefore apply to this section. Councillors guilty of insider trading and using the words ‘helping the 
Council out’ were in effect using this rule to justify their action. 
212   Section 8.1, p.162, considers the attitude of the Council to condoning wrongdoing. 
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goods in breach of section 12 of the MCA 1882 continued to be reported, the defence of 
‘helping the Council out’ was increasingly criticised.  
The language used by Scott left no doubt that in 1884 he saw insider trading as a frequent 
practice in municipal corporations. He stated that: 
What concerns the ratepayers, however, is that the Corporation is also a vast Co-
operative Mutual Trading Society. …The books contain invoices by aldermen and 
councillors……who supplied to the Corporation, and in some cases even to the 
committee of which they are members. 213    
A more damaging allegation was that some councillors employed subterfuge to get orders, by 
taking out contracts in the name of a relative. Scott did not give the names of any members of 
the Council who were guilty of this offence but his identification of the practice did heighten 
public awareness of its existence and led to cases alleging insider trading being brought to 
public notice. He accused some councillors of being members of the ‘Cooperative Mutual 
Trading Society;’ and he named two councillors who had supplied goods to the Council from 
their businesses. The description of the extravagance of the Baths Committee included the 
purchase of a ceremonial trowel, costing £15 which was used to lay the foundation stone of 
Osborne Street Baths as, ‘a purchase from an alderman….out of the rates’…214 The alderman 
was William Batty, a retail jeweller with shops in Manchester and Southport, who ’knowingly’ 
supplied the trowel. Batty, who was to serve as Lord Mayor of Manchester in the year 1888/9 
made no attempt to cover the fact that he has supplied the trowel; it appears that he saw his 
action as ‘helping the Council out’ by supplying an unusual item.215 Councillor John Mark, a 
grocer stated at a Council meeting that he was ‘entirely innocent’ of having any pre- agreed 
contracts with the corporation, but he confirmed that successive Mayors ‘were in the habit of 
sending to his establishment for goods for the ‘Mayor’s kitchen.’ 216 217  His business also 
supplied some of the cigars, wines and spirits bought by departments of the corporation, 
purchases which were entered in the accounts in the usual way. Although he could not be 
accused of using his position as a councillor to seduce this business, he was also accused of 
selling the Council a horse, and regularly provided the groceries for Council banquets; actions 
that were evidence of insider trading. 218  Scott gave details of the spending on a banquet to 
                                               
213   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.15. 
214   Manchester City News, 17 April 1886, p.5. William Batty was elected to Manchester Council in 1868, and 
became an alderman in 1884. He was also criticised when he was a member of the Victoria Hotel sub-committee 
of the Improvement Committee, he supplied the clocks for the building. He was Mayor for the year 1888-9.  
The mismanagement of the scheme to build the Victoria Hotel, undertaken by the Improvement Committee of 
Manchester Council, is discussed in Section 9.2, p.176. 
216   John Mark was elected to Manchester Council in 1877. He was elected alderman in 1889, and served as 
Mayor in 1889-90 and 1890-1891. As chairman of the Watch Committee, he was criticised by a Home Office enquiry 
held in 1897 for the part played by the Committee in covering up police corruption, (the so-called Bannister affair). 
As a result, he resigned from the Council. 
217   Manchester City News, 31 October 1885. Manchester Council Proceedings, p.6.  
218   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p. 28.  
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celebrate the opening of the Art Gallery which cost £4,800 to stage.219  He identified the 
amount of the total which related to the alleged insider trading activities of John Mark as 
£37/5/4d.  Mark’s defence, that he did not have a pre-agreed contract, suggests that he was 
aware of the sanction of disqualification in section 12(1)(c) of the MCA, and was distancing 
himself from the provisions of the section. Scott  argued that the transactions were illegal and 
that there were legal precedents which made it ’the bounden duty of honorary auditors to 
refuse signing the accounts in future if there are any payments to a member of the Council for 
goods supplied to the Corporation.’220  He did not give the  legal basis for this action; nor did 
he argue that, since in common law there was a contract between Mark and Corporation, 
albeit unwritten, Mark should have been disqualified under s12(1)(c) from sitting as a 
councillor.221 On the information given however, neither Mark nor Batty could be said to have 
made a large profit from their dealings with the Council. In both these cases it seemed that 
the defence that the two alleged offenders had acted to ‘help the Council out’ was accepted.   
 
There were problems about how far the definition of insider trading applied to public duties. 
When the minutes of the Museum, Parks and Libraries Committee were presented for 
approval at a meeting of Salford Council, the issue of a member of the committee, Councillor 
James Higson, a plasterer and decorator, acting as a subcontractor on a Council scheme to 
build a library at Irlams o’ th’ Height, was raised. 222 The form of words in the 1882 MCA was 
the same as that of the 1835 Act and was taken to include anyone who ‘knowingly benefited 
from a contract with the Council, whether as a contractor or subcontractor.223 Higson stated 
that he had not tried to disguise his involvement in the scheme; he had consulted the Town 
Clerk, Samuel Brown, who had stated that he was justified in entering the sub contract. 
Alderman Mandley, the Chair of the Committee, defended Higson, as he had acted on the 
incorrect advice of the Town Clerk. He suggested that, as Higson had given up the contract, 
it should be sufficient to offer an apology to the Council.  Higson resigned, a resignation that 
was accepted ‘with regret.’  Although there were no cases of a councillor being disqualified 
from Council for insider trading in either Manchester or Salford during the late Victorian period, 
Alan Doig reported a case where a member of a local Health Board who was disqualified, 
appealed against the disqualification. 224 The case, Nutton v Wilson, (1889) related to the 
                                               
219   Ibid., p. 27. He disapproved of these ‘celebrations’, stating that the Art Gallery was ‘a facility which catered for 
the middle or upper classes,’ which should not have been a charge on the rates, and was therefore ultra vires i.e. 
beyond the legal powers of the Council.   
.220   Ibid., p.16, was presumably using the argument that the purchase of these goods was ultra vires.  
221   In this case, the requirements for a contract were satisfied, there was an offer and an acceptance.  
222   Salford Chronicle, Proceedings of Salford Council, 8 December 1900.Editorial comment, p.4. James Higson 
was elected to Salford Council in 1892, and resigned after this criticism, in 1900. 
223   Ibid., 22 October 1881, p.2.,’Notes on Section 12 implications.’  
224  Alan Doig, Corruption and misconduct in Contemporary British politics,.p.66. Doig did not provide any 
references for this case, which took place in Halifax. 
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disqualification of a member of a Health board, covered by a similar term in the Public Health 
Act to section 12. The defendant, a joiner, was a member of the Board when a contract for 
work on health premises was awarded to two plumbers. He was unaware when he took a 
small job with one of the plumbers subsequently, that the work he was asked to do was related 
to this contract.  The ruling stated that the section was ‘to prevent members being exposed to 
temptation or even the semblance of temptation’; in effect, irrespective of any question of profit 
from the contract or corrupt intention, the defendant was in breach of the Act. The 
disqualification was confirmed. 
Whilst the defence of ‘helping the Council out’ continued being used to excuse ‘occasional’ 
purchases of items, by the 1880s the practice of using the defence to justify a regular business 
arrangement between a councillor and the Council was seen as a more serious offence. In 
two cases involving Councillor Charles Stewart225 and Alderman John King,226 senior 
members of Manchester Council, both men used their position to enter long- term and very 
profitable arrangements involving the purchase of materials which were surplus to the 
Council’s requirements. In both cases, Council discussion was not about whether the two men 
were in breach of s12(1)(c), but whether their actions were acts of personal corruption. Frank 
Hollins reported in 1885, that when he audited the books of the Manchester Highways and 
Sewers Department, he found that during the period 1881-85 there were 33 invoiced 
transactions involving Councillor Charles Stewart. 227  At the Council meeting when the 
minutes of Paving Sewering and Highways Committee were discussed, 228 Councillor Stewart 
explained that he had visited the Water Street Yard on business, as deputy Chairman of the 
Highways Committee. He had been told by Mr Stott the Superintendent, that the yard was 
being blocked by the dumping of loads of waste material chiselled off paving stones.  As a 
result, he agreed ‘to help the Council out’ by taking the material to use as ballast for a house 
building project he was undertaking, even though he stated ‘ballast would have been cheaper.’ 
After the initial delivery of scraplings, he continued to use the same source of supply for the 
material. The opinion was that he should have known that that the material should have been 
sold by tender as there might have been other customers for the material, and he could not 
therefore rely on a defence of ‘helping the Council out.’ Stewart did have support for his action; 
a Mr Horsfield stated that he had bought scraplings on the same basis as Stewart; it was 
cheaper for the corporation to sell the scraplings locally, rather than to pay to dispose of them 
                                               
225   Councillor Charles Stewart, a pawnbroker, who was elected to the Council in 1869, had already attracted 
Hollins’ critical attention for the level of his expenses claim (which was three times greater than the next highest 
claim) resulting to Hollins calling him ‘Deputation Charlie.’  
225   Ibid., 31 October 1885, p.6.  
226   The career and behaviour of Alderman King are considered in Section 6.4.p.126, ‘Lifestyle Choices.’  
227   Manchester City News, 24 October. 1885, p.5. ‘A Citizen Auditor’s Review.’’ 
228   Ibid., 31 October 1885, p.6.  
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at a greater distance. He stated Stewart was paying a fair price, and he concluded that he 
thought that Mr Hollins was ‘making a mountain out of a mole hill.’ 229. Alderman Abel 
Heywood, the Committee Chairman concluded that the matter was ‘irregular’, but he did not 
feel the councillor had been ‘dishonest’. He apparently recognised the personal nature of the 
attack on Stewart, when he commented, ‘It would be a poor reward to condemn him on the 
mere statement of an auditor;’ not a glowing endorsement of Stewart’s integrity. Charles 
Stewart did not stand for re-election to the Council in 1885. 230 
 
The affairs of the Manchester Gas Committee in the 1890s had already attracted the attention 
of Norbury Williams, one of Manchester’s Elective auditors. He reported that when the Gas 
Committee were applying for powers to extend their trading operations at a Local Government 
Board hearing, it was admitted that for many years, one firm of asphalters, Lord and Co., had 
been the sole purchaser of tar, a by-product of gas production. The company used pipes 
installed in their yards which communicated directly with two gasworks; Gaythorn and Bradford 
Road, to transfer the material. This ‘unfair’ advantage led to their tender being the only one 
submitted for tar sales.231 There is no evidence that Lord & Co obtained the contract by unfair 
means; it seems that Norbury Williams saw this as a case of mismanagement by the Gas 
Committee. In a later letter to the Lord Mayor, Alderman Abraham Lloyd, in 1889,232 Norbury 
Williams drew attention to ‘certain proceedings of the Gas committee’ which, he alleged, were 
‘illegal and blameworthy.’ 233  He was referring to the sale of Hucknall coke, a by-product of 
gas manufacture which was said to be difficult to burn, and hence to sell, but had been sold 
for 5/- per ton to a mill owned by the trustees of Alderman Lamb, and two mills where Alderman 
King, a senior member of the City Council, had financial interests. 234  He added that he had 
been assured ‘by contacts’, that there would be customers who would pay 10/- per ton for the 
material:  
but they knew that the whole quantity produced went to the two Aldermen King mills 
and, having trading relations with the Corporation, they didn’t think it would be politic 
to challenge the price. 
Norbury Williams also alleged that there was no record of a written contract for these sales 
and asked how this matter could have been overlooked by the Gas Committee and its 
                                               
229   Ibid., 7 November 1885, p.3. Letter: John Horsfield, an Asphalt & Concrete contractor.  
230  The failure of Abel Heywood to make a stronger condemnation of Stewart’s behaviour on this occasion, 
probably reflected his frustration with what he, like many councillors saw was ‘interference’ in Council business by 
Elective auditors like Hollins. 
231   Salford Reporter, 29 January 1898. Letter: W Hunt, Salford Elective auditor.  
232   Abraham Evans Lloyd, a chemical manufacturer was elected to the Council in1880 He was elected alderman 
in 1892. and served as Lord Mayor in the years 1894-5 and 1895-6. He died in 1899. 
233   Alderman King’s actions were illegal under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act. 1889, the terms of which 
are considered in Section 4.3 below. Alderman Lamb was Chairman of the Manchester Gas Committee from 1879 
to 1891. 
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officials.235  These transactions were defended by Alderman Gibson, Chairman of the Gas 
Committee,236 who stated that others had tried to use Hucknall coke and rejected it, and the 
Gas Committee considered that King had done the Corporation a favour by taking the material. 
237   An editorial stated that no one doubted the good faith of Alderman King, and that most 
accepted that he had ‘erred but erred innocently,’ as he saw his actions were in the public 
interest. 238  239  
The four cases of alleged insider trading described above, where the defence was that the 
offenders were ‘helping the Council out, were all breaches of 12(1)(c) and were actions which 
justified the censure of critics. Yet they actually represent different degrees of culpability. 
There was no suggestion that Batty overcharged for the goods provided; the profit made was 
small and whilst Mark seemed to realise that his actions were ‘irregular’, both provided a 
convenient service for the Council. It is more difficult to argue that the motives of Stewart and 
King were simply ‘helping the Council out.’ Both men were senior and experienced members 
of Council who must have known that there could be a market for material, surplus to the 
Council which should have been tested by seeking tenders from potential purchasers. By 
failing to do this, and continuing the profitable business, they were both guilty of personal 
corruption, the abuse of power by a person in a position of trust for personal gain. 
The provisions of 12(1)(c) of the MCA relating to insider trading also applied to cases where 
there was a contract between the Council and the business in which a Councillor was a partner 
or director.240  Two cases involved councillors with interests in businesses which had entered 
contracts with the Council as a result of a successful tender.  Charles Rowley and Son, the art 
dealers, won a tender to provide picture frames to the Corporation, although Councillor 
Charles Rowley, a junior partner in the company, was also a member of the Art Committee.241 
It was alleged that in this situation he could have influenced the decision about awarding the 
                                               
235   Norbury Williams stated that in the 1895 account books, two invoices were sent to Alderman King for 2,460 
tons of the Hucknall coke at a cost of 5/-.per ton. Assuming that the coke was saleable at 10/- per ton, this 
represented a total loss of £615 to the Corporation, and a corresponding saving for Alderman King.  
236   Robert Gibson, a luggage manufacturer, was elected to Manchester Council in 1882.  He was elected as an 
alderman in 1893, and took over the Chair of the Gas Committee in 1894.  He was Lord Mayor in the year 1897-8.   
237   Manchester City News, Manchester Council Meeting, 8 February 1896, p.5. 
238   Ibid., 7 March 1896, editorial, p.4.  
239   It is hard to believe Alderman John King was innocent!  He was elected to Manchester Council in 1856, became 
an alderman in 1867 and served as Lord Mayor in 1864/5. A manufacturer, he fought the battle to delay the 
Thirlmere scheme arguing that Manchester did not need additional water.  He was Chairman of the Finance 
Committee from 1886 to 1903. (The profile of Alderman King which appeared in Manchester Faces & places, 10 
March 1891 p. 117, was published prior to the date that these allegations were made.)  
240   Section 12(1)(c.), uses the phrase ‘has directly or indirectly …by himself or his partner any share or interest in 
any contract’ …This was interpreted as covering both owners and directors.  
241   Charles Rowley was a philanthropist. He founded the Ancoats Brotherhood in 1878 to bring art music and 
literature to the working classes...He was elected to the Manchester Council in 1875 serving until 1884. He resigned 
from the Council after Scott made allegations that his behaviour lacked integrity. Scott denied that he had brought 
‘a charge of dishonesty’ against Rowley. He stated that he had not intended to infer that Rowley was dishonest; 
merely that it was ‘undesirable for his own sake that he should sign an invoice for goods. (Scott, Leaves from the 
Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.30). 
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tender, although there was no evidence that Charles Rowley was involved in the day-to-day 
business of company and the tender was awarded to Charles Rowley and Son because their 
price was the lowest. Mr. A. Turner, who was the chairman of the Manchester Council Arts 
subcommittee, stated at a governors’ meeting of the Manchester Royal Institute that the tender 
awarded to Rowley’s was to supply one particular size of frame; the other parts of the tender 
were awarded to a different company.242  
In 1899, Salford Corporation invited tenders for the supply of 16 boilers for installation in the 
new Electrical Works which was being built. The contract was awarded to a local firm, 
Galloways, where Sir Richard Mottram, ex-Mayor of Salford, had trained as an engineer.243  
He was one of several directors of the Company; he also held directorships in other 
companies.  An editorial in Manchester City News 244 stated that the features of this transaction 
‘invited comment,’ 245 but the matter was not pursued by the press. The cases of Rowley and 
Mottram illustrate the problem in ascribing a breach of 12(1)(c) to their actions. Whilst the 
actual wording of the paragraph could be construed to apply to the two councillors, in both 
these cases the companies involved were prominent suppliers of the products specified in the 
tenders and there was no evidence that either man had solicited the business. 246 By the late 
Victorian period, many businesses companies originally founded and managed by members 
of the Council had changed, with the introduction of professional managers; so that a 
councillor-Director or even a partner in a business might no longer have any interest or control 
in the company’s day-to-day running. This is suggested by Sir Richard Mottram’s statement 
that, if he had had his way, Galloways would not have tendered for the contract. The sympathy 
shown by the press to Mottram was likely to have been recognition of this dilemma; the 
suggestion that he was guilty of an offence under the ‘Public bodies Corrupt Practices Act’ 
was not raised in the press report. 247   Salford Council seems to have taken a pragmatic view 
of the Galloways situation. The company, who were a leading supplier of boilers and 
transformers, supplied the equipment to the Electricity Works. No action was taken to 
disqualify Richard Mottram from sitting on Salford Council; and although sympathy was 
                                               
242   Manchester City News, 27 October,1884 p.3: Column headed ‘Protests and Correspondence.’  
243   Richard Mottram was elected to Salford Council in 1877.He was elected alderman in 1885 and served as 
Mayor for 3 years (1894-5,1995-6 & 1896-7). He was knighted in 1897. 
244   Manchester City News, 4 November 1899, editorial, p.5. 
245    It appears that the decision to award the contract to Galloways was because it was said to supply a reliable 
product.  It was also a local company and local companies were favoured, although Galloways did not submit the 
lowest tender.  
246   John Garrard suggested that the very presence of these two men on the Council, which behaved as ‘an 
exclusive ‘club’ was sufficient to ensure that their companies were favoured in any tender determination.  
247   Although the ‘Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act was passed in 1889, which provided inter alia a statutory 
sanction for those guilty of insider trading, no members of either Council or their officials were prosecuted under 
the Act during the nineteenth century. The Act and its implementation. is considered in the section 4.3. 
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expressed for position of Charles Rowley, he did not stand for re-election to Manchester 
Council in 1885. 
There was a further problem. Municipal government in the two municipalities was not immune 
from acts of corruption by individuals, which could occur within any branch of municipal 
services where opportunities existed for conflict of interest to arise.  Both Manchester and 
Salford employed staff to carry out a range of different roles within the municipality, including 
officers with special expertise, whose roles often involved developing and defining services or 
having executive responsibilities. The risk that councillors could influence decisions made in 
Council to further their own interests was recognised; the wording of the MCA para 22(3) 
provided that:  
A member of the Council shall not vote or take part in the discussion of any matter 
before the Council, or a committee, in which he has, directly or indirectly, by himself or 
by his partner any pecuniary interest….  
 
G. R. Searle, who noted that even in Parliament, where there had been attempts to define a 
member’s ‘duties and obligations,’ there were still cases where ministers had profited from 
knowledge obtained whilst undertaking official duties.248 W. Ivor Jennings agreed, writing in 
1938 noted that whilst improvements had taken place in central government to reduce 
incidents of corruption, the position in local government was ‘by no means so satisfactory;’ 
and that there were situations where a conflict of interest ‘was inevitable.’ 249 By the last decade 
of the nineteenth century both municipalities had recognised that there was a problem in 
allocating members of the Council to particular committees. The development of municipal 
trading organisations to deliver tramways and electricity services, which were managed by the 
relevant Council committee, required a wide range of equipment and support services. 
Although it was recognised that allocating members to committees which reflected their 
experience was desirable, there was also a perceived risk this could provide increased 
opportunities not only for insider trading but for the decisions by these committees being 
challenged on the grounds they were influenced by the personal interests of committee 
members. 250. With the passage of the 1891 act to abolish the Salford District Committees, the 
membership of the new unitary committees particularly the Electric Lighting Committee led to 
some soul searching by the Council. The membership of this existing committee, an off-shoot 
                                               
248   G. R. Searle, Corruption in British Politics 1895-1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987), p.44. 
249    W. Ivor Jennings, ‘Corruption and the public service,’ Political Quarterly Volume 9, no.1, 1938, .37. Jennings 
is referring to a wider problem here, the extent to which the interests of councillors or the Council itself, could have 
an impact on the actions of the Council. This is considered in Section 5.2, p102, ‘Vested interests, a threat to 
integrity?’ 
250   Salford Chronicle, 8 December 1900, p.8, Proceedings of Salford Council: Report. The dilemma faced by 
Salford when discussing membership Council Committees is discussed in Section 4.2, p.56. 
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of the Gas committee set up to supply electricity as a municipal trading operation, had already 
attracted allegations about mismanagement and extravagance. The membership of the 
committee was completely changed. The conclusion of discussions about the general problem 
considered by the Council was that barring members from particular committees, on the 
grounds that a conflict of interest that could arise at some future date, was impractical, and 
that the matter should not be pursued. As a result, no general changes were made to the 
method of appointing members of Salford Council to particular committees. Changes in how 
membership of committees in Salford was selected did however, occur in part, because of the 
‘Great Salford Muddle’, where committee overspending was the major problem.251 
Membership of the Finance Committee was changed, so that it was composed of a member 
elected by each of the Salford standing committees, thus providing a forum where the 
spending plans of all the committees could be reviewed in the context of the budget of the 
Council, and conflicts of interest were less likely to occur. 
 
4.3 The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889. 
 
By the late Victorian period, when opportunities to profit by insider trading had increased, the 
practice, which could prevent competitive tendering from taking place, was increasingly seen 
not to be in the interests of the ratepayers. There was no sudden change in attitude, but 
gradually more practices which were previously accepted as customary practices were being 
seen as unacceptable or even shady (venial). The number of councillors who were involved 
in these practices is difficult to assess; even where a committee became aware that one of its 
members was involved in insider trading, it seems that the rule of ‘loyalty to the committee’ 
applied; and it was ‘hidden’ offence. 252  Despite this, reports of insider trading did reach the 
press; in some cases the matter was discussed in the Council itself. There were also 
increasing complaints about decisions made by councillors or officials where it was alleged to 
there was a conflict of interest which made the decision unfair. The result was increasing 
concern about the standards of conduct in public life and the recognition that there was a need 
for a clear definition of what constituted acceptable behaviour when carrying out Council 
business. Two major and continuing scandals which received national coverage were 
undoubtedly the spur for the 1889 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, the first anti-corruption 
                                               
251   The reasons and consequences of the ‘Great Salford Muddle’ are considered in Section 7.1, entitled ‘Keeping 
the books.’ 
252   Manchester City News, 26 April 1886 p.6. The conclusion of the report about the mismanagement of the 
Victoria Hotel project noted that members of the Improvement Committee did not report the problems with the 
projects being managed by the Committee at the meetings of the Council. The report concluded ‘Loyalty to the 
committee is the bane and curse of representative bodies.’ 
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legislation applicable to deal with personal corruption in public bodies arising from these 
causes. 253  
The scandal involving Samuel Hunter, the Engineer and Gas Manager of Salford Gasworks, 
who had in effect taken over the decision-making processes in the Gas Committee, attracted 
huge attention.254 It revealed how the tendering system for the supply of coal and cannel, a 
major expenditure for the Council, had been suborned by the decisions which he made to 
secure commission. The nature and extent of the practice of commission taking was revealed 
when Ellis Lever, a leading coal merchant in the region. was prosecuted for criminal libel. 255 
It was alleged that he had ‘unlawfully and maliciously written and published a certain false and 
defamatory libel’ about the award of tenders in Salford.  He had stated that in a telegram to 
the Mayor that ‘Bribery, corruption and fraud have prevailed in (the) borough to an enormous 
extent for many years,’ with the implication that Hunter had been accepting bribes (in the form 
of commission), and the Gas committee had connived in the wrong-doing.256  The Gas 
Committee reluctantly took legal action and Lever was sued for criminal libel. The three-day 
hearing, which was fully reported in the local press, attracted national coverage. The evidence 
presented gave details about how the tenders for the supply of coal and cannel were 
evaluated, and how Hunter managed to arrange that suppliers willing to pay him commission 
were selected. 257. Lever was found not guilty of libel and Hunter was dismissed. After a delay, 
the Gas Committee, whose behaviour suggested that it had in effect connived in Hunter’s 
malfeasance, resigned.258  It was not until March 1888 that Hunter was prosecuted, not for 
bribery, because it was considered too difficult to prosecute him for that offence, but for perjury 
and forgery, both criminal offences.259 He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment with hard labour.  
                                               
253   There was already a criminal offence of corruption by embezzlement, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
254   The Salford local press reported the trial of Ellis Lever for libel in great detail, for example Salford Chronicle 
devoted full page coverage in March 1887. Garrard The Great Salford Gas Scandal 1887 noted that as every large 
town had a gasworks the trial attracted press attention for more than 12 months because it brought out the extent 
of commission-taking in the industry. 
255    Commission-taking in this situation involved a confidential agreement for the payment of a fee to the agent of 
the customer (Hunter) by the supplier of goods (a Coal merchant or colliery), as a precondition for the award of a 
contract, in effect a subversion of the tendering procedure. 
256   Salford Reporter, 12 March 1881. Lever had previously made similar allegations about the Salford system of 
contracting for coal supplies in a letter to the Chairman the Gas committee, but when threatened with an action for 
libel he had retracted the allegations and paid Hunter’s costs. 
257   Subsequent publicity and comment in the press about commission taking confirmed that these practices were 
a normal part of contracting, not only in the gas industry, but also in many other types of business.  
258   It is difficult to believe that the Gas Committee were unaware of Hunter’s practice of taking commission. This 
raises the possibility that there was sympathy for Hunter’s actions because he was thought to be receiving a salary 
which was not commensurate with his alleged achievement in making the sale of gas a profitable enterprise. The 
connivance of the Gas Committee might therefore be explained because ’allowing’ Hunter to seek commission’ 
was compensation for this situation. 
259   The allegation of perjury arose from the evidence which Hunter had given at the Lever ‘libel’ trial; the forgery 
allegation arose from his forgery of the signature of the Chairman of the Gas committee, written to a supplier of 
coal, purporting to confirm that the payment of commission to Hunter was acceptable.  
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It was the scandal of the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) which finally led to the 
recognition that legislation was necessary to stamp out unacceptable practices which were 
being used in local government by many local councils. Reports in the London press in the 
mid 1880 suggested that the practices associated with the sale of surplus land by the MBW, 
which was no longer required when the street improvements were completed, were a scandal. 
The culmination of these claims was the publication of two reports in the Financial Times 
alleging that corrupt practices were being used in the way tenancies were being awarded for 
building plots on new streets.260 A Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Herschell, was set up 
in February 1888 to investigate these claims. His report confirmed that the use of corrupt 
practices in the MBW was widespread.261  His specific criticism was focussed on two members 
of Board who were practicing architects, and several officials of the Architects Department 
including two surveyors, all of whom had made money by misusing their positions for personal 
gain. The report noted that these practices had been in use for many years. The scandal also 
drew attention to the administrative failures of the Board. Gloria Clifton, in a detailed study of 
the organisation and management of the Board’s services, noted that the MBW was one of 
the first local authorities to develop an extensive bureaucratic administration,262  The majority 
of permanent staff of the Board were recruited by competition for advertised posts which were 
in a management structure which provided for the supervision and training. The MBW had 
been set up in 1855; the first act of the 59 members of the Board who were mainly nominated, 
was to elect a Chairman who agreed to serve full-time in the office and was paid a salary. His 
role was to guide the affairs of the Board. This was very successful, perhaps because of the 
post holders who were elected, the first of whom was (Sir) John Thwaites. Clifton noted that 
despite these considerable management arrangements, scandal had occurred. She 
commented that whilst it was the professionalism of men such as the architects. engineers 
and surveyors who developed the specific skills needed to undertake the specialised work of 
the Board, the quality and integrity of the senior officials responsible for maintaining the probity 
of the practices used was crucial. 263 In a situation where the increasing numbers of 
professionals became employees of public bodies such as municipal corporations, and who 
had therefore lost the freedom to pursue opportunities in private practice which might be 
financially advantageous, there was a clear risk that they would ignore or fail to see that there 
was a conflict of interest with their public duties, the situation in the MBW.  
                                               
260   Financial Times, 25 October, and 23 November 1886. 
261   Final Report of the Royal Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into Certain Matters Connected with the Working 
of the Metropolitan Board of Works. BPP1989 vol 39. 5705. Farrer Herschell, who chaired the meetings of the 
Commission, was a a leading QC and parliamentarian who had served as Solicitor General and was Lord 
Chancellor from 1892 to 1895. 
262   Gloria C. Clifton, Professionalism Patronage and Public Service in Victorian London (London: Athlone 
Press,1992).  
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The MBW scandal brought to public notice the issue of the standards of professional conduct 
of architects and surveyors in particular, but also other professionals working in the wider field 
of public service where practices such as insider trading were increasingly seen to be 
improper, and allegations of could lead to questioning of decisions made where these 
professions were involved. The result of public pressure for legislation to deal with this issue 
was the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices. Act,1889. Section 1 of the Act prohibited a person 
covered by the Act whether by himself, or in conjunction with any other person 
 from corruptly soliciting or receiving, or agreeing to receive, for himself, or any other 
person, any gift, loan, fee, reward or advantage whatever as an inducement to, or 
reward for, doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction 
whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which the public body is concerned. 
The Act therefore included the practice of insider trading, and cases arising from a conflict of 
interest, but it was not retrospective.  
Although the expectation 1889 Act, with its criminal sanction was that it would deter councillors 
or officials from attempting to exploit their position to gain a financial advantage, it is difficult 
to prove that this was the case. Both Councils were in practice reluctant to impose any sanction 
when wrongdoing by councillors occurred, and neither Manchester nor Salford used the Act 
to prosecute offenders in the nineteenth century.263 Comment about sanctioning councillors 
for insider trading, if it was mentioned, was usually concerned with whether the penalty of 
disqualification from the Council was appropriate. Allegations of insider trading continued to 
be publicised, particularly when the development of the electricity industry in the 1890s needed 
a wide range of equipment both for use in Electricity works and the street installations, but the 
use of the sanction of disqualification was avoided. The purchase of this equipment much of 
which was manufactured in Manchester and Salford, provided opportunities for councillors 
who had interests in acquiring a stake in these developments. As late as 1900, William Hunt, 
one of Salford’s Elective auditors alleged that the method used for awarding contracts for the 
supply of equipment to be used in a new Salford Electricity works was corrupt.  264 He stated 
that there was ‘something rotten in the state of affairs’ when, on one occasion, (the date was 
not given) it was only when the Electrical Engineer, C.L. Turner was able to convince the 
Committee that one tender was not ‘suitable for purpose’ that the acceptance of an 
inappropriate tender was avoided, despite considerable pressure for a different decision from 
another Committee member. He also alleged that on another occasion, a luncheon was 
provided by one contractor who had an interest in a tender, just before a meeting to discuss 
                                               
263   As the Act created an indictable offence, the complication of undertaking a prosecution using the Act might 
have been a deterrent to using it to prosecute cases of wrongdoing, particularly as both Councils failed to accept 
that the offences which it covered were cases of corruption. 
264   Salford Reporter, 21June 1900. Letter William Hunt.  
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tenders and that threats were made against one member of the Committee who held out 
against a particular decision. A further allegation related to an incident where, at a meeting 
held to open tenders, pressure was brought to make a decision before proper discussion and 
advice was taken.  On this occasion, ‘foul language and abuse’. was used by one member to 
make his opponent ‘amenable to reason.’  No evidence was provided that these examples of 
conflict of interest did result in benefit to the offending councillors, who he did not name, and 
no attempt seems to have been made to identify the guilty parties. The Council’s response to 
these allegations was to replace the membership of the Electricity Committee. Although 
Manchester Council avoided cases which led to the level of publicity engendered by the Hunter 
case, there were ‘conflict of interest’ problems with the tendering procedures used by the 
Council. The Chairman of the Electricity Committee, Alderman Lloyd Higginbottom, an 
engineer who was the Chairman of several electrical companies, also had an interest in the 
award of tenders for developments in the electricity field. 265 He was accused by the Elective 
auditors of ‘decidedly improper conduct’ when it was revealed that he had used his influence 
to assist these companies to gain orders. He was forced to resign. 266  
Allegations of conflict of interest arose when an individual was accused of using the 
opportunities which presented themselves when carrying out duties attached to his position 
for personal benefit. Using Council property or resources for a private purpose was regarded 
by both Councils as a breach of duty, and one area where the imposition of a sanction was 
seen as appropriate. Senior members of the corporation who held managerial positions, 
apparently saw this practice as a long-standing tradition, a perk of some posts.  It was not until 
the 1880s that examples of the practice came to public notice. As there were concerns that 
this behaviour set a bad example for more junior staff, the approach of both Councils was to 
set up a special committee or an independent inquiry to investigate the matter.267  An early 
reported case arose from the report of the subcommittee set up by Manchester Council 
following the conviction in 1880 of the Chief Clerk of the Waterworks Department, Frederick 
Hepton for embezzlement. This confirmed that the Chairman of the Waterworks Committee, 
Alderman John Grave, had used departmental facilities as a private banking service to provide 
loans on demand, using monies held in a section of the Waterworks Department which should 
have been banked. 268 This was with the connivance of the Superintendent of the Department, 
T.G.H. Berrey, who had also borrowed money from the same account. These irregular 
transactions dated back to April 1875; no interest had been charged or paid on any of these 
                                               
265   Lloyd Higginbottom was elected to Manchester Council in 1890, and became an alderman in the same year. 
266   Manchester Council Proceedings, 5 November 1900. 
267   Public exposure of the practice was usually as a result of the matter being raised in Council by a member of 
the Council, rather than as a matter identified by critics. 
268   The Hepton embezzlement is discussed in Section 4.4, p.78. 
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dealings.  Although no evidence was given suggesting that Alderman Grave269 had embezzled 
monies belonging to the Corporation, the Subcommittee set up to investigate these dealings 
noted that it was ‘lamentable’ that:  
any direct part taken in these irregularities by a gentleman holding the high and 
honourable position of Alderman of the city and Chairman of this important department, 
that the example thus furnished must have had a detrimental effect on the discipline of 
the department and given encouragement to the deplorable laxity that has prevailed. 
270 
The word ‘corruption’ was not used in the Council report about either man; the Council’s 
actions suggested that they thought that both were guilty of venial rather than venal conduct. 
The enquiry into the stewardship of Samuel Hunter whilst in post as Gas Engineer of Salford, 
following his dismissal on 9 February 1887, also brought to light the extent to which he had 
used Council resources for private purposes. 271  A Mr J.F. Halligan, deputy manager of two 
of the Salford Gasworks, confirmed that Hunter used employees of the gasworks to undertake 
work at Beech House, his property in Salford, for periods of four and five weeks at a time. He 
also stated that he got his supplies from the storekeeper at the Gas works.  In the next weeks, 
the enquiry heard a succession of other members of the Gasworks staff about private work 
undertaken for Hunter. In two later cases an inquiry was set up as a direct result of an 
allegation that Departmental managers were using Council property for a private purpose. W. 
D. Callison, had succeeded Henry Whiley to the post of the Superintendent of the Cleansing 
Department of Manchester Corporation in 1893.  Rumours of malfeasance which were 
reported to the Council, eventually led to an enquiry being set up under an external referee, a 
Mr E Sutton.272,  His ‘brief report’ was published in June 1898.273 The main allegation made 
against Callison, which was confirmed, was that he had used workmen, paid by the Council, 
to do painting and decorating work at his property, using materials from the Council store for 
which he failed to pay the full price. C. L. Turner, Salford’s Electrical Engineer, was accused 
of patenting and exploiting design work which he had undertaken whilst in the employ of 
Salford Corporation, and which, the Council alleged, he had stolen. Turner was also accused 
of ‘misleading the Electric Lighting Committee’ on certain important matters. He had lied about 
the date he obtained a patent for the design work he was alleged to have stolen, and how the 
list of possible contractors came into the possession of a pipe work company. An independent 
                                               
269   A biography on Alderman Grave is given in Section 6.3, p.126, ‘Lifestyle choices, the aspirations of officials & 
members of the Council’.  The biography of T. G. H. Berrey is given on page 79. 
270   Proceedings of Manchester Council, 1 September 1880. The sanctions imposed on those guilty of this type of 
offence are discussed in Chapter Eight.  
271   Notes from the Investigation committee on Salford Gasworks (held at the Gas Office, Bloom Street 21 February 
1887 onwards).  The Hunter papers, parcel 1. Box no.90. Salford Local History Library.  
272   The complaint was originally referred to the Mayor, as titular head of administrative services. As he took no 
action, pressure from members of the Council led to the setting up of the external enquiry.  
273   Manchester City News, 25 June 1898 p.4. 
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committee set up to consider the matter which reported on 12 May 1900, confirmed that the 
truth of the allegations and why Turner had ‘lost the confidence of the Committee.’ 274   In each 
of these cases the finding was that the individuals concerned were guilty of behaviour lacking 
integrity and should be sanctioned.  
There was particular concern that members of the Council involved in insider trading could 
undermine the fairer system of purchasing goods by tender, or that decisions could be swayed 
if conflicts of interest arose. As a result of rumours that Council members had contracts with 
the Council to provide services, Salford Council agreed in 1901 to set up a Special 
Subcommittee: 
To consider whether any member of the Council has, directly or indirectly, by himself 
or his partner, any share or interest in any contract or employment for, by, or on behalf 
of the Council, in contravention of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. 
The Subcommittee considered three cases.275 The first, involving Councillor James Corney, a 
builder by trade, who was elected in 1894 to Salford Council, occurred in 1896 when he was 
a member of the Baths Committee. He agreed to supervise repairs to the roof of Pendleton 
Baths, as a cheaper alternative to the more expensive complete roof replacement, and he 
arranged for an unemployed joiner, a Mr Barnard, to do the work ‘on his own account’ although 
he borrowed the ladders and equipment which he needed from Corney, who also gave him 
instructions about the work required. The invoice for the work, submitted by Barnard, had no 
bill heading. The issue was whether Barnard was an employee of Corney; if yes, this was a 
breach of s.12(1)(c) the MCA 1882. Whilst Corney’s actions undoubtedly saved the Council 
money, the pretence that Barnard was self-employed was difficult to sustain, as Corney 
submitted the account for the work done for payment, and paid Barnard, thus supporting 
evidence that Corney was guilty of insider trading.  Councillor Arthur Haworth, a leather goods 
manufacturer who was elected to the Council in 1895 had been chairman of the Salford 
Electric Lighting Committee. He was accused of sending a letter to a subcontractor of a 
successful tender for electrical plant in 1895, soliciting a contract to supply leather belting. He 
stated that his family firm had previously done business with a Mr Stead, one of this company’s 
directors, and it was only at his suggestion that he wrote the letter soliciting business. The 
belting contract was awarded to Haworth’s family firm, although Stead stated this was strictly 
based on price and quality, but he denied suggesting Haworth should contact him about a 
contract matter. The contradictory evidence was not explained or apparently investigated. The 
third case involved Councillor William Huddart, a coal merchant, and member of the Gas 
Committee, who was elected to Salford Council in 1891 He was alleged to have acted as 
                                               
274   Salford Weekly News, 12 May 1900. Salford Council Meeting, p.7. 
275   Proceeding of Salford Council, 6 March 1901.  Report of the Special Subcommittee.  
75 
agent for the Salford Gas Department in 1895 in the negotiations about a contract for the 
transport of coal from the rail sidings to the gasworks. A separate contract was awarded to a 
Mr Scholes, to carry out is coal deliveries to various Corporation gasworks, yet it was alleged 
the work was done by Huddart using his carts and men. Huddart stated that he had sold his 
business to his nephew; the carts had not been painted with the new owner’s name.  He was 
not asked to explain why he took commission of 10d per ton from the monies paid to him by 
the Gas Department, when the sub contract with Scholes was signed.  
The report of the Special Subcommittee noted that Councillors Corney, Howarth, and Huddart 
had shown ‘a lack of scrupulous regard for their obligations as members of the Council’ and 
were in breach of paragraph 12(1)(c) of the MCA 1882. The use of the words ’lack of 
scrupulous regard’ implies abuse of position i.e. corruption.276 In the Council debate which 
followed, it was argued that there was insufficient evidence to bring a charge under the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act (1889).277 As the Act was not retrospective and none of the 
alleged acts had been committed in recent years, prosecution was not an option. When the 
subcommittee report was considered by the Council, an attempt was made to mitigate the 
subcommittee verdict by an amendment to a motion simply to accept the report, by adding an 
additional phrase, (shown here in italics):  
that it be placed on record that the alleged incidents of contracting or subcontracting 
have not been established, …the Council are nevertheless of the opinion that no 
members of the Corporation should enter into relations, however innocent, with 
contractors likely to disturb public confidence in the Council…278 
The amendment was lost, and the motion to accept the report was passed. The 
correspondence columns of the two Salford papers reflected a variety of views, including 
letters asking when the three councillors were going to resign; when disqualification 
proceedings would take place, and comments about the consequences of ‘tolerating this 
behaviour.’ 279 There was agreement that the Special Committee had done a good job, and 
delivered a fair verdict, but one correspondent felt too great a fuss had been made of the 
problem. He noted that ‘a mountain of labour had produced ‘a miserable mouse indeed!’ None 
of the correspondents used the word corruption, although one stated that the actions of the 
three councillors were ‘a clear abuse of position,’ which should have led to disqualification. 
Corney resigned from the Council, citing pressure of business. Huddart, who received a vote 
                                               
276   The inference made by the Council itself, that acts of personal corruption, performed by its members of the 
municipality acting under the aegis of the Council, could be seen as evidence of Council corruption, was made in 
the case of three Councillors Corney Howarth and Huddart. 
277   The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act (1889) is considered in Section 4.3. 
278   The amendment was tabled by Councillor Desquesnes, the deputy Chairman of the Health Committee, which 
was chaired by Councillor Huddart.  
279   Salford Reporter, 6 April 1901, p,5. Letter from the ‘Salford Municipal League’, to the Town Clerk L. C. Evans, 
calling for the three men to resign.  
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of confidence from the Regent Liberal Association, was elected as an alderman in 1909. 
Howarth made no comment about the subcommittee report, but did not stand for re-election 
to the Council in 1901. 280  
The reported cases of insider trading which breached the requirements of section s.12(1)(c) 
of the MCA 1882 show the changing attitude from a practice which was tolerated, to cases 
where critics increasingly regarded the practice as venial or even corrupt conduct. The 
apparent unwillingness of both Councils to implement the sanctions which were available to 
deal with councillors who were guilty of this behaviour, which damaged the reputation of the 
Councils for integrity, is discussed in Chapter 8.1, p.162, which examines the extent to which 
the two Councils condoned wrongdoing and the reasons why this happened.  
 
4.4. Embezzlement. 
 
This section considers cases of embezzlement where the allegation of corruption was proven. 
In a number of these cases, the embezzlement resulted in a significant loss of Council monies.  
As a result, the allegations of critics were not merely about the attitude of the Council to the 
sanction of these offenders, but concentrated instead on why the embezzlement had occurred. 
  
Corruption by embezzlement was committed by staff ranging from junior clerical staff to the 
most senior officials in the municipality, all of whom were involved in the process of handling 
money received by the corporation, which they diverted for personal use.  Although there was 
no attempt to condone incidents of embezzlement, both Councils tried to avoid publicity in 
dealing with employees guilty of the offence, because this reflected badly on their ability to 
provide government with integrity.  As a result, legal action was avoided if possible; offenders 
such as officers, who were responsible for receiving monies for Council services were 
dismissed, and the moneys lost were recovered from the ‘security’ which all members of staff 
were require to provide on appointment.281 For the posts of municipal town clerk and treasurer, 
the security was usually £3,000, although for more junior staff the figure could be as low as 
£100, still a significant sum of money for junior staff in municipal employ.  It is not therefore 
                                               
280   Salford Reporter, 13 April 1901, p.4.  
281   Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern England, p.136. The MCA 1882 section 20, provided the power to require 
security from every officer appointed by the Council. When insurance companies required prosecutions to be 
brought against those committing embezzlement, Salford Council decided to set up its own fund in 1866, to avoid 
the publicity which this could attract. The premiums paid by staff were intended to build up a fund to cover the 
recovery of any monies embezzled, instead of the staff providing their own security. When the Noar defalcation 
occurred the resources in the fund were inadequate, so the monies to replace the loss suffered were charged to 
the Borough fund. The use of the Borough fund for this purpose was not queried.  The system of using commercial 
insurance companies was reintroduced. 
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possible to know how many actual cases there were of embezzlement; the few cases reported 
were almost certainly the tip of a wider problem. Although the security would have been initially 
provided by friends and relatives, by the 1860s companies selling insurance policies had 
replaced these personal guarantees. Robb stated that before restitution was made, some 
companies required the employer to publicise the punishment for embezzlement by 
prosecuting offenders in order to act as a deterrent, as a result some cases were reported in 
the press. 
 
It was more difficult to cover up incidents of embezzlement committed by more senior 
members of the Council which resulted in significant losses of Council monies, a matter of 
concern to ratepayers. These usually came to public attention as a result of an announcement 
in Council about the ‘accidental’ discovery of a shortfall in the monies in a departmental 
account.282 In these cases, after disclosure of information about who committed the 
embezzlement and which department was involved, critical comment not surprisingly focussed 
on the internal  investigation to determine how the embezzlement had been carried out, 
concentrating  on the management and audit systems in use in the municipality. William Noar, 
who was appointed Treasurer of Salford Corporation in 1861, was found in 1866 to have 
embezzled £3,100, offences which had started from the date of his appointment. 283  Noar’s 
work was never checked. The state of the Treasurer’s account books had been criticised by 
the Elective auditors, but no action had been taken to improve the record keeping in the 
Department. It was only when Noar was instructed to ‘balance the books’ by the Finance 
Committee, prior to implementing some minor changes in departmental financial procedures, 
that the shortfall in the accounts became apparent. Two further cases where there were 
prosecutions for embezzlement in Salford, used the same method. Jos. Kenyon, who had 
been employed for 12 months by a Local Health Board, was charged with embezzling £80, 
monies which he should have banked. 284  . A ‘Mr Stansfield’ a collector of Paving accounts for 
the Salford District committee, said to be a ‘perfectly respectable man’ was prosecuted on two 
sample charges of embezzlement of £24 and £58. He had embezzled more than £1,000 which 
he used to speculate on property. In neither case was the work of these officers checked on a 
regular basis. 
John Graves, Salford’s Town Clerk, appointed in 1882, embezzled three instalments of money 
received from the overseers in the years 1885, 1886 and 1887 - monies which had previously 
                                               
282   This could be by notification to the Council of a shortfall in the accounts of a particular department found by 
professional auditors, a discovery made when changes to the procedure used which resulted in a check of the 
account books or an occasional random check as part of the annual accounts.  
283   Salford Weekly News, 22 September 1866, editorial, p.2.  
284   Salford Chronicle, 12 July 1879. Magistrates Court reports. 
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been paid directly to the Treasurer.285 He also embezzled inter alia some other small sums of 
money he should also have paid to the Treasurer. As he absconded, there was no prosecution, 
but reports to the Council about how the embezzlement was carried out, and the full extent of 
the shortfall, provided the reasons why the embezzlement occurred and the extent of the 
incompetence of the Elective auditor, Salford Finance Committee and the Council.  
The embezzlement by Frederick Hepton, a senior clerk of Manchester Waterworks 
Department, who was prosecuted in 1880, led to the financial procedures in a section of the 
Department being open to full public scrutiny. It was as a result of an annual audit that led 
William Aldred, a professional accountant and author of the audit, to state in a letter to the 
Chairman of the Waterworks Committee: 
I regret to report that I have discovered irregularities in the accounts of the Chief Clerk 
and Cashier, who has purposely withheld from myself and previous Auditors certain 
books in which discrepancies appear. 286  
 
For two years Aldred had been unaware of how the accounts were kept and the number of 
account books being used in the small section of the Department which dealt with 
miscellaneous sales. He did not apparently meet with the staff of the section and only 
examined the books which were presented to him for audit.  The accounts dealing with the 
supply of water to customers were found to be in order, but the fact that this problem could 
occur in a major municipal trading operation led to sustained censure of the Council and 
analysis about how the embezzlement had been made possible.287 The editorial in Manchester 
City News published on 17 July 1880, examined why the audit of the system of book keeping 
used in the Waterworks Department had failed to detect the fraud.  Surprisingly it did not blame 
the Waterworks Committee, although the appointment of Hepton in the dual capacity, 
(apparently as a cost saving measure), provided the. opportunity to carry out the 
embezzlement. 288 The poor performance of the professional auditor; William Aldred also 
                                               
285   The Graves embezzlement came to light when a family who had entrusted money to him, asked to see the 
legal papers. He absconded, and the embezzlement of the Council moneys was then identified. This case is 
considered in more detail in Section 6.3, p.126 ‘Lifestyle choices, the aspirations of officials & members of the 
Council.’  
286   The letter was not read into the Minutes of the Waterworks Committee of Manchester Council until 3 March 
1881.  
287   Hepton used a similar technique to Noar, but in this case, Hepton gave the ‘customer’ a receipt for the moneys 
received in the sale of materials which were surplus to the Council’s requirements, but entered a lesser amount in 
the Assets ledger. 
288   There was one very important requirement if embezzlement was to be avoided; there had to be a clear 
separation between the role of the Chief Clerk and Bookkeeper, responsible for producing the invoices, and the 
Cashier, responsible for receiving payments and producing the receipts confirming payment.  Without this 
separation, a person with a dual appointment could receive one sum of money, credit the payer’s account with a 
different and lesser sum and keep the difference; and then take care not to send invoices to those customers where 
the books continue to show that the account is not settled. On audit, the payer will still show as a debtor, but the 
ledgers will balance. In the Hepton and Tetlow/Hallard cases, the failure to separate these functions provided the 
opportunity for embezzlement. 
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escaped criticism; instead it was T. G. H Berrey, who as Hepton’s supervisor, was expected 
to carry out weekly checks on the Cash Book, but failed to do so, who was held to be primarily 
responsible. 289 The editorial stated 
that the system of bookkeeping and audit had its faults is too palpable now to be denied, and 
though we do not in any degree blame the committee, we cannot help thinking that a gentleman 
of Mr Berrey’s ability and experience ought long ago to have suggested improvements which 
would have brought Hepton’s career as a defaulter to an end... 
The problems with the accounts of the Waterworks Department in 1880 had wider implications. 
This was the first major case in which the detail of the mismanagement and incompetence in 
a section of a large municipal trading operation was put under the spotlight; accounts which 
had been audited by a professional auditor without the problem being identified.  For critics, 
the Hepton embezzlement raised concerns about whether the same problems might be 
common to the activities of other Committees in the municipality, but this matter was not 
pursued. 290 
 The lessons of the Hepton case were not learned. In a much later case, a variant of his method 
was used by John Tetlow, a Director of John Tetlow & Sons, earthenware pipe manufacturers 
and David Hallard aged 22 years, a clerk with Manchester Corporation. 291  They were jointly 
charged with specimen charges of receiving 6 sums of money (£51-£64) from the Corporation 
by false pretences and conspiring together for this purpose. The Corporation bought clay 
piping from the Tetlow Company.  John Tetlow one of the Company directors, obtained the 
correct invoice for the goods ordered by the Council, from the bookkeeper of the firm, which 
he suppressed, and generated a new invoice which used a larger cost for the goods. Hallard, 
had a dual role. He both ordered the goods and cleared the new invoice for payment. Tetlow 
then presented this invoice personally at the Manchester Offices of the Treasurer’s 
Department where he received a cheque payable to a special company account which he held 
at the Union Bank, and from which he made a payment to the Company for the correct amount 
of the original invoice. The profit to the fraudsters was roughly £50 per transaction. The fraud 
was discovered when the Union Bank notified Alfred Tetlow, another director, that a cheque 
for £184, a payment from the Treasurer’s department had been ‘lost.’ He informed the City 
                                               
289   Faces & Places, Volume 5 (1894) p.106, includes the obituary of T.H. G. Berrey.  It noted that his Municipal 
service began in 1839 when he joined the staff of Manchester Council’s Waterworks Department undertaking 
clerical duties largely associated with the Committee’s finances. He was appointed Superintendent in 1851.He took 
over the role of outdoor superintendent in 1874, and despite having no engineering training he instituted 
improvements in water delivery and the testing of water fittings. He was elected Associate of the Institute of Civil 
Engineering in 1874. The obituary fails to make any mention of Berrey’s role in the Waterworks scandal of 1880. 
290   A number of departments had ‘side lines’; for example, the Highways and Paving Department sold scraplings, 
& the Health Department built privies and sold manure. As the full financial accounts of the various Departments 
are not available, it is not clear whether these activities were separately identified in the accounts and were audited.   
291   Manchester City News, 23 April 1898, p.6.  
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Treasurer and this led to an investigation which led to the discovery of the fraud and 
prosecution of the offenders 
For many low paid clerical officers whose duties involved handling money on behalf of the 
Council, the temptation to embezzle council monies must have been very  great, particularly 
when audit procedures were  inadequate or non-existent  and supervision was minimal, so the 
risk of being found out was believed to be very low.292 As the volume and complexity of Council 
business increased, the means of preventing embezzlement was then, and remains so in the 
twenty first century, a battle to continuously improve the methods of audit and supervision of 
staff to discourage embezzlement; or if it happens, to identify the wrongdoing before a 
significant loss of money occurred.293 A case of embezzlement in Wolverhampton in 1917 by 
an officer of the Council showed how serious the consequences could be of failing to 
implement these requirements. 294  In 1905, the Council passed a resolution bringing the 
accounts of the Education Committee in line the accounts of all the other committees of the 
Council i.e. under the ‘control’ the borough treasurer and the borough accountant. The day-
to-day financial business of the Committee was carried out by Jesse Varley who had been 
appointed as an account clerk in 1898. In theory he was responsible to the Education 
Committee as a whole which in turn was responsible to the Town Clerk, but the Chairman of 
the Education Committee, who was also Chairman of the Finance Committee, and the Town 
Clerk had complete trust in Varley. The result was that there were no proper arrangements to 
supervise and monitor his work, and any checks which were made were cursory. His main 
role was to pay in cash the salaries of teachers, including any extra duties which might have 
been undertaken. The embezzlement was carried out by including in the Salary Account book, 
used to record these transactions, a number of blank pages, duplicates of which he obtained 
from the printers. Payments to the ‘real’ teachers were recorded in this book, so that nothing 
untoward would emerge if the books were inspected, as the names of the teachers could be 
checked against the official list of teachers employed by the municipality.  Varley ‘invented’ a 
large number of teachers, whose names and payments were entered onto the Salary Account 
duplicate sheets. Prior to the date for the audit, which was notified to Varley in advance, the 
Salary Account book was sent to the printers where the blank sheets were removed and 
replaced by the duplicate sheets giving details of the payments made to the phantom teachers. 
The binding was then made good. Varley forged receipts for these extra payments. The 
                                               
292   This issue is considered in more detail In Section 6.1, p117. 
293   Manchester City News 17 July 1880, editorial, p.4, commenting on the failure to prevent embezzlement in the 
Hepton Waterworks case considered above, stated, ‘if a cashier is determined to rob his employer, he will do so 
whatever the system of checks.’  
294   This account is taken from Chapter Seven by John Smith entitled ‘’Ingenuous and daring’: the Wolverhampton 
Council fraud 1905-17’ in editors, James Moore and John Smith Corruption in Urban politics and Society, Britain 
1780-1950 (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007). 
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apparent overspending of the Departmental budget which audit revealed was explained to be 
the result of delays in receiving government grants; no check was made to see if this was the 
case. It was well- known that Varley enjoyed a life style well in excess of his Council income 
of £325, which he stated was the result of family money inherited by his wife. This was untrue. 
The Varley defalcations, which continued from 1905 to 1917, totalled £84,336, and were only 
uncovered when a junior clerk, newly employed in the audit department noted the discrepancy 
between the official list of teachers employed by the authority, and the names of those in the 
altered Salary Account book, sent for audit. This check has not previously formed part of the 
checks carried out during the audit process. The long-term implications of the Varley affair 
which led to the issue by the LGB a revision of the duties of district audit and an 
acknowledgement the role of the Finance committee, did have a major impact on the control 
of local government finances in the following years.  
 
4.5. Mismanagement; the rhetoric of corruption? 
 
The evidence of the previous section confirms that corruption by embezzlement committed by 
individual members of the Council was no longer seen as an isolated event, but instead was 
increasingly seen to be one facet of a wider problem; mismanagement by the Councils.  
Embezzlement could lead to the loss of a considerable amount of Council monies a matter of 
concern to ratepayers. As well as the allegations which were reported to the Council when 
shortfall in departmental accounts were discovered, allegations of corrupt behaviour by the 
two councils were also made or inferred by a small number of critics including maverick 
councillors such as Councillor Mandley in Salford. 295 It was, however, the Elective auditors, 
who saw that their  role as being to confirm the integrity of the spending decisions made by 
the Council, who provided the evidence that embezzlement was facilitated by the 
mismanagement of the two Councils. 296 Their audit reports, which identified factors such as a 
failure of the Councils to provide an appropriate financial or management system to carry out 
and audit business transactions, were  compiled on the basis of information which was said to 
have been obtained by examining the account books of the municipality. These reports were 
therefore seen to be authoritative. This section focuses on how the Elective auditors presented 
                                               
295   Manchester Faces and Places, Volume 4, 1892-3 p.55. James T.G. de Thiballier Mandley, who was elected 
to Salford Council in 1876, made allegations about management of the Gasworks which he criticised for poor 
quality and expensive gas and he queried whether the Gasworks actually made a profit. Although his allegations 
of mismanagement and misfeasance were later proved to be valid, his regular disruption of Council business left 
him open to criticism both by members of the Council and in the press.  
296   Manchester City News, 30 September 1894, editorial, defined the duties of an elective auditor was ’ to detect 
abuses and show them up, i.e. see money is spent legally and not recklessly and or for the wrong purposes.....; 
This is discussed in Section 7.1, p.152. 
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their findings, the motivation of these men as critics, and the extent to which the language 
which they used, which was both emotive and persuasive, and often used the rhetoric of 
corruption, is able to provide an assessment of the integrity of the two Councils.  
Three of Manchester’s Elective auditors Joseph Scott, Frank Hollins, and S. Norbury Williams 
published their reports in Manchester City News. 297  Joseph Scott’s role and the nature of his 
allegations have been considered in Section 4.1. The most assiduous of Manchester’s Elective 
auditors, his analysis of the spending by Manchester Council during the municipal year of 
1883/4.  was based on an examination of 40,000 invoices issued by the Corporation, as well 
as all the account books of the authority. The publication of his findings had the effect of 
focussing attention on areas of Council spending usually hidden from ratepayers, and he 
sought to direct attention to practices which had previously been accepted but which he 
regarded as abuse of position and power. 298 Very few of the incidents which Scott identified 
in ‘Leaves’ had been reported in any of the Council proceedings or other press reports, and 
few complaints had been previously made about the matters he identified and criticised.299  No 
other Elective auditor in the late Victorian period, either before or after Scott carried out such 
a detailed audit. The number of incidents which came to public attention, both in the years 
before the Scott reports and subsequently, was a small fraction of the numbers which Scott’s 
detailed audit revealed. It is reasonable to assume that had each Council year been studied 
in the same depth, the findings would have been comparable to the Scott study. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that the few incidents which were reported by later critics 
contained similar allegations, suggesting that Scott’s findings did represent the types of 
mismanagement, misfeasance and Council corruption which occurred and recurred 
throughout the period. 
Roughly 25% of his reports dealt with matters of ‘routine’ spending in the various departments 
within Manchester Corporation. He examined matters such as travel claims and 
entertainment, particularly the spending on wines and cigars, and day to day expenditure on 
departmental administration which was not specifically identified in the accounts of the 
Borough. He also made detailed allegations about the spending by committees and 
individuals, identifying what he claimed were incidents of extravagance, and unjustifiable 
spending which was sometimes ultra vires, or was, as he hinted, behaviour lacking integrity. 
                                               
,297   The biographies of these three men are given in section 2.4, p.31. 
298   Joseph Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor. The ten reports plus an eleventh summary, in which 
he stated his aim in writing these reports, were published weekly between September 13th 1884 and November 
22nd 1884.   
299   In previous years, matters such as the need for visits to Woodhead to inspect the Manchester Water Works, 
and the cost of entertainment had been discussed in both Manchester & Salford Councils as part of unsuccessful 
attempts to cut down expenditure on ‘deputations’ and ‘pic-nics’, but no details or costings were given. The Scott 
reports gave the costs of examples of this type of expenditure.  
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Examples of the detailed allegations made by Scott are considered in the previous sections of 
this chapter. Although nowhere in his first ten reports does he use the word ‘corruption’, he 
made the purpose of his audit clear when, in the eleventh and concluding report he stated that 
he had endeavoured, ‘to the best of my ability to indicate to ratepayers where corruption is to 
be found’. 300 His criticism was made more effective by the way he presented his findings. He 
left the readership in no doubt about his opinion of members of the Council, often by the use 
of satire, which caught the readers’ attention and was an effective way of making a point. He 
compared, for example, the pantomime ‘The Forty Thieves’ with the ‘pantomime’ performed 
in November, by which he meant the first meeting of the new Manchester Council. Dealing 
with expenses claims particularly claims for cab fares, he asked why ‘as soon as a man enters 
the Council chamber, he is seized with an acute form of paralysis of the lower limbs.’301 He 
also employed parody to provoke the reader to believe that corruption must be rife in the 
conduct of the corporation business; for example, by stating that the amount of wine drunk in 
a year by members of the Council was ‘sufficient to fill a small reservoir’ 302  Referring to the 
failure to optimise the use of expensive Council resources he noted:  
It sometimes happens that one department may be so busy that they have to hire 
horses……all the while perhaps the horses belonging to another department are 
eating their heads off in the stable, waiting for work.  303. 
The significance of these statements would not have been lost on the reader; this language 
would have set the scene for a critic to put the worst possible construction on the ability of the 
Council to provide competent and efficient government.  The publication of his findings 
provoked responses from the public, the Council and some named councillors, which were 
also reported in the press, many denying Scott’s conclusions or his interpretation of a situation. 
There are valid criticisms of some of his allegations. He did not check the facts with the various 
departments before he accused its members of misfeasance or incompetence, nor did he seek 
to establish whether there was an explanation for the allegations he made. More seriously 
although he was not afraid of naming names, he failed to name the perpetrator(s) involved in 
many of his most damaging allegations. He alleged, for example, that councillors, who could 
be guilty of having contracts with the Corporation, a matter which could lead to disqualification, 
used the names of  ‘brothers, sons, cousins, and other relatives’ as the holders of the 
contracts, but does not name them, nor does he name the councillor who charged the Council 
commission on the purchase of the weighing machine, or the councillor who, he alleged, had 
been paid commission on loans..304  He had prejudices; he did not believe that officials who 
                                               
300   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p. 53. 
301   Ibid., p.19. 
302   Ibid., p.5.  
303   Ibid., p.36. 
304    Manchester City News, 4 October 1884, Manchester Council Proceedings, p.6. The allegation that commission 
was paid on loans was explained by Alderman Thompson. He stated that it was found that a councillor had invested 
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were getting a salary from the Corporation should be able to claim a fixed sum to cover their 
expenses, unlike councillors; but conceded that they should perhaps be allowed out-of-pocket 
monies. Although he recognised that the duties of the Mayor involved entertaining visitors, he 
did not agree that Mayoral entertainment should be funded by the Council. Whilst he accepted 
that the Mayor should be given a fixed entertainment budget, he felt he should pay for any 
spending over that limit. He argued that no deputation should require more than one or two 
members of the Council, and by publishing a list of the actual expenses claims by many of the 
members of the Council, he inferred that these were excessive and not justified.  
There is no evidence that Scott undertook the duties of an Elective auditor for personal 
advancement; after two years’ service as an elective auditor he played no further part in 
municipal life. He was unpaid and did not attend the monthly lunches provided as a service to 
auditors whilst undertaking audit duties.305 Although there are some reservations about how 
he interpreted some of his findings, he did identify unjustified spending, misfeasance, and the 
behaviour of the Council in condoning the actions of councillors or officials who were guilty of 
personal corruption a state of affairs he suggested was Council corruption. He also identified 
actions which were ultra vires the powers of the Council. His findings were seen as a powerful 
indictment of the conduct of local government in Manchester.306    
Whilst still serving with Joseph Scott as Elective auditor, Frank Hollins produced a series of 
reports, ‘A Citizen Auditor’s review’ which were also published in Manchester City News, 
covering the Council year 1884/5. These reports continued the Scott tradition of reviewing the 
spending of the various departments of the municipality. Although he lacked Scott’s 
presentational skills, and he duplicated some of the findings of Scott’s earlier reports, he did 
add some additional examples of extravagance and unjustified expenditure. Nonetheless care 
has to be taken in accepting at face value any of the allegations made after 1886, when Hollins 
had Wallace McGuffin Greaves as his co- elective auditor. The Hollins family had failed to win 
a tender for supplying goods to the Health Department, and Hollins was unsuccessful in 
proving that that the tendering procedure used had been corrupt.307 The apparent 
consequence of this failure was that Hollins-Greaves audit reports, which mainly dealt with the 
Health Department, constituted a campaign alleging corruption and mismanagement by the 
Superintendent of the Department, Henry Whiley and the Chairman Alderman Schofield. This 
                                               
in Council stock as a trustee on behalf of the Trust. Advice was taken by the Finance Committee over whether 
commission should be paid in these circumstances. Sir Joseph Heron had approved the payment.  
305   Ibid., 22 November 1884. The editor’s reply to a correspondent (Mr. Arthur White) asking about payment to 
Elective auditors.  
306   Scott’s more detailed findings on the conduct of the Council of Manchester Corporation will be cited in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
307   Manchester City News, 3 October 1885. The allegation, which dealt with a tender evaluation, is discussed on 
p.57. 
85 
led the Corporation to take action for libel. The report of the enquiry into the validity of these 
allegations, produced with the agreement of both parties to the action, provided an objective 
assessment of the validity of the Hollins claims.308 The eight-page report of the enquiry, 
published in the Proceedings of Manchester Council, found that although embezzlement could 
not be ruled out because entries in the account books were altered and spare sheets had 
been removed, there was no firm evidence of misfeasance or corruption. 309 There was no 
evidence either that the corporation was defrauded of income by the casual attitude to keeping 
the books at the Corporation Yard, which was used by the Health Department, although again 
the record keeping was found to be totally inadequate. The serious allegations about how 
contracts for supplies were concluded were withdrawn by the Elective auditors. The remainder 
of the report dealt with a number of infringements of good bookkeeping practice used in 
sections of the Health Department. The detailed conclusions of the enquiry noted the need to 
implement better systems of record keeping, and to appoint a responsible official at the Health 
Department Town Yard to ensure that agreed procedures in dealing with goods and income 
were followed. The report concluded with a comment about the evidence produced by Hollins 
and Greaves: 
it is to be regretted that …they did not more closely investigate statements made to 
them, their credulity has been most grievously imposed upon by persons who boasted 
of their dishonesty, the greater part of whom have left the service of the Corporation   
and thus they, (the Elective auditors), have been left to make serious allegations 
…which they have been unable to sustain. . 310 
The report gave qualified praise to the Health Department, noting that:  
No charge of fraud has been sustained against any member of the committee or the 
committee’s responsible officers. True small irregularities have existed….   but I am 
satisfied that these shortcomings are not greater than in any other concern of equal 
size.311 
Although this report was intended to reassure critics about integrity in the Health Department, 
the statement that there were still major shortcomings in how the Department conducted 
business was hardly persuasive 
                                               
308   This libel hearing, which lasted 18 days, took evidence on oath. A document Ref F347, 91 Ma1:1877 in the 
Central Library Manchester contains ’Shorthand notes of the proceedings’ of the High Court QB Division for the 
first 7 days of the trial, when Hollins and Greaves were cross examined 
309   Proceedings of Manchester Council,8 June 1887. 
310   Hollins’ reputation was damaged when the Superintendent of the Health Department, Henry Whiley, retaliated 
to the allegation of corrupt practices in the Department by noting that Hollins had failed to carry out the 
improvements which he was required to make to the closets in two blocks of property which he owned; as a result, 
the Department undertook the work. Although Hollins had agreed to pay the cost of the work by instalments he had 
failed to do so. The Corporation had been obliged to summon him to the Police Court for 6 out of the 7 instalments 
on 1 property, 4 out of 5 of the other.  Hollins stated that he did not pay because he said the work was ‘unnecessary’.  
311   Proceedings of Manchester Council,8 June 1887.  
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Prior to his election as an Elective auditor in Manchester in 1894, Samuel Norbury Williams 
had been Chairman of the Manchester Ratepayers’ Association. 312  The damning report by 
the Association about the Victoria Hotel scheme was published in the name of its two 
secretaries, although Norbury Williams must have had inside knowledge about the content, 
and the hints in the report that there had been corruption.313  He subsequently published a 
letter alleging that ‘bribery and corruption prevailed to a large extent,’ and he offered ... ‘to 
bring before any commission evidence of bribery and corruption in two if not three departments 
of the Corporation’ The Council which sued Norbury Williams for libel, lost their action on a 
technicality before any evidence was heard.314 He never produced any evidence to support 
these allegations. As an Elective auditor from 1894 onwards, he was selective in the 
allegations which he made, which he brought to public attention by publishing the letters he 
had sent to the Lord Mayor in Manchester City News, detailing the alleged corruption. He 
supported these allegations by information which he had obtained directly from by interviews 
with councillors and contractors who had dealings with the Council and he also published an 
occasional ‘Elective auditors report’ about his findings. 315 
In the 1880s and 1890s, Salford was not well served by its Elective auditors. Edward Harrison, 
who was elected in 1877 and served until 1898, was an auctioneer and valuer, He was a 
frequent letter writer to the press, but the subject matter was usually about matters of personal 
concern. He frequently complained about the price of gas and its luminance, or the failure of 
the Council to accept his expenses claims. As Harrison did not publish any reports detailing 
his audit findings, it is difficult to know therefore how thoroughly he examined the account 
books of the municipality. The amount of time he alleged he spent on auditing the accounts 
can be calculated from the claims he made for expenses. In 1890, it was reported to the 
General Finance Committee that Harrison had presented an account for £348/12/-, based on 
an entitlement of 2 guineas per day (equivalent to 166 days’ service) which he claimed under 
the provisions of the Public Health Act 1875. 316 The Town Clerk was ordered to offer Mr 
Harrison 20 guineas ‘to settle the claim. Harrison was criticised for failure to act in the 1888 
case involving John Graves, Salford’s Town Clerk, who failed to pay over monies to the 
Treasurer which he has received on behalf of the Corporation in three consecutive years. 317  
                                               
312   Samuel Norbury Williams was an accountant. He was elected as an Elective auditor for Manchester Council 
in 1894, a role he undertook for 34 years until 1927. He died in 1929 at the age of 77.  
313   The role of aldermen in the mismanagement of this scheme. to complete the building of the Victoria Hotel is 
considered in Section 5.1, p.101. 
314   The Court held that a municipal corporation could not be guilty of corruption. This ruling and its implications 
are discussed in Section 3.1 p.34. 
315   His allegations of corrupt behaviour by Alderman King were discussed in Section 4.2, p. 64. 
316   Salford Chronicle, 4 October 1890. Salford Borough Council, General Finance Committee. p.5.   
317   Ibid., 27 August 1889, Letter, Edward Harrison.  In a letter signed SW, the writer noted that after the inspection 
of the books of the Town Clerk by Harrison, the books were said to be ‘in order’. 
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In letter to the Salford Chronicle in which he gave an account of the Town Clerk’s 
indebtedness, Harrison stated that he had not reported the matter because it was ‘no great 
amount…  for a man whose salary was £1200 per year.’318 He stated that he had been told 
the matter had been taken in hand, so he took no action. It is hard to believe that there was 
no misfeasance or corruption in Salford in all the years he acted as Elective auditor; the very 
few matters relating to audit published during his period of service were initiated by one of his 
co-Elective auditors. Daniel Sharrock, who served in this capacity for 4 years, from 1884-1887 
did attempt to get greater access to the accounts of the municipality. It was revealed in a 
Salford Council meeting that Sharrock had refused to sign off the accounts, because he said 
that he was not given adequate time to examine the various account books. The result of this 
refusal was that the preparation and publication of the spending estimates of the Council, 
which were based on the audited accounts of the previous year, were delayed.  
 
A number of Elective auditors, particularly those elected to office in the 1890s saw the post as 
a way of furthering a political agenda, by using the access to the press which the role provided, 
a tactic used by the Independent Labour Party (ILP).319 John Garrard noted the socialists in 
Salford were able to capture the ‘hitherto defunct office of Elective auditor’ and were able use 
the office ‘to cause the Council leadership great trouble’ by uncovering and publicising 
examples of Council incompetence...320 Both John Hempsall who served as Elective auditor 
for two years 1895-6-1896-7 and William Hunt who serve in 1898-1899, and 1901-2, were ILP 
nominees who served in Salford. Letters of criticism about the reasons for the Great Salford 
Muddle were written by John Hempsall, and in 1898 it was William Hunt who identified and 
publicised malfeasance by members of the Electric Lighting Committee, and the incompetent 
way the matter was dealt with by the Council. Both used the contacts which as Elective 
auditors, they had with members of the corporation and described their findings using 
hyperbole. Their letters to the press were influential, focussing the public’s attention on the 
current actions of the Council.321  D.L. Prince, who served as Elective auditor in Manchester 
with Norbury Williams for 2 years, 1894/5 and 1895/6, was also an ILP nominee. He was 
supported by the ILP newspaper Labour Leader which publicised his findings. He did uncover 
incidents of financial incompetence and extravagance, rather than corruption, but found it 
                                               
318    Ibid., 31 August 1889. The total amount embezzled by Graves was £752/0/9. 
319   The Independent Labour Party (ILP), a new socialist organisation was founded in 1893 in Bradford, mainly on 
the initiative of Keir Hardie and Robert Blatchford. It was affiliated to the Labour Party in 1906 The party had a 
branch in Salford. 
320   John Garrard, Leaders and Politics in Nineteenth Century Salford (Salford: Salford University Research Series 
1967).  
321   The allegations of these elective auditors are cited in appropriate sections of the thesis. 
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difficult to get his reports published in the local weekly press.  On 28 September 1895, the 
Labour Leader reported that:  
Comrade D. L. Prince has issued a report of his work. He has been able to get it into 
Manchester City News and the Courier, but the Guardian rejected it. The report should 
be in the hands of all comrades; it contains many important findings, for example 
savings to be made on commission paid to private firms for investing money. 
In Prince’s December 1895 report, he rightly questioned the business capability of Tory and 
Liberal members of the Council, who had agreed to a loan of £8,000 to the Ship Canal 
Promotions Company, without specifying how the money was to be repaid; he also reported 
the ‘Great to-do’ about the charges for services which he had submitted.322  Although it had 
been established that payment to the elective auditors could be made in certain 
circumstances,  the Council noted that the payment of these monies in Salford was presently 
the subject of legal action by Harrison; Salford’s Elective auditor. Prince was therefore offered 
a one-off payment of £150.  When Councillor Mainwaring suggested that any expenses paid 
to Prince would be going to the ILP, and this was why he had been selected as their candidate; 
he was asked to withdraw this allegation.323 Although Redford did not name Prince, he 
reported that an Elective auditor had resigned because of the ‘cowardly attacks and deliberate 
falsehoods’ of some of the councillors. Prince withdrew his application to resign when the 
Town Clerk demanded the legal fine of £50, the penalty for resigning. 324.  He stated   ’I have 
already lost too much in discharging my duties, I could ill afford to add £50 to it.’   He refused 
to undertake any further duties or appear before the Council to account for his neglect of duty. 
The Executive Committee of the ILP passed a resolution:  
In view of the fact that D. L. Prince resigned as Elective auditor without consulting or 
conferring with the Executive of the Party the Executive Committee of the Manchester 
and Salford ILP have no confidence in him and suspend him as a member of the Party 
pending the decision of the General meeting.   
 
Findings and précis of Chapter Four  
 
This chapter has focussed on how attitudes to corruption were quite clearly changing in the 
late Victorian period. This was illustrated by the attitude to the integrity of practices such as 
customary practices, some of which continued to be accepted, but were criticised, whilst the 
attitude cases of insider trading, initially tolerated, were increasingly seen as venial, if not 
corrupt. Although the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act (1988) was intended to clamp down 
                                               
322   Labour Leader 28 December 1895, ILP notes, p.8. 
323   Councillor Mainwaring was elected to the Council in 1988. A boot maker by trade, he was elected as an 
alderman in 1898. The report did not state whether he withdrew this allegation. 
324    Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, p.446. 
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on practices which were seen to be bringing the reputation of the two Councils into disrepute, 
the research identified the unwillingness of both Councils to fully use the sanctions available 
against those guilty of behaviour lacking integrity. Whilst the evidence suggested that both 
Councils were reluctant to accept the guilt of those whose offence related to a practice which 
had previously been tolerated, the findings suggest that the behaviour of both Councils to the 
use of sanctions was strongly influenced by the need to avoid the publicity damaging their 
reputation for integrity which using the sanction could bring. 
The last two sections of the Chapter deal with cases of embezzlement where the loss of 
monies to the Council could be significant and the allegations of personal corruption were self-
evident. The evidence of these cases has shown that critical comment began to identify 
mismanagement; the failure of the two Councils to implement management systems which 
would prevent or at least reduce the risk of embezzlement occurring. The attitude of Elective 
auditors to their role, the reliability of their findings and how they reported their findings has 
been considered noting that they undoubtedly uncovered instances of veniality or corruption 
by individuals working for the Council, however many of their allegations of Council corruption 
related to misfeasance arising from mismanagement, or to patterns of behaviour which had 
previously been tolerated but as a result of changing standards of behaviour were seen as 
misfeasance  
The next part of the thesis, Part Three, entitled ‘Municipal government: a machine out of joint?’ 
examines why mismanagement occurred by considering how the municipal Councils of 
Manchester and Salford conducted Council. business.  
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Part Three-  Municipal government; a machine out of joint? 
 
The aim of this part of the thesis is to address subsidiary question three: 
 ‘What was the attitude of the two Councils to the management and delivery of Council 
business, and why did this lead to frequent incidents of mismanagement and allegations 
of corruption? 
 This will be undertaken by analysing in more detail how the two municipalities undertook 
Council business using the constitutions set up under the MCA 1882, and why the procedures 
used in both municipalities led to the mismanagement of Council business. It identifies two 
main factors which had an impact on the performance of Councils and affected the reputation 
of both Councils for competence and integrity. These were the availability and deployment of 
the resources needed to undertake Council business, including managerial, financial, and 
technical expertise; and the extent to which the mindset of councillors and officials, derived 
from the practices of commerce influenced the practices of the two Councils. These factors 
are considered in the next three chapters.  
Chapter Five. The Council and its committees.  
 
 An introduction to the constitution of the municipalities of Manchester and Salford was given 
in Chapter Two. The aim of this Chapter is to focus on how the two Councils actually conducted 
Council business and to explore the practical problems experienced in delivering government 
with competence and integrity. It examines the background, mindset, and attitude of the men 
who served on the Council, and the influence of these factors on their behaviour as members 
of Council committees. It argues that this behaviour was to lead to the increasing autonomy 
and dysfunctional relationships of committees with the Council itself, and was a major factor 
in determining the extent to which the two councils were able to provide government with 
integrity and competence. 
 
5.1. The councillors, fit and proper persons? 
 
The primacy of the Council in the structure of a new municipality had led to early discussions 
about the ‘qualifications’ needed by a person taking on this important role. Sir Robert Peel 
noted that if municipal government was to command respect, municipal affairs should be in 
the hands of those who ’from possession of property have the strongest interest in good 
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government, and, from the qualification of high character and intelligence, are most likely to 
conciliate the respect and confidence of their fellow citizens.’325 The ‘choice’ of suitable recruits 
to be councillors was in fact ‘Hobson’s choice,’ (in practice no choice). The type of managerial 
expertise needed by councillors in the new municipal corporations was not required or 
developed in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Peel had therefore to turn to the 
proprietied class or their equivalents in urban municipalities to provide governance; the 
businessmen, merchants, or manufacturers, many of whom had experience in commerce. 
Although the constitution of both Manchester and Salford changed with the implementation of 
the MCA 1835, it was these  men who had previously taken part in the government of the 
boroughs who offered themselves for election to be councillors in the new municipalities and 
were responsible as members of the Council for making the policy decisions about how 
municipal services were developed.326 The responsibilities for functions such as sewering, 
paving, lighting, and duties in the public health field, previously carried out by the 
Police/Improvement Commissioners, and transferred to the new municipal Corporations, 
became core activities for the new Councils.  
Municipal corporations were seen to have the same role as a business, whose function was 
to provide services to ratepayers. Although many of the men who served on municipal 
Councils accepted the inferred moral obligation (noblesse oblige) that those with wealth and 
position should give service to the community, the motive for taking on Council service was 
not completely altruistic.  As well as social prominence and leadership, which often followed 
election to the Council, to be elected as a member of the Council was also regarded as 
recognition of success in life. Having a background of success in commerce, where business 
practices were based on ‘laissez faire ’with near absence of regulation, was regarded as 
demonstrating business acumen, and the ability to carry out the business of local government 
on behalf of the community. 327 As business in commerce was flourishing, central government 
had seen no need to ‘burden' commerce with legislation.328  There was no legal requirement 
for the books and accounts of most commercial companies to be kept in a particular way, nor 
was there a requirement for audit in most branches of commerce. This was the experience 
which councillors saw to be appropriate for conducting council business. Not surprisingly being 
elected to the Council inculcated in councillors a belief about the rightness of any decisions 
                                               
325   E. P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons, p.311.  
326   John Garrard, Leadership and Politics in 19c Salford; a Historical Analysis of Urban Political Power. (Salford 
University. Research Series) p.6. 
327   By the late Victorian period, the business of municipal Councils such a Manchester and Salford had expanded 
in both size and complexity, for example, the Gas department of Manchester Council had 1,700 employees. The 
experience of successful businessmen gained in family businesses which had scarcely any need for accountability 
herefore had little in common with the expertise needed to the discharge the duties of a municipal Council. 
328   Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern England p.189. Audit was not mandatory for most joint stock companies 
until 1900  
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made as a councillor and an arrogant approach to how the business of the Council should be 
conducted. The result of this attitude meant that demands for change by critics were seen as 
interference, even when it had become clear that change was necessary, for example to 
improve audit systems. Beatrice Webb confirmed that in her interviews with Council Chairmen, 
who virtually ran some Manchester Council Committees, their actions were often based on an 
‘I am right’ attitude, which was shared by members of the Council. 329   How these attitudes 
influenced the way the Council approached the implementation of policy decisions is 
considered in Chapters 5.3 and 5.4.  
Hennock, in a discussion about the recruitment of councillors to urban government, noted that 
from the 1850s there were increasing numbers of critical comments alleging that that the 
calibre of members of councils had declined, and ‘these expressions can be found in local 
newspapers. 330 The concern both at a local level and a national level was also that ‘men of 
property and station’ were increasingly reluctant to put themselves forward to serve on council. 
He cited a Manchester Guardian article in 1861 which noted that ‘substantial and respectable 
men’ on Manchester Council had been replaced by people ‘lower down the scale’ which was 
a ‘deplorable lapse.’331 The implication that there would be a decline in the competence of a 
council arose because their replacements were men who were drawn largely from the 
‘shopocracy’; shopkeepers and tradesmen. men who were often the ‘economists’ on the 
Council, who sought to reduce expenditure.332  A letter to Salford Weekly News also expressed 
the view that this was an unfortunate trend because, 
It would be unreasonable to expect the small trader who deals in units of tens and 
seldom reaches three figures to comprehend the sums involving some hundreds of 
thousands as it would be to expect a man ignorant of geometry and mathematics to 
calculate the distance and density of Saturn… 333 
An editorial in Salford Weekly News in 1878 also supported the view that there had been a 
decline in the calibre of members of Salford Council suggesting that:  
 
It is true that as in other Town Councils there are members who are not equal to the 
position they hold and who may think more of the gratification of their personal ambition 
or fancies than of public service….and the number of these persons latterly we are 
sorry to say has rather increased rather than decreased in our own town Council.334  
 
                                               
329   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study (London: Longmans Green & Co 1932, p.197. She gave 
the reference to her diary for these comments as ‘MS Diary September 1899.’ 
330   Hennock, Fit & Proper Persons, p.312.  
331   Ibid., p.313.  
332   Manchester Guardian, 18 November 1861. 
333   Salford Weekly News, 16 July 1867 p.4.  
334   Salford Chronicle, 9 January 1892 p.4. Editorial.  
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Although academic interest has not centred on the subject of corruption in urban 
municipalities, several authors have studied the process of political change in the late Victorian 
period. Their findings are relevant to consideration about whether the calibre of councillors 
declined in the late Victorian period. John Garrard, in his study of the exercise of political 
power in Salford, examined the changing composition of Salford Council.335 He noted that the 
percentage of ‘large proprietors’ which included manufacturers, business men and merchants, 
men who were likely to have experience of commerce, fell from roughly 50% of Council 
membership in 1870 to 30% in 1900; whilst the percentage of ‘small proprietors,’ which 
included shopkeepers and tradesmen, rose from 20% to 35%.  No comparable study has been 
carried out for Manchester; the only figures available, which allow comparison of the two 
Councils, show that Salford Council had a higher proportion of ‘large proprietors’ than 
Manchester over the period to 1866-1875. 336   Manchester had a higher percentage of named 
merchants over the same period; both Councils had similar numbers of small proprietors. As 
the factors which caused the fall in the large proprietorial class on Salford Council were 
common to both municipalities, it is very likely that there was a similar decline in the 
membership of the proprietorial class on Manchester Council during the last quarter of the 
century.  
Comment from councillors themselves also suggested that the calibre of those standing for 
Council was falling.  Alderman Husband, the Mayor of Salford, made the same point in 1882 
in an address to the annual meeting of Manchester Society of Chartered Accountants. 
Referring to the recruits to Salford Council, he stated that the disposition to serve the public 
by persons qualified to do so was decreasing, and that coincided with the fact that there was:  
an increased disposition amongst men, quite unfit for such service, to undertake 
it…Hence we get into the Corporation men who are little fit mentally or morally… What 
was needed was good common sense, good business capacity and ’honest zeal for 
public good and power of expression in concise and clear terms’ …special knowledge 
was valuable only in special cases, the public too often confide their interests to those 
whose principal object is self-aggrandisement.337 
 He did not provide any evidence in support of these allegations, and might have added to the  
list of qualities needed by a councillor, a thick skin; he himself had suffered denigration at the  
hands of the press.338 
                                               
335   John Garrard, Leadership and politics in 19c Salford, a Historical analysis of urban political power. Salford City 
politics- Research Series. (Salford: Salford University, 1967?)  p.6.  
336   Appendix 2, p.194, shows the occupational analysis for Manchester and Salford Councils.   
337   Ibid.,6 May 1882, p.2.  Alderman Husband was a builder and contractor, a Tory property owner and a member 
of the Salford Property Owners’ Association.  He was elected an Alderman 1874, chaired the Salford General 
Finance Committee and served as Mayor for 2 years, 1881-3.  It is not clear what motivated Husband to make such 
a blatant attack on fellow councillors.  
338   Salford Weekly News, 2 October 1876, stated in an editorial, that Husband’s remarks in a debate in Council; 
‘were puerile, indeed we may say they were silly in the most extreme sense of the word.  They had in them neither 
sense nor reason.’  
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This view was challenged Hennock, who argued that the members of the ‘shopocracy,’ heavily 
burdened by rates,’ had legitimacy as a councillor. 339 This view also supported by Councillor 
Harry Rawson, writing in 1894, who defended the competence of the ‘exercise of most varied 
abilities and qualifications.’ He stated:  
There are superfine and ignorant critics who affect to decry the work that is done by 
municipalities; but the plain unvarnished truth given…of the recent enterprises of 
Manchester Corporation will, it is hope convince all thoughtful readers that, in the work 
of local government, there is ample scope for the exercise of the most varied abilities 
and qualifications, and for the satisfaction of a laudable and honourable ambition…340  
 There were a number of disincentives to serving on the Council, including the increased time 
demands made to carry out the role of councillor, with more and longer meetings; often to the 
detriment of the demands of their own businesses. There was often a need to stand for election 
on a party ticket as elections became more frequent after the broadening of the borough 
franchise, and the press started to take a greater interest in council affairs. The result was 
regular criticism about council actions or inactions, which were often personalised and 
generated unwelcome and uncongenial publicity. Many potential councillors who moved to 
more salubrious surroundings to avoid the polluted conditions in the two boroughs no longer 
met the residence qualifications necessary to stand for Council, and many others who would 
have served on the Council for the status and publicity which it gave, used other ways of 
gaining social status, for example by engaging in charitable activities. The problem is whether 
or not there is any evidence that this led to a changed membership of the Councils and a 
reduction in their competence to take the decisions needed to conduct Council business.   
Although the occupational background of a Councillor was thought to provide evidence of the 
likely contribution which a Councillor would make to the conduct of local government, L. J. 
Sharpe argued that other factors, such as integrity, will-power, judgement, political nous and 
local knowledge were also important, but he believed that …‘a person’s occupation ‘can tell 
us something, but certainly not everything about his likely qualities as a councillor.’….341 No 
studies have been carried out to assess whether this correlation existed in Manchester and 
.Salford, although a study was carried out in Wolverhampton by G. W. Jones in 1969..342  He 
                                               
339   Hennock, Fit & Proper Persons, p.316, noted that by the 1860s new models emerged to judge the suitability 
of town councillors. He cited John Stuart Mill who accepted the view that Councils should be bodies with a mixed 
social composition.  
340   Harry Rawson, An Historical Record of some recent Enterprises of the Corporation of Manchester and of its 
Cooperation in the Completion of the Manchester Ship Canal. (1894) p. viii. Rawson who was a printer and 
bookseller, was Chairman of a subcommittee of the Town Hall Committee which was charged on 2 October 1893 
with producing an historical record of ‘some recent enterprises’ of Manchester Corporation.  This 190-page report 
was the result; it was published in April 1894. He was served on Manchester Council between 1856 and 1865, and 
was re-elected in 1884 He was elected alderman in 1894. A supporter of Manchester Mechanics Institute, he was 
made a Freeman of the City in 1903. 
341 .   L. J. Sharpe, ‘Elected representatives in local government.’  British Journal of Sociology 1962, 189-209.  
342   G. W. Jones, A Study of Wolverhampton Town Council 1889-1964. (London: Macmillan, 1969). 
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assessed the contribution of each councillor to Council business, placing each member in one 
of four classes.343  His judgements were inevitably subjective, but the results he obtained do 
support the view that in Wolverhampton, the councillors who were drawn from the 
manufacturers group, which was  the largest group on the Council throughout the period, made 
the outstanding contributions to Council business; 344  He  also found that the same group had 
the highest percentage of poor contributors.345 The similarity in the demographics of 
Wolverhampton and the municipalities of Manchester and Salford suggest that comparable 
results would be obtained had the exercise been carried out in these municipalities; showing 
that the manufacturers, merchants and business men who had commercial experience were 
the major participants in conducting Council business on both the Manchester and Salford 
Councils. One final factor to be considered is whether the commitments of these men to their 
businesses, meant that the period of service on the Council might be shorter, so that they 
failed to get sufficient experience of Council business, with the result their ability to conduct 
Council business could be questioned. Garrard commented that by the last decades of the 
century, the introduction of the professional manager into commerce and industry, and the 
practice of handing over the day to day running of the family business to sons, enabled some 
of the propertied to serve on the Council for longer periods, making it possible for them gain 
the greater expertise needed to undertake the business of the Council.  
 
Whilst the allegedly declining calibre of the Council received critical comment, it was left to 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who visited Manchester and Salford in 1899, to enquire into the 
current administration of English provincial local government, to state that there was a direct 
connection between calibre of councillors and the competence of the Council.  Beatrice 
Webb’s record of the visit included a crude generalisation: that the calibre of members of 
Manchester Council was poor, the quality of debate in the Council … ‘was not more than 
average’… and the general achievements of the Council ‘did not impress them.’ She included 
the following assessment of the members of Manchester Council  
so far as we have made the acquaintance of the councillors there are none very good 
and none very bad: I have not picked out any who seem to be ‘rotters’.  The abler 
among them are all old men - a little gang of Liberals who are still the salt of the Council. 
The social status is predominately lower middle class, a Tory solicitor and an I.L.P. 
journalist being the only men with any pretension to culture. 346 
                                               
343  Ibid., p.160. Assessment was made on the basis of contributions to Council debates, membership and 
commitment to the work of Committees, letters to and mention in the press etc.  Class A was reserved for 
‘outstanding figures’; Class D, for those who made little or no impact on Council business.’ 
344   Ibid., p 234.  
348    .Ibid., p.154. The reason suggested was that many business men could not tolerate the somewhat convoluted 
debates and procedures of the Council, and preferred instead to concentrate on their own businesses. 
346   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study, p.195. 
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H. G. Wells had noted that Mrs Webb ‘had a tendency’ to moralise and to slip into something 
of a ‘de haut en bas’ (condescending) attitude’. Margaret Cole also commented that those who 
disagreed with their (the Webbs) values ‘found them impervious to criticism’. 347  Redford was 
clearly irritated by this assessment. He stated:   
One is tempted to ask why men of the stamp of Aldermen Hoy, Harwood and Leech, 
whose published reports lacked neither academic accuracy nor constructive ability, 
failed to meet or to impress the Webbs. 348  
Although Sidney Webb did not comment on the competence of Manchester Council, the 
calibre of members of the Salford Council did not escape his criticism.349  He referred to 
Alderman Rudman, the Mayor, as ‘a flashy publican’; and Alderman Robinson, the deputy 
Mayor, as ‘an aged property owner’… and ‘a Conservative of a vulgar type.’ Greenall noted 
that Alderman Phillips, who had chaired the Gas Committee after the ‘Hunter’ affair, was 
marginally more to the Webbs’ liking. Sidney Webb described him as: 
a Manchester businessman, somewhat Jewish, of easy familiar manners who 
represented the honest element in the corporation, but a common unimaginative man, 
simply regarding the corporation as a business enterprise to be done honestly, 
economically and efficiently, though without any fads...350  
There is no evidence that the increase in the numbers of allegations of mismanagement made 
about the conduct of Council business in the two municipalities could be attributed to a decline 
in the calibre of the membership of the Councils. An alternative and more probable explanation 
was that this increase was the result of the inefficient way the increasing workload of the 
Council was managed; and this occurred at a time when conduct of Council business was 
under greater scrutiny by the press. By the 1880s, the problems of dealing with the challenges 
of improving the health of an industrialised society led a growing volume of more expensive 
and often technically complex schemes of work needing the Council’s scrutiny and approval 
These could take up considerable amounts of the Council’s time. Neither Council recognised 
the need to change how the Councils conducted their business to accommodate these 
demands. The MCA 1882 required municipal corporations to hold quarterly meetings, but by 
the 1870s both municipalities had to hold meetings more regularly to complete the necessary 
business. In practice both Manchester and Salford held between 12 and 15 Council meetings 
per year.351 Meetings of both Manchester and Salford Borough Councils had to be arranged 
to discuss special issues, and additional meetings had to be arranged to complete unfinished 
                                               
347  Margaret Cole, Commentary, British Newspaper Archive, December letter to Gertrude Himmelfarb dated 
12/01/1968. 
348   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, p.431n. 
349   Greenall, Victorian Salford, p.209. 
350   Ibid., p.209. 
351   MCA 1882, Chapter 50, Second Schedule: ‘Meetings and Proceedings of the Council,’ paragraph 1.  
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agendas.352  Speeches in Council were rarely short; the Victorian councillor was noted for 
verbosity; every member of the Council claimed the right to speak about an item on the agenda 
unfettered by time constraints. Whether the business of a meeting was transacted with 
efficiency depended on the Mayor as chairman.  It was unusual to find a Mayor capable of 
ensuring that, whilst sensible debate was allowed, diatribes and monologues were reined in. 
An editorial in Manchester City News found it sufficiently noteworthy to report that ‘at the 
Proceedings of Salford Council last Wednesday, there were 16 committee reports and 18 
items on the Agenda, three being notices of motions. The meeting started at 10-00 am and 
finished at 1.45 pm’.353 The editorial commented that Salford’s Mayor (Alderman Peter 
Keevney) had ‘an expeditious mode of getting through the work’. Without firm direction from 
the Chair, debates could end in disorder. A much later editorial in Salford Chronicle deplored 
the behaviour of ‘Councillor Mandley and company;’ referring to a Council meeting as a ‘bear 
garden,’ and blaming the Mayor (Benjamin Robinson) for failing to keep order. The report 
noted that as a result important business on the agenda was not reached as the meeting had 
to be adjourned.353 Manchester City News noted that in the once-a-month Manchester Council 
meetings ’business overruns, and business is put back; sometimes matters which members 
have raised can be put back for 6 months.’ 354 
Where there was disagreement about matters often involving trivial matters or salary 
increases, but there was said to be a ‘principle’ at stake, delaying tactics could be used. Often 
this involved tabling amendments to resolutions which were debated, and rejected, only for 
further amendments to be raised. A motion on the agenda of Manchester Council to increase 
the salary of the Medical Officer of Health from £500 to £650, resulted in 6 votes on 
amendments before the original motion was passed.355 The total number of votes cast in the 
first ballot was 51, (out of a Council membership of 64,) the number of votes cast in the final 
ballot was 38, suggesting that 13 councillors showed their disapproval of the long- drawn-out 
procedure by absenting themselves.  It was unclear however why seven votes, taken over 
several Council meetings, were needed to agree the name for the new Manchester civic 
building. The name proposed in the original motion, ‘Manchester Town Hall’ was finally 
accepted.  
 
Even when councillors found time to attend the actual meetings of the Council, they usually 
found it was impossible to set aside the additional time needed to obtain an understanding of 
the more technical matters on agenda. When complex schemes came before up for 
                                               
352   Manchester City News ,30 September 1893, editorial p.4. 
353   Salford Chronicle, 5 April 1890, editorial p.4.   
354   Manchester City News, 7 January 1893, p.5. ‘Topics of the Week’.  
355   Proceedings of Manchester Council, 1 April 1874.   
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consideration, councillors had to rely on the briefing provided by the Chairman of the relevant 
committee both to explain exactly what the scheme was intended to achieve, and deal with 
any questions arising about its costings and implementation. Officials with the technical 
expertise were not allowed to attend Council meetings; the idea of having an official attending 
a Council meeting able to answer any technical questions when a technical scheme was being 
considered, was seen as usurping the traditional function of a councillor.356  Councillors were 
not provided with any notes about issues to be discussed, with the consequence that they 
could be poorly briefed when making important spending decisions.357  As a result, schemes 
considered by Council often failed get the scrutiny needed to ensure that decisions made had 
a proper foundation. The result was that problems, which should have been dealt with in 
Council could lead to mismanagement when the scheme was implemented.358  
 
The agenda for a Council meeting was drawn up by the Town Clerk in consultation with the 
Mayor. Little attempt was made to improve the efficiency in the way Council business was 
conducted. The problem was exacerbated by the failure to control lengthy debates, often on 
subjects of marginal interest. Any radical steps to improve how the Councils dealt with its 
business were frustrated by the belief of councillors that their role in carrying out the powers 
of the executive meant hearing all the arguments for and against any decision before the full 
Council. This prevented the making of possible procedural changes which would have 
improved the efficiency of how the two Councils conducted business. Certain matters 
concerning mainly with administrative business such as the preparation of by-laws, or 
ceremonial matters which took up Council time, could have been dealt with by subcommittees 
of the Council, acting with the authority of the full Council, with a membership drawn from each 
standing committee and using the advice of officials. Even the time spent on discussing salary 
increases could have been avoided if the Councils had set up a subcommittee to develop a 
‘grading and salary structure’ applicable to its employees, a major undertaking which would 
have avoided regular wrangling in Council about salary increases for individual members of 
staff. The failure of the Councils to accept the need to ensure that officials with appropriate 
expertise were involved in the development of decisions about major technically complex and 
usually expensive schemes, and that the presentation of the scheme to the Council was also 
                                               
356   Garrard, Leadership and power in Victorian Industrial Cities, 1830-1880, p.74.  
357   Garrard, The Great Salford Gas scandal of 1887, p.10, did note however that Council policies and decisions 
were increasingly made by specialist committees of a main Committee which often involved key committee 
members particularly the chairman and vice chairman along with the paid officials.  How the expertise of officials, 
who did provide technical expertise to committees, was used, is considered in the next Chapter Six.  
358  An example of this type of problem arose when the question of whether the Council should undertake the 
Victoria Hotel project was agreed. There was no brief from the Council setting out the scope and nature of the 
undertaking which the Improvement Committee were asked to carry out. The problems with this project are 
considered in Section 9.2, p.176. The attitude of committees to the conduct of projects delegated to it by the Council 
is considered in the next chapter. 
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undertaken by an official with the knowledge to ensure that the Council understood the nature 
of the commitment which it was undertaking, undoubtedly contributed to misunderstandings 
about how a scheme should be implemented.359  
 
The constitution of a municipal Council provided that aldermen be elected by councillors either 
from existing members of the Council or from persons outside the Council who were qualified 
to be elected as councillors. The original intention was that by having the office of alderman, 
experienced councillors could be retained for a further period in office, or persons with 
particular expertise brought onto the Council. One alderman could be elected for every three 
councillors; they were to be subject to re-election by members of the Council every six years. 
The provision to co-opt as alderman persons with special expertise was criticised and not used 
in practice. The dilemma which the method posed was illustrated by the ‘Leeming’ affair in 
Salford.360 On the death of Alderman Pochin, there were two nominees for election to replace 
him; an existing Councillor Goodwin, and an ‘outsider’ Jas Leeming, a manufacturer who had 
been a councillor, but had lost his seat in a previous Council election. Leeming was elected. 
This led to comments that as he had been rejected by a large majority of the electorate in the 
St Stephen’s ward, and was not therefore wanted by the electorate; he should not serve on 
the Council. 361 Salford Council did not try to introduce an outsider onto the Council again. The 
Council did have power to co-opt people with special expertise onto committees; this was used 
by both Councils to co-opted ‘experts’ to serve on committees such as the Art Galleries and 
Libraries, and the Technical Education Committees, but was only used where the decisions 
taken by the particular committee did not involve major policy areas of the Council’s business. 
 
Although the aldermanic system meant that men of long experience were retained on the 
Council, one consequence was that in practice aldermen, who continued to meet the 
requirements for election to the Council, served until they resigned or died. As a result of their 
long experience, many of the committees of both Councils were chaired by aldermen. Criticism 
about their lack of answerability to the electorate came both from the press and from within 
the Councils themselves. An editorial in 1872 noted that ’readers have frequently observed 
that by aldermanic vote measures are carried or rejected against the will of the majority of the 
representative part of the Council’. 362 Rather than curbing the spendthrift, the accusations 
made were often about the extravagance of aldermen. Councillor B.V. Armitage in Salford, 
                                               
359   The handling by the Victoria Hotel scheme by the Improvement Committee of Manchester Council, which is 
discussed below, illustrated the problems which occurred when officials were not formally involved in the planning 
and implementation of this scheme. 
360   Salford Chronicle, 20 July 1872, p.3. 
361   Ibid., 3 August 1872, p.2.  Letter: ‘Nimrod.’ 
362   Ibid., 19 July 1872.  Editorial, p. 2. 
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complained about their willingness to support and often initiate the claims of officials for salary 
increases.363 He noted that  
the aldermen of the Council were not the representatives of the ratepayers; some of 
them holding office by the courtesy of the Council and some of them would not be there 
at all if it had not been for the members. Therefore, the councillors were really the 
Houses of Commons, and had the voting and the spending of money, and were 
answerable to the ratepayers – the aldermen were not.364 
 
Criticism of aldermen in Manchester was equally vigorous.  Councillor Windsor, who was the 
Mayor’s Auditor between 1879 and 1885, tried on several occasions to get Council support for 
a move to have the law changed and the office of alderman abolished.365 He asked the Council 
to express an opinion: 
 That it is desirable that the office of alderman as now constituted should be should be 
abolished and that the Council should consist only of persons elected by ratepayers 
and thus be subject to direct popular control.366  
Scott commented: 
I would suggest the hopelessness of an individual councillor attempting a financial 
reform, when irresponsible aldermen have the power of spending ratepayers’ money 
without appearing before the ratepayers for election.367 
Manchester City News criticised Alderman Thompson’s behaviour, noting that:  
He has apparently a supreme contempt for the opinion of the ratepayers when it is 
different from his own…Alderman Thompson seems oblivious of the fact that the affairs 
of the Council are the affairs of the ratepayers…. The Aldermanic office seems to have 
had a baneful influence upon his judgement of the rights of fellow ratepayers. If 
aldermen, because they are safe from popular vote intend to disregard popular 
influence, they will hasten the abolition of the office which is already a vestige of gone 
days, an anomaly in modern institutions and an obstacle to popular self-government.368 
 
The Manchester Ratepayers’ Association, in its report on the mismanagement of the Victoria 
Hotel project, used the main part of the first instalment of its report to criticise the role of the 
‘unelected aldermen’ on the Improvement Committee.369 370  It noted ’our association has 
openly and often expressed its opinion with reference to aldermen.  We contend that, having 
ceased to represent the ratepayers, they should be abolished.’ Although the Association 
recognised that the Council were legally responsible for the conduct of Council committees, 
                                               
363   Benjamin Armitage, a manufacturer, served on Salford Council between1875 and 1881. 
364   Proceedings of Salford Council, 5 June 1880, p.4. 
365   William T. Windsor, a merchant was elected to the Council in 1876. He was elected alderman in 1888, resigning 
from the Council in 1891 when he became bankrupt.  
366   Manchester City News, 9 January 1886, p.4. Editorial ‘The Council shirk the discussion.’ 
367   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.3. 
368   Manchester City News, 8 May 1886, p.4, editorial.  
369   Ibid., The six reports of the Manchester Ratepayer’s Association appeared in Manchester City News during 
April and May 1886. 
370   In this section, the focus has been on the role of aldermen on the Manchester Improvement Committee. The 
wider issue of the relationship of the Councils and their committees is considered in Section 5.3 p.106. 
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the frustration about the incompetent management by the Improvement Committee was 
clearly expressed when their report stated that the Committee was responsible for ‘all the 
works and expenditure’ in connection with the scheme.’  It noted that the numbers of aldermen 
on the Committee between 1880 and 1886, (shown in the table) ranged from 40% to 60% of 
the Committee membership.  
Year Size of committee No. of Aldermen No. of Councillors 
1880-1           18         11             7 
1881-2           18         11             7 
1882-3           16         7             9 
1883-4           16         8             8 
1884-5           16         9             7 
    
Their report stated that for a committee of this size, a reasonable number of aldermen was 
five. It also noted the low turnover of the membership on the Committee; eleven of whose 
members (which it named) had served more than 6 years.  The Committee was alleged to be 
guilty of approving additional expenditure without any thought to the overall project costs. 
Councillor Clay stated that on one occasion a ‘bare quorum’ of the Improvement Committee 
(three members) had ‘voted away £20,000 to £30,000.’371   As the total cost of the project at 
the time of writing was thought to be £100,000, this figure appears to be an exaggeration, but 
Clay was correct in noting that expensive purchases could, and were agreed with only three 
members of the Committee present.   
The mismanagement of the Victoria Hotel scheme led to highly critical press attacks on the 
incompetence of the Improvement Committee and the role of its chairman. In his letter of 
resignation, t Grundy, who was forced to resign, complained bitterly about the charge that 
aldermen ’behave with reckless extravagance; and are slaves of officialdom clinging 
tenaciously to office.’ Manchester City News stated:  
 
In most of this Alderman Grundy is undoubtedly mistaken. ….. Much of the criticism of 
municipal affairs necessarily falls on aldermen because they are generally chairmen 
of the Departments criticised, and chairmen generally exercise great influence in 
committees; it was not a personal attack.’372  
 
Despite proposals to abolish the role of aldermen, or to subject them to re-election by 
ratepayers after 6 years, both of which would have required a change to legislation, neither 
                                               
371   Manchester City News, 26 April 1886, p.6. Manchester Ratepayer’s Association final report.   
372   Ibid., 26 September 1885, editorial p.4.  Alderman Charles Grundy was elected to the Council in 1857, and 
was elected Alderman in 1863. He became chairman of the Improvement Committee 1878, and served   as Mayor 
for the years 1877-8 and 1878-9. 
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Manchester nor Salford Councils supported any change in the existing situation; being elected 
as an alderman was, after all, the ambition of most councillors. 373  
 
5.2.  Vested interests, a threat to integrity? 374 
 
Hennock recognised there was a dilemma in having businessmen as councillors. He 
acknowledged the contribution they could make to municipal government but noted that there 
would be some ‘vested interests’ in a town which businessmen were ‘almost bound’ to want 
to know about.375 This section considers the extent to which vested interests could influence 
how a councillor might responded to proposals made by the Council in conducting business. 
Hennock identified information such as the actions and policies the Council might be 
considering which could be an incentive for a business man to become a member of a 
Council.376  W. Ivor Jennings noted that ‘It is certain that a substantial number of those who 
man public health and planning committees ’are in the nature of things prejudiced’ i.e. had 
vested interests.to protect. ’377   
Election to the Council was regarded by many authors and by councillors themselves as 
obtaining membership of the ‘best club’ in the town, which provided a support network for its 
members. Membership of the ‘club’, which was seen as evidence of provide status, also 
afforded comradeship where there was mutual trust. Sidney Webb was critical of the behaviour 
of the Mayor of Salford. He noted in 1899 that at 11am at a meeting in the Mayor’s parlour, 
the Mayor was smoking a cigar, and there were already many bottles of drink displayed on a 
table. 378  He was witnessing what many councillors, who also attended Board meetings of 
companies where wine and cigars were made available, expected when attending Council or 
Committee meetings; it was a common practice for councillors to meet before a meeting and 
enjoy a drink and a cigar. The social life of members of the ‘best club’ was also often shared 
with other club members. The diaries of Bosdin Leech 379 record social occasions attended by 
                                               
373   The post of ‘alderman’ was abolished in municipalities under the terms of the Local Government Act 1972, 
which took effect on 1 April 1974. 
374    Vested Interest: A situation where a person or a group of persons have a very strong personal reason for acting 
in a particular way, because of an expectation of personal gain. This contrasts with conflict of interest, a situation 
in which a person is in an immediate position to derive personal benefit from actions or decisions made in their 
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375   Hennock, Fit and proper persons, p.170, stated that ‘the dangers to public well-being were obvious’ but 
suggested that the danger only arose ‘if these were the only concerns represented on the town Council’.  
376   Ibid., p.297.  
377   W. Ivor Jennings, ‘Political Quarterly, Volume 9, no.1, 1938, 37. 
378    Greenall, The making of Victorian Salford, p. 54. referred to Salford Council, during the Victorian period as 
‘the finest club in Salford.’  
379   Bosdin Leech, The Leech Diaries–LCH Collection Shelf position Mun.A.8.10) Chetham’s library, Manchester.  
Bosdin Thomas Leech, a merchant, was elected to Manchester Council in 1880; and elected an Alderman in 1891. 
He served as Mayor 1891-2, and was knighted in 1894. A director of the Manchester Ship Canal Company he 
wrote the two-volume definitive account of the building of the Manchester Ship Canal. (Sir Bosdin Leech History of 
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other councillors when matters coming before the Council could be discussed. In some cases, 
councillors and officials attended the same church, and were involved with the same charities. 
380 The protection’ of the ‘best club’ network stretched further. Long serving employees of the 
municipality were regarded as members of the Council ‘family’, where the reward for 
membership was mutual loyalty. 381 The reluctance of the two Councils to sanction councillors 
who were guilty of the practice of insider trading, despite the changing public attitudes to the 
practice, is an example of the attitude of members of the club to the standards of integrity 
expected in public service. Robb commenting on attitudes in commerce noted  
the codes of behaviour and standards of business ethics were poorly articulated…. 
ethical boundaries were vague, in effect persons in the business community developed 
private patterns of behaviour that were at odds with the professed public morality. …382   
These attitudes were apparent in how ‘members of the club’ behaved. It could be difficult for 
a councillor to lead the way by condemning established patterns of behaviour and supporting 
higher standards of integrity in the face of general satisfaction with the status quo, and the 
hostile attitude to the need to make changes which could be held by other members of the 
‘club’. The lack of influence of party politics on the conduct of Council business in both 
municipalities had an effect on the behaviour of members of the Council and its committees. 
In the absence of a party structure which provided an opposition in the Council chamber, which 
could draw attention to the actions of the Council which lacked integrity, councillors who raised 
objections about particular matters could find themselves isolated, even though they might 
have previously subscribed to a common programme to implement improvements in public 
health and the environment. 383  The result was therefore a willingness to overcome any 
scruples held about the detail of particular policies. A commonly held vested interest by 
members of the ‘club’ was to minimising harmful publicity about the Council’s actions, as this 
would reflect on the competence and integrity of the Council and its members. This led to 
attempts to prevent the reporting of the extent of embezzlement by officers, 384  and the 
reasons for mismanagement, although these attempts were often unsuccessful. The attitude 
of both Councils to the sanction of excluding a fellow member of the Council ‘club’ from 
membership of the Council merely because of involvement in insider trading, a matter which 
                                               
the Manchester Ship Canal, from its inception to its completion, with personal reminiscences (Manchester: Sherratt 
& Hughes, 1907)). 
380   Alderman Davies of Salford Council and Samuel Hunter Salford’s disgraced Gas engineer were both officials 
of Irwell Street Wesleyan Chapel.  
381   The attitude of Manchester Council to T.H.G. Berrey, the Chief Superintendent of the Waterworks Department, 
who was undoubtedly guilty of behaviour lacking integrity is discussed in Chapter 8.1 p.162. 
382   Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern England. p.169. 
383   An extreme case of a councillor who was isolated because of his views, was James Mandley, whose trenchant 
views about the management of Salford Gasworks and constant disruption of Council business resulted in a lack 
of support from other members of the Council.  
384   For example, avoiding prosecution for embezzlement by dismissing offenders and recovering shortfalls from 
the guarantee which all the officers had to have. 
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had previously been acceptable, was that it was too severe. There was also resistance to 
imposing the legal sanction of disqualification because this would damage the reputation of 
the Council for government with integrity. Paradoxically by failing to use the sanction which 
could have been an effectual deterrent for dealing with insider trading, and by apparently 
condoning the wrong doing, the reputation of both Councils was damaged.385 
Property was one subject where a number of councillors shared a vested interest. R. L. 
Greenall commented that on Salford Council ’the rights of property were most tenderly 
protected’ 386 One illustration of how this could be achieved was demonstrated by Salford 
Property Owners’ Association, whose Chairman George M. Jones and several members of 
the Association were also members of the Council.387 In 1871, the Council approved strict 
building regulations to improve the standard of new buildings in the municipality. This action 
had been opposed by the Property Owners’ Association, and when the regulations were 
implemented, they were widely ignored, a situation which was said to be due to the Association 
deterring the inspectors of the Building Committee from doing their job.  The attempt to draw 
up new regulations was also delayed, leading Councillor J. W. Walker to comment that 
although something needed to be done, ’they would never succeed until they had the co-
operation of the property owners.’388  
The belief that mismanagement could be the result of pressure from members of the Council 
or the Council itself to protect vested interests, was not cited by critics as the cause of 
mismanagement, presumably because it was difficult to prove. The threat of legal action for 
libel when an allegation was made about this type of behaviour was no doubt also a powerful 
deterrent.  The editorial response to one case in Salford suggests that vested interests were 
seen to be a serious obstacle to governance with integrity. The Water Committee which 
considered tenders to supply material for uniforms for scavengers, were unanimous that a 
particular sample and tender should be accepted.  When however, it was announced that the 
sample had been submitted by a Mr Thornber a linen draper, two councillors, Huddart and 
Yearnshaw 389  objected to the decision allegedly because ‘Mr Thornber was not a friend of 
councillors.’390 ’ This was a minor incident where the challenge, made after the committee had 
                                               
385   The damage to the reputation of both Councils by their actions in condoning wrongdoing is considered in 
Chapter 8 1, p.162. 
386   R. L. Greenall, The Making of Victorian Salford, p.162. 
387   John Garrard, Leadership and Politics in 19c Salford, a Historical Analysis of Urban Political Power, p.66.  
388   Salford Weekly News, 7 March 1874 p.3. J.W. Walker was a pattern card maker who served on the Council 
for 11 years, from 1868 to 1879.  
389   William Huddart, a coal dealer was elected to the Council in 1891 he was elect alderman in 1909, William 
Yearnshaw a Baker and Flour dealer served on Salford Council from1889 to 1907.  
390   Salford Chronicle, 9 January 1892 p.4. Editorial. The inference of the remark ‘who was not a friend of 
Councillors’ can be read as meaning that some councillors regarded their role first and foremost to represent their 
narrow interests and those of ‘friends and relatives,’ and were not therefore objective when they were asked to 
make decisions which might clash with these interests.  
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made their decision, was unsuccessful. The language of the criticism used about this incident 
by Salford Chronicle is noteworthy; suggesting this behaviour was seen as an example of a 
wider problem of conflict of interest arising from vested interests of the councillors involved in 
adjudicating tenders. The report in the press which called Huddart and Yearnshaw 
‘Unscrupulous politicians,’ stated that 
it is made all too manifest that a certain class of men navigate themselves into public 
bodies not to represent the ratepayers, but to forward the interests of any shopkeepers 
or contractors who may side with them politically or whom they may call a friend. This 
is municipal representation in 1892. 391   
The problems with this tender left the newspaper to comment sarcastically that such was the 
code of honour of the Council ‘that it has perforce been decreed that members shall judge 
such samples without knowing whence they emanate’.  
By the last decade of the nineteenth century, both municipalities recognised that the system 
of choosing committee members needed to be changed.  Allocation of members of Salford 
Council to particular committees was, until 1892, constrained by the need to ensure that the 
number of members representing Salford constituencies did not exceed the total numbers of 
representatives drawn equally from Pendleton and Broughton, on any of the General 
Committees of the municipality. This made it difficult to allocate councillors with relevant 
experience to a particular committee. In 1892, the District committees were abolished and 
committee membership was no longer determined by the district that a councillor represented. 
After the rationalisation of the constitution of Salford Council, so that its committees served 
the whole borough, Salford Council had set up an ‘Appointments Committee’ to allocate 
members of Council to particular committees. Allegations of mismanagement and 
extravagance made about the Electric Lighting Committee led to some soul searching by 
Salford Council about the appointment to Council Committees of men whose private business 
interests could conflict with the Council’s interests, offering opportunities for insider trading or 
conflict of interest392. After a long debate, it was however agreed that the matter of barring 
members from particular committees, on the grounds that as a result of their interests a conflict 
of interest that could arise at some future date was impractical, and the matter should not be 
pursued.393 
 
                                               
391   Salford Chronicle, 9 January 1892, p.4.  ‘Comment on local matters.’ 
392   This is considered in section 4.2, p.56. 
393   The Council did set up a ‘Special Committee’ to consider the allegations of insider trading made against 
councillors Huddart Corney, and Haworth. These cases and the aftermath were considered in Chapter 4.2, p 73. 
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5.3. Controlling the actions of committees.394  
Many of the problems of mismanagement occurred because of the failure of both Councils to 
monitor and control the actions of their committees, with the result that important issues which 
might have originated in committee received inadequate scrutiny in Council.  Both Manchester 
and Salford used the powers provided by the 1835 MCA, which allowed a municipal Council 
to appoint committees to transact any part of their business, ‘as they think fit,’ and to delegate 
to the committee the power to make recommendations and carry out instructions from the 
Council on matters within an area of responsibility which was defined when the committee was 
appointed.  This was usually achieved by listing the sections of Acts of Parliament which 
imposed duties on the Corporation and which were within the remit of the particular committee.  
There were real problems in setting up a committee structure capable of dealing with an 
increasing and varying workload. Arthur Redford examined the operation of the committees in 
Manchester in the 1870s.395 New duties placed on municipalities often affected the work of 
more than one committee. He commented that problems of interpretation of the terms of 
reference were frequent; when more than one committee discussed a particular issue, usually 
without any communication or consultation and occasionally in competition with other 
committees which felt the matter lay within their province.  As part of a discussion about the 
committee structure in Manchester, he gave examples of new issues where the definition of 
the boundaries of a committee’s responsibilities was unclear; for example the requirement to 
close private slaughter houses required cooperation from the Markets Committee, the 
Nuisance Committee as well as the Health Committee.396  The opposition from interested 
groups in the community could also delay the implementation of necessary reforms; the 
Butchers’ Guardian Association objected to the scheme to close private abattoirs on the 
grounds that public abattoirs would  ‘aggregate the nuisances and sewage exhalations,’… and 
the proposals were ‘an attack on private property.’ Some rationalisation of the committee 
structure did take place; a ‘Health’ Committee was set up in 1868; and a further reorganisation 
of the duties of several committees was undertaken in 1875, when the first wave of 
amalgamations of townships took place. 397 The changing role of the two Councils meant that 
the organisation of committees to deal efficiently with Council business remained a problem. 
Although minor adjustments were made in 1890 to the role of the various committees in 
Manchester, more major changes to the remit of the various committees were needed to clarify 
                                               
394   The committee structures in Manchester and Salford are described in Chapter 2.2. and Appendices 3&4, 
pp.192 &193. 
395   Arthur Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, Borough & City, p.286.   
396   Ibid., p.284. 
397  Ibid., p.279. The functions of John Leigh when he was appointed as Officer of Health in Manchester, were 
found to be divided between nine Council committees. 
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‘who did what,’ after the further extension of the city boundaries. 398  One important change 
made at this time, for example, was the formation of two committees to replace the functions 
of the Health Committee. A Sanitary Committee took over the business relating to health, 
housing and the food supply, whilst a Cleansing Committee was responsible for the practical 
work of scavenging, disposal of refuse and keeping the City clean. The Nuisance committee 
was abolished.  
Where a matter was seen to require an input from more than one committee, no attempt was 
made to bring representatives of the relevant committees together to discuss the matter; each 
committee met separately and as committee meetings were usually held every two weeks, 
and issues were rarely dealt with at a single meeting of a committee, this could add to the time 
taken for any decision to be made. As there was no mechanism to monitor, coordinate and, if 
necessary, allocate the work to a particular committee, clashes of interest when more than 
one committee were discussing the same matter persisted.399 The boundaries of the 
Manchester municipality were extended in 1885 and 1890 by the incorporation of neighbouring 
townships, so that the Council which in 1871 had 64 members, by the end of the century had 
104 members. As ‘new’ members expected to sit on at least three committees, Manchester 
committees grew in size, so that by the end of the century many had at least 20 members.400  
The ‘tripartite’ constitution of Salford Council made progress to improve public health in the 
municipality very difficult.401 Each district made its own arrangements for sewering and 
scavenging, and fiercely resisted any criticism or interference from the other districts about 
the system used or its cost and effectiveness. As membership of the General committees such 
as Health and Rivers was also on the basis that Salford councillors could not out vote 
Pendleton and Broughton representatives, it was very difficult to get any cooperation about 
schemes to deal with issues such as flooding, a problem which affected only Salford District, 
as this could lead to an increase the general rate also paid by Pendleton and Broughton.  All 
councillors who were members of the General Council committees, and their subcommittees, 
which served all three districts of the municipality, also needed to attend the meetings of the 
District committees, which meant travel to a different venue, and they might also be involved 
with special committees, set up to consider particular issues. Although Salford municipal 
boundaries did not change after 1853, a local Amalgamation Act in 1891 which united the 
                                               
398   Manchester Council, Epitome, 4 February 1885.The anomaly that the gas supply to the Markets was controlled 
by the Markets Committee was removed by transferring responsibility to the Gas Committee. 
399   The lack of committee minutes makes it difficult to identify the extent of this difficulty. The problem of 
coordinating the work of the various committees in both Councils is considered further in the next section. 
400  The sizes of the Committees in the two municipalities and the number of subcommittees are given in 
Appendices 3 & 4,.pp.192 & 193. 
401   This is considered in Section 2.1, p.19. 
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three districts of the municipality meant each committee of the Council served the whole 
municipality.  
The various committees of both authorities undertook the day-to- day management of the 
relevant service departments, as well as dealing with matters referred to it by the Council. The 
meetings of committees were unlikely to be quick affairs and as result councillors often needed 
to commit two or three days per week to attend to Council and committee business.  Most of 
the projects which were undertaken by a municipal corporation either originated in or were 
delegated to one of the Council’s committees to provide and manage. The result was that 
many of the problems of mismanagement and overspending arose directly from the decisions 
made in these committees. 402The minutes of the various committees, which were prepared 
by or in conjunction with the committee chairman, and could be written to omit or underplay 
controversial matters, thus ensuring that no difficult questions could arise when the minutes 
were presented to the Council for approval. By the 1880s both Councils needed to meet at 
least monthly. The first item on the agenda was the approval of Committee minutes, which 
were ‘Jointly and severally read’. How this was interpreted varied.403 Committee reports in both 
municipalities were subject to challenge; the result was that debates on the minutes could be 
lengthy. 
Any substantial discussion about such a matter was reported in the press report of ‘Council 
Proceedings’ under the committee title. A usual practice was to refer the query back to the full 
Committee for consideration. At the following Council meeting, objections made to a 
committee matter in the previous Council meeting were often waived with little or no 
information about how the query had been resolved. Occasionally when a committee asked 
for guidance about a matter, the discussion was reported in the ‘Proceedings of the Council’, 
but this was rare.  Until December 1883, for those minutes which were passed by Manchester 
Council without significant discussion, the ‘Proceedings of the Council’ simply gave a list of 
the committees involved and recorded the resolution to accept the minutes, en bloc. After 
December 1883, Manchester Council passed a separate resolution to accept each set of 
minutes, again subject to any query to be resolved.  It is not clear why this change was made, 
although it might have been to stop the use of the derogatory phrase ‘nodding through’, used 
to describe the approval procedure when only one resolution was used to approve all sets of 
minutes. 
                                               
402...The development by Council committees of a service department both to implement new schemes of work and 
to deal with problems arising with the services provided by the committee is discussed in Section 6.4, p.13. 
403   In the 1870s, committee reports in Salford were often read out in full. The practice in Manchester seemed to 
depend on the particular committee, and the Council chairman. 
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Loyalty to the Committee was seen as paramount, and leaks during Council meetings about 
discussions in a Committee, which could be damaging to its reputation, were unusual. 404 . 405 
The result of these procedures was that debate about any matters or actions of a committee 
which might be controversial, could be restricted, leaving the Council unaware of problems 
relating to projects or services which were being undertaken by the Committee.  
As councillors did not have time to read the minutes of all the Committees which were tabled 
for approval, Manchester Council set up a small committee to consider ‘to what extent the 
proceedings of the various Committees shall be brought before the Council.’ Their report led 
to agreement that an ‘epitome’ or summary giving the resolutions passed by each committee 
should be circulated with the agenda, so that councillors had the opportunity to raise in Council 
any matter which seemed to be of concern to the Council as a whole when the minutes came 
up for approval.  The system was finally implemented in Manchester in November 1884.The 
circulation of a ‘synopsis’ for the same purpose with the agenda of Salford Council followed in 
1887. The epitome and synopsis were prepared in each municipality by the Town Clerk’s 
Department, on the basis of the minutes of the various Committee meetings. Both the epitome 
and synopsis contained only a list of the resolutions passed at the meeting and not matters 
which were discussed where no decision was taken. Copies of both were also sent to the 
Press.  Challenges to Committee minutes did increase in the later years of the Victorian period. 
It is not clear whether this was due to the information provided by the epitomes; Arthur Redford 
clearly thought that their influence as a briefing document had been questionable. He noted 
that in 1905/6 the practice of presenting the various report in the epitomes in historical order, 
with the Watch Committee first and the Health Committee near the end, would be changed. 
The reason given was so that each standing committee would be able ‘to claim the earliest 
attention of the Council.’406 
 
As Council work became more complex, and involved the implementation of technically 
involved projects, knowledge of the business of a committee could only be acquired by 
experience and a commitment to work to understand the relevant practical background. This 
was the reason for the practice adopted in Manchester which allowed committees to nominate 
their own members for re-election each year. 407  The result was that membership of a 
                                               
404  Report of the Manchester Ratepayer’s Association, April 26th 1886, p.6. ‘Victoria Hotel, the spending of 
£100,000.’ The report noted that ‘loyalty to the committee’ meant that problems identified in Committee were not 
usually brought to the notice of the Council.  
405   Salford Reporter, June 1900, letter from William Hunt, a Salford Elective auditor, who made serious allegations 
of jobbery in the awarding of contracts by the Salford Electric Lighting Committee. The detailed information which 
the letter leaked about how the tender evaluation was conducted in committee could only have come from someone 
who had attended the Committee meeting. In this case the likely candidate was the Electrical Engineer C. L Turner, 
who later resigned when a Special Committee found that he had ‘lost the confidence of the Committee.’ 
406   Redford, The History of Local government in Manchester, Volume III, p,176. 
407   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study, p.196.  
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particular committee could be little changed year on year, and members developed a fierce 
loyalty to the committee, and defensiveness when the committee was criticised. It was often 
long-serving aldermen, who were regarded as having the necessary experience of the 
Committee’s work who frequently therefore served as the Chairman or Deputy Chairman. 
Redford reported that the Webbs, who visited Manchester and Salford in 1899 to assess the 
effectiveness of local government in the two municipalities, attributed the ineffectiveness of 
some committees in Manchester to the persistence in office of an aldermanic chairman who 
had grown too old for the work. They had suggested for example, that the senility of Alderman 
King was to blame for the inefficiency of the Manchester Finance Committee.408  Beatrice 
Webb also remarked that some committees were dominated by persons who were 
‘grotesquely unfit’. She labelled the chairman of the Markets Committee ‘for many years,’ as 
‘an illiterate tailor.’409 She does not give any evidence to support her allegation; the long-time 
Chairman of the Markets Committee who was heavily criticised for his handling of the dispute 
with the market tenants was Alderman Foulkes Roberts, a merchant.410  Richard L. Read, who 
was a tailor, had previously been deputy chairman of the Committee; but did not become 
Chairman until 1897. 
The relationship between the Council and its committees was often difficult. Critics of the 
system considered that, as committees were usually chaired by aldermen who were therefore 
not at risk of being ousted by the electorate.  They were therefore able to exert too much 
influence, and as a result the Council was unable to supervise the committee’s actions. Seuss 
Law commented that ’the committees became little kingdoms with the chairman possessing 
almost monarchical powers within them’411 As each committee aimed at this autonomy, 
supervision and the need to answer to the Council for their actions was seen by chairmen as 
interference. The result of this attitude was that Committee reports to the Council often and 
deliberately withheld relevant information. This ‘independent behaviour’ noted by critics, was 
highlighted by the Ratepayers’ Association when discussing the management by the 
Improvement Committee of the Victoria Hotel contract. Their report stated:  
Only a few weeks ago a councillor thought it necessary to proclaim aloud in the Council 
the astonishing fact that his committee had generously given a small parcel of land to 
another committee, as if forsooth, they were competing bodies instead of being (as 
they should be) integral parts of one body. The fact is that the committees of our 
                                               
408   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, p.436. The ‘inefficiency’ of the Manchester 
Finance Committee is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
409   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study p.197.  
410   J. Foulkes Roberts was a Congregationalist deacon who took a particular interest in educational matters and 
Sunday school work. He resigned as Chair of the Markets Committee in 1897 when he was elected Lord Mayor. 
He was referred to as ‘having a practical business-like mind,’ and ‘Never a showy speaker,’ or ‘one inclined to court 
popularity,’ (Taken from Manchester Faces and Places, Volume 8, 1897, p.89). His actions in the mismanagement 
the markets are discussed in Section 9.1. 
411   G. Seuss Law, Manchester’s Politics 1885-1906. Unpublished Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania (1975) p.67. 
How the Committees of the Council and their departments achieved autonomy is considered in Chapter Six below.  
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Council are rapidly becoming if they have not already become, ‘corporations’ by 
themselves. Each seems to ‘act on its own book’ and to resent any interference on the 
part of any other committee or member of Council. In this lie the seeds of serious 
mischief, unless citizens are very vigilant. 412 
 
Most committees met fortnightly. When there were matters which, according to the Chairman 
of a Committee require more urgent action, these were often dealt with by ‘Chairman’s action,’ 
on the grounds of the difficulty of convening a meeting of the full committee. Matters agreed 
by the Chairman were apparently automatically confirmed by the next meeting of the full 
committee.  R. G. Lawson, writing about Manchester Council in 1904 commented critically that 
business which should come before the Committee ’tends to be conducted by the Chair, 
Deputy and officials.’413 Comparing how decisions were taken in a company, he noted that 
Manchester Council has 19 standing committees. He commented that the number of members 
on the committees was between 13 and 22, a situation ‘which is not conducive to efficiency’. 
Using a ‘Company’ analogy, he suggested that as Rylands Ltd. has a board of eight members 
and Lancashire and Yorkshire Railways has thirteen directors; a committee size of eight ‘might 
be conducive to more efficient decision making’.414  Lawson must however have known that 
whilst it would be within the powers of the Council to have small committees, such a proposal 
would be unacceptable to the members of the Council who expected to have a right to serve 
on at least three committees. 
5.4. The coordination and management of Council services. 
 
The structure of a municipal corporation, established using the template provided by the 
MCA1835/1882, failed to provide a system for the coordination and management of municipal 
services. The only provision in the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 which was repeated in 
the 1882 legislation, and was presumably for this purpose, was for ‘a fit person’ from amongst 
the aldermen, councillors or persons ‘as such’, to be elected Mayor for one year at a time.415 
The appointment of a Mayor was intended as a replacement for the pre-incorporation office of 
Borough Reeve, who, as a member of the important borough organisations was in a position 
to oversee and coordinate the limited number of functions taken on by local government at 
that time. A mayor, appointed under the MCAs also had a series of obligations and duties, 
especially in relation to elections. He was the presiding officer of the Council, ordering its 
                                               
412    Manchester City News, 26 April 1886, p.6.  ‘Victoria Hotel. The Spending of £100,000.’  Part 6.  
413   R. G. Lawson, The city Council seen from within, a first year’s experience, (Manchester: Manchester City 
News. 1904.)  This was a 15- page pamphlet. Lawson, who served on Manchester Council from December 1902 
to September 1904, was a member of the Baths, Rivers and Tramways Committees. 
414   The size of Manchester Council, which had originally 64 members, grew to 76 after the boundary extensions 
of 1885, and expanded to 104 after the incorporation of further townships in 1890.Further expansion post 1900 led 
to a Council of 128 members. 
415   Municipal Corporations Act (1882), s.14. 
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procedures and debates in accordance with the statutory standing orders, and he had the 
powers vested in a chairman to regulate and control the proceedings in Council. Although the 
Act provided that the person elected was ‘to have precedence in all places in the borough,’ 
the Mayor had no more legal powers than an ordinary councillor.416  The standing orders of 
both Manchester and Salford, which provided that he should have ex-officio membership of 
all committees, did enable the post- holder to know the work being undertaken across the 
Council, and could therefore potentially play a role in coordinating the services of the various 
departments within the municipality. J. H.  Warren, however, commented that by custom and 
tradition, the Mayor was looked upon as the Borough’s civic leader, with the function of 
‘promoting and expressing the Borough’s civic sense,’ a duty which occupied a considerable 
part of his time. 417  This meant abandoning much of the ordinary work of the Council.  As early 
as 1842, Councillor Prentice had stated that ’the work being divided amongst various 
committees, independent of each other, and therefore needing someone as the directing 
head; that directing head they had found in the late Mayor.’418  This statement was made when 
the role of Manchester Council was limited, and the Mayor could play a coordinating role, but 
the need for the effective coordination of services was already recognised. The Mayor as 
chairman of the Council was still seen as the de facto Head of all services; and as a last resort, 
answerable for performance of the Council. When the Health Committee of Manchester 
Council repeatedly failed to take action to deal with the complaints about the conduct of W. D. 
Callison, the Superintendent of the Health Department, the Mayor was asked to look into the 
matter, but he had no powers to force the Committee to comply; except perhaps by focusing 
the disapproval of the rest of the Council on the defaulting committee.419 Warren also noted 
that a Mayor should not concern himself with the matters of policy in the Council, and could 
not direct the officers, who were responsible to the Council through an appropriate 
committee.420  Councillor Walker, speaking at a Liberal Meeting in Salford in 1877   noted that  
’Council members …honoured and respected their chairmen and deputy chairmen, but these 
men had to rule in justice and mercy…They did not allow even Mayors to be tyrannical’.421 
John Garrard noted that although a Mayor might identify objectives to be achieved in his 
mayoralty, the influence which he could exert was strictly limited. Richard Husband, Salford’s 
Mayor in 1882, recognised the need for discretion ’for if a mayor were to interfere too much 
                                               
416   Herman Finer, English Local History, p.223.  
417   J. H. Warren, The English Local Government System, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1966) p.89. 
418   Manchester Guardian,12 November 1845 p.6; (quoted in John Garrard (Ed.) Heads of the Local State:  Mayors 
Provosts & Burgomasters since 1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate), 2007 p.14. 
419   The investigation into the allegations made about Callison was eventually carried out by an external referee, 
a Mr E Sutton, appointed by the Council. This case is considered in Section 4.3.p .73. 
379   J H. Warren, The English Local Government System p.90. The mayor became chief magistrate of the Borough 
Bench and was ex officio a member of the Bench for a further year after he had relinquished office. 
421   The ‘Richard Husband’ quotation and the ‘Councillor Walker’ quotation are taken from John Garrard, 
Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Cities 1830-1880 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1983), 
p.65. 
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with the business of any committee, he would soon find that he was encroaching upon ‘their 
rights and privileges’.  The most therefore that a Mayor of a municipality could expect therefore 
was to be ‘the first among equals.’  
 
The expansion in the responsibilities of local authorities in the mid-Victorian period increased 
the need for coordination of the various activities within the authority. T.E. Headrick remarked 
that in some cases the Town Clerk ‘stepped in to meet the challenge.’422 As de facto legal 
adviser to the Council, a Town Clerk would be consulted by officials such as the Borough 
Engineer and the Medical Officer of Health. He also carried out the instructions of the Council 
given in any resolutions passed at their meetings, and in his capacity as Town Clerk, 
correspondence to the Council would pass through his department.   Headrick noted that:  
 
In Manchester Joseph Heron, Town Clerk for thirty-nine years, virtually dominated 
Council policy during that period; and as Town Clerk, he considered himself 
responsible for all the work of the Corporation, even that technically in the charge of 
other officials in other departments.  He was no doubt an unusual man with great 
administrative and legal skill, marvellous wit, courteous manner and the very desirable 
capacity to reach quick decisions.423 
 
Shena Simon confirmed that Heron frequently intervened in Council debates and when asked 
for advice, it would be given in the form of an instruction ’to do;’ no objection to his advice was 
admissible. 424  Heron accepted the Council’s offer to take an appointment of Consultant Town 
Clerk in 1877, a post he held until he died in 1890.  
William Talbot, a solicitor, was eventually appointed as Town Clerk in 1890, having been 
served 23 years previously as deputy Town Clerk. Although Simon stated that he was an 
excellent lawyer, she added that he had none of Sir Joseph’s capacity for quick decisions, and 
sometimes appeared weak and hesitating. She commented that ‘the Council growing larger 
with each extension of the City boundaries, and taking on more and more duties, had become 
less of a unity’.425  Unlike Heron, Talbot showed no inclination to take on the role of ‘advising’ 
on the decisions which committees should make.  The problem Simon identified was that the 
Council had gradually broken up in to a series of autonomous committees during the last 
decades of the century. The solution she suggested, the need to overhaul the committee 
system, would not have addressed this problem.  The need was for a means of managing and 
coordinating the work of the various Council Committees so that entrenched chairmen who 
                                               
422   T. E. Headrick, The Town Clerk in English Local Government (London: George Allen & Unwin 1962), p.23.  
423    Ibid., p.24. 
424   Manchester City News, 4 January 1890, Obituary. Heron’s career and attitudes to his role in the municipality 
are considered in Section 6.3 ‘Lifestyle choices, p.126. 
384    Shena D Simon, A century of City Government, p.409.  
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promoted Committee autonomy, became answerable for the services provided by their 
Committee. T. C. Horsfall in a paper presented to the Manchester Statistical Society in 1895, 
started his lecture by noting: 
Manchester is a very imperfectly governed town; and it and all other large English towns 
must continue to be imperfectly governed until they have at the head of their town Council 
well trained officials holding office for life or during good behaviour, instead of men who, 
having their own professions or businesses to attend to and receiving only such very 
imperfect training in government as is to be gained from membership of a town Council 
must be considered to be amateurs, and who hold office for only one or two years. ’426 
 
He stated that the present situation had arisen ’not because of any lack of ability or good will 
on the part of its members, but because the whole system is bad’. He also suggested that the 
important committees should have a well-trained well-paid man appointed for a term of years, 
or life, ’so long as he should be efficient,’ whose role was to chair the Committee. One change 
was absolutely essential; ‘the heads of Town Councils should be well-trained leaders.’  
Beatrice Webb’s analysis of local government in Manchester led her to a similar conclusion. 
She stated that:  
the men running the organisation are not a bad lot; one or two of the officials are distinctly able.  
But there is no head to the concern, no one who corresponds to a general manager of a railway 
company, still less to be its paid chairman.  The mayor, elected for one year, has all his time 
absorbed by public meetings, social functions, or routine administration: he is far more the 
ceremonial Head of the City than the chief executive of the city government. 
She clearly did not feel that Manchester needed another Joseph Heron when she noted that:  
The town clerk and his deputy are exclusively engaged in legal and parliamentary business; 
they spend all their time in the lobbies of the House of Commons in presenting the Corporation’s 
case at the L.G.B. enquiries; in preparing leases and drafting agreements, or in submitting bye-
laws to government departments. The suggestion that the town clerk of a great city like 
Manchester can be anything more than its solicitor and parliamentary agent – can fill the place 
of its chief executive officer – is, as things are present, an absurdity.427 
Her analysis also provided clear support for the need for a general manager with executive 
powers. Neither Horsfall nor Webb considered the practicality of making such an appointment.  
The management of Council services would require an appointee to determine and implement 
the priorities of the service, and this would have required Committee chairmen to cede power. 
There was no provision for this in the MCAs and it would have been highly unlikely that 
councillors would have accepted any change; after all, the attitude of the Council was that it 
was elected to conduct municipal government. 428  There were ways in which cooperation 
                                               
426   T. C. Horsfall, ‘The government of Manchester.’ Manchester Statistical Society, November 1895 (Manchester: 
John Heywood 1895), p.1.  Thomas Coglan Horsfall (1841-1932) a partner in a card manufacturing business, 
retired from business |on ill health grounds in 1886. He was leading founder of the Manchester Art Museum and 
took an active role in many committees involved in the campaigns for social and educational reform.  
427   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study, p.195.  
428   Clifton, Professionalism Patronage and Public Service in Victorian London described the system used by the 
Metropolitan Board of Works. The first act of the 59 members of the Board who were mainly nominated to serve 
on the Board, was to elect a Chairman who agreed to serve full-time in the office and was paid a salary. His role 
was to guide the affairs of the Board. This was very successful, perhaps because of the post holders who were 
elected, the first of whom was (Sir) John Thwaites. 
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between committees might have been improved. The membership of the Wolverhampton 
General Purposes Committee during the late Victorian period was made up of all the senior 
men on the Council, including all the aldermen, Chairmen of standing committees and the 
senior councillors from each ward, comprising 30 from a total membership of the Council which 
had 64 members. Whilst it had a number of specific roles, for example the preparation of by-
laws and dealing with staffing matters, its main job was to act as a filter through which 
proposals made by committees passed, before going before the Council. As all committee 
chairmen were members, it was a bargaining ground where the support for a proposal could 
be tested. G.W. Jones noted, however, that it had limited success; it was too easy to by-pass 
the scrutiny of this Committee. The Finance Committee set up by Salford in 1898 which was 
consisted of representatives elected by the standing committees of the Council, did provide a 
forum for exchange of information, but in neither Salford or Wolverhampton did either of these 
arrangements overcome the problem that effective coordination of Council services in the late 
Victorian period would only have been be possible if there had been major changes to the 
constitution of the two municipalities.  
 
Findings and précis of -Chapter Five. 
 
The findings of this chapter confirm that both Manchester and Salford Councils faced major 
and almost insuperable problems in coping with the extent of urban squalor in the two 
municipalities. The chapter has examined the background of the men who served on the 
Municipal Councils in the two boroughs many of whom had experience of the commercial 
business practices, and saw these as relevant to the conduct of Council business. The 
evidence of this research suggest that election to the Council inculcated an arrogant belief 
about the rightness of their decisions which should not be challenged, with the result that that 
officials played no part in meetings of the Council. The types of problems occurring in the 
1880s are detailed, noting how the attitude of both Councils also prevented any steps being 
taken to improve the efficiency of the Council in dealing with municipal business. The 
penultimate section of the chapter considered the dysfunctional relationship with the Council 
which developed as committees, chaired by aldermen who resented being answerable to the 
Council for their actions, sought autonomy from Council. The section which included examples 
where a committee took action without the approval of the Council, whether by Chairman’s 
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action or by the deliberate failure to disclose the proposed action to the Council, noted the 
comment of the Ratepayers’ Association that this could lead to ‘serious mischief.’ 
The final section of the chapter examined the consequences of the failure of MCA1882, to 
provide a system for the overall management and coordination of the services provided by a 
municipality.  It examined the proposals made by commentators such as such as T. C. Horsfall 
and Beatrice Webb, but noted that their proposals would require the chairmen of Committees 
to cede power to any manager appointed to take on this role, which would be unacceptable to 
the Councils in both municipalities. 
This chapter has noted the failure of two Councils to fully utilise the expertise of officials in 
carrying out the business of the Council, the next chapter examines further the important role 
which officers and officials played in municipal government.  
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Chapter Six. The staffing establishment of municipalities: integrity 
in the workplace? 
 
Many of the valid allegations of mismanagement made about the conduct of the two Councils 
concerned the technical or managerial input into schemes of work undertaken by the Councils. 
This chapter examine the range of the expertise needed by the two municipalities to support 
and deliver Council services, and the attitudes of men, whether employed as officers or 
officials, to the need to conduct their duties with integrity. It argues that as a result of the 
attitude of councillors to their role in delivering council services, the management structure 
which evolved for staff employed by the municipality failed to facilitate access to the expertise 
of officials to ensure that the services or the schemes undertaken by the municipality were 
delivered with competence.  
 
6.1 Municipal officers – not genteel enough to pass muster as proper middle 
class? 
 
The two corporations, which had become major employers in their municipalities, needed a 
staffing structure with a range of skills, including officers to carry out the day-to-day services 
in a particular department within the Councils, municipal services in the community, such as 
branch libraries, and public baths, and the increasing involvement in the provision of artisan 
housing. All increased both the numbers of staff on the pay roll of the two Councils and the 
types of expertise required. Additions to the range of the municipal enterprises of gas and 
water included the provision of electricity and the operation of a tramways service, chargeable 
services, which also resulted in a large increase in the need for clerical support. This section 
examines the mindset and attitude of these officers to the delivery of Council services with 
integrity and the extent to which their conduct was influenced by the prevalent belief in 
commerce; that success in life was to be measured by the success in attainting wealth and 
social status. 
A number of authors have considered the plight of the clerks working in Council employ. 
Anderson noted that many clerical staff employed by Manchester Corporation obtained their 
employment by patronage, by relationship to an official or a councillor.429  Shena Simon gave 
figures for employees in the service of Manchester Corporation in one year, 1908. She stated 
that 37 were related to heads of Department, and a further 86 were related to aldermen and 
                                               
.429   Gregory Anderson, Victorian Clerks, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), p.114. 
. 
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councillors.430 She noted that an attempt to prohibit the system of appointing staff on the basis 
of a letter of recommendation was heavily defeated. Appointees could be could be any age; 
and many ‘temporary’ appointees who had worked for the municipality for more than 15 years, 
lacked the security of establishment. 
McLeod noted that many of these men were involved in collecting money from the ratepayers 
for the services provided by the municipality and were usually low paid. 431 He commented on 
their system of values and way of life which he stated was characteristic of the white-collar 
worker. 432. He also noted the contention that there was a greater affinity between the clerk 
and employer, than between clerk and workman.  To a clerical officer the maintenance of this 
distinction was very important. It required, in addition to basic literacy, respectability, 
demonstrated by manner and appearance; and moral superiority shown by the exercise in 
employment of the qualities of industry, honesty and self-control. This was a claim regard by 
as pretentious, and lampooned by publications of the time.433  
Gregory Anderson described the behaviour of clerks who sought to emulate their employers 
in dress and manners, commenting that this not simply vanity, extravagance or absurd display, 
but instead an expression of the wish to be an employer.434  This need for this visible 
respectability, which involved expenditure on clothing and housing, caused financial pressure 
on incomes, and as the white-collar worker was often haunted by the fear of unemployment, 
job security was important. Perkin commented that the reason the low paid clerks ’kept 
themselves to themselves’ was that they did not want friends and neighbours to know how 
modestly they lived. He described them as being ’Too genteel to go to the pub; not genteel 
enough to pass muster as proper middle class.’ 435.  Geoffrey Crossick, citing B G Orchard, 
who studied the clerks of Liverpool in commercial employ in 1881, noted that clerks, ’white- 
collar workers’, were a very diverse occupational group. He stated:  
Their ranks embrace some who, though servants of others are enabled by their ample 
salaries to live in not the least ample houses at Claughton …though others (equally 
‘clerks’) must strive hard to exist on twelve shillings a week. 436 437 
                                               
430  Shena D Simon, A century of city government Manchester 1838-1938 (Manchester: George Allen & 
Unwin.1938). p.412. Unfortunately, she does not give the total number of staff included in this survey. 
431    Hugh McLeod, ‘White collar values and the role of religion’ in Crossick The Lower Middle Class.in Britain p.61. 
432   The term ‘white-collar worker’  refers to an employee whose job entails mental or clerical work, such as in an 
office, as distinct from the blue collar worker  whose skills were manual.  
433   For example: George and Weedon Grossmith, The Diary of a Nobody (Harmsworth: Penguin Books, 1965). 
Previously serialised in Punch, the ‘diary’ appeared in book form in 1892. 
434    Anderson, Victorian Clerks, p.41. 
435   Harold Perkin, The Rise of the Professional Society in England since 1880, p.96. 
436    Geoffrey Crossick, ed., The Lower Middle Class in Britain ‘(London: Croom Helm (1977), p.18. 
437    B. G. Orchard, The Clerks of Liverpool (Liverpool: Liverpool Corporation.1871), p.4. 
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Despite the wide range of salaries which he quoted, the higher salaries enjoyed by clerks 
employed in insurance and banking were perceived by many clerical officers in municipal 
employ to be paid to men carrying out roles which were similar to their own.  
All new posts in both municipalities, which were usually created on the request from one of 
the Council committees, had to be approved by the Council. Hasluck commented that the 
Council were well aware of the feeling of unwillingness amongst ratepayers about the 
appointment of more staff, which increased the burden on the rates 438  He suggested that the 
relationship which councillors had with the permanent staff of the Council, and the desire not 
to appear harsh to the officials, led sooner or later to posts being agreed. Manpower planning 
considerations were set aside; the need to mitigate expense was achieved by making 
appointments at the lowest grade without regard to whether the post fitted into a management 
structure which would provide both supervision and training. Few senior posts were created; 
the small number of the more senior vacancies which fell vacant were filled by promoting 
existing junior staff with experience of the role. As these posts were not advertised, 
opportunities for promotion to more senior posts in different departments of the municipality 
did not occur. 439  In-post promotions were a way of rewarding existing employees for their 
loyalty. Many of the superintendents of major services were internal Departmental promotions 
from less senior posts in the same section. The consequence of this policy was that it 
prevented the appointment of staff from outside the municipality able to introduce new ideas 
into municipal practice, at a time when expertise was sorely needed to fill the few very senior 
posts such as the administrative heads of service departments. Beatrice Webb commented 
that in Manchester in 1899 most of these posts were held by promoted clerks, who had no 
professional training for their work.440  By the late Victorian period, some posts in municipal 
employ did require a specific qualification for a job, but these were usually for officials, 
particularly posts where the cost was subsidised by payments from the LGB, such as the 
Medical Officer or Borough Analyst. These posts were usually advertised.  
For the Victorian officer employed by a municipality, the evidence of commercial and industrial 
success in the Victorian period was seen as evidence that anyone could, by hard work conduct 
and perseverance advance in society. Books on achieving personal success, which contained 
stories of the achievements of industrialists and business men who had started from humble 
beginnings, were very popular. Samuel Smiles ‘Self Help’ which was published in 1865 sold 
90,000 copies within one year; by the time of the author’s death in 1904 it had sold over a 
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439   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study. The appointments of officials who were required to have 
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quarter of a million copies.441 For the reader, the introductory paragraph of ‘Self Help’ set out 
Smiles’ recipe for success which anyone could follow. Smiles stated:  
Heaven helps those who help themselves’ is a well-tried maxim, embodying in a small 
compass the results of vast human experience.  The spirit of self-help is the route of 
all genuine growth in the individual, and exhibited in the lives of many, it constitutes 
the true source of national vigour and strength.442  
 
Walter Houghton discussing this Victorian philosophy about what constituted success in life, 
saw a different picture. 443 He used an early quotation by John Henry Newman which to 
illustrate Victorian attitudes: 
I do not know anything more dreadful than a state of mind which is, perhaps, the 
characteristic of this country, and which the prosperity of this country so miserably 
fosters.  I mean the ambitious spirit, to use a great word, but I know no other word to 
express my meaning – that low ambition which sets everyone on the lookout to at the 
entire unfixedness in the social position of individuals, that treading on the heels of one 
another, that habitual dissatisfaction of each with the position he occupies, and the 
eager desire to push himself into the next above it had become, or was becoming a 
characteristic of the nation...444 
 
Houghton added that money alone was not sufficient; the struggle for money was motivated 
by a desire for the respectability which money could command, and the possibility of social 
advancement. 445  John Stuart Mill deplored  
that entire unfixedness in the social position of individuals- that treading on the heels 
of one another- that habitual dissatisfaction of each with the position he occupies, and 
the eager desire to push himself into the next above it...no one seems to care any 
longer to cultivate…the pleasures and virtues corresponding to his station in society, 
but solely to get out of it as quickly as possible.’ 446  
 
 Although the self-help message redefined the extent to which success could be assured, the 
reasons for not advancing in society were, for many, still regarded as the result of personal 
failings and not the result of failures of the social and economic system.447  The desire to 
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achieve success at all costs led to the belief that failure was the worse fate imaginable. This 
dread of failure was noted by Carlyle, who commented  
what is it that the modern English soul does, in very truth, dread infinitely and 
contemplate with entire despair?  What is this Hell? With hesitation, with astonishment, 
I pronounce it to be: The terror of not succeeding.448  
 
This was the fear which, for many working in municipal employ who received monies on behalf 
of the Council, remained a continuous concern and influenced their actions. Robb, discussing 
embezzlement in commerce suggested that many of the cases of embezzlement where small 
amounts of money were involved resulted from ‘lifestyle pressures,’ the constant struggle to 
keep up appearances. 449  Clerks in municipal employ were in a similar position. The 
possibilities of promotion were very low. The need to succeed and be seen to have achieved 
respectability, whatever the cost, meant that the temptation to commit fraud by embezzlement 
was very great. The laxity in the bookkeeping practices used by municipalities, which created 
opportunities for such crime, also meant that the risk of being found out was reduced. 450  
 
6.2. The middle- class professional in municipal employ. 
The MCA 1835 had recognised the need for officials with expertise; and both Manchester and 
Salford Councils had made the statutorily required appointments of a Town Clerk and a 
Treasurer on receiving the Charter of Incorporation.451 Both had also appointed an officer with 
civil engineering expertise452 as a priority.453  By the 1880s the two municipalities had a number 
of specialised Departments such as the Town Clerks, Treasurers, Civil Engineering and Public 
Health, managed on a day to day basis by an official with special expertise.  
Municipalities needed men with professional expertise in a number of other areas. Although 
the knowledge needed by Councils often related to technologies and skills which were being 
developed in the newer manufacturing and commercial organisations outside the Corporation, 
a great deal of the expertise required was unique to a municipality. Both Reader and Robb 
commented on the great increase in the numbers of ‘professions’, occupations requiring 
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particular skills and knowledge which developed during the Victorian period. 454 455   Industrial 
developments dependent on finance and investment also needed increasing numbers of 
trained engineers and men with expertise in technical areas such as civil engineering and 
accountancy; this was mirrored by the expanding role of local government which also needed 
expertise in fields as diverse as gas engineering and municipal accounting.  Gunn commented 
that these officers formed a middle class, which had the following characteristics: 
They were distinguished from the labouring majority by their possession of property – 
whether mobile capital, stock in trade or professional credentials - and by their 
exemption from manual labour. Their economic activity thus involved the possession 
and management of material resources and the labour of others.  456  
 
He noted that one way this middle class could be defined was with the development of 
professions. Turning a trade into a profession had economic benefits for those who went 
through a regulated form of training, and obtained a qualification, especially if this was the 
route of entry into a career reserved for those with the relevant qualification.457 By the late 
Victorian period, some posts in municipal employ did require a specific qualification for a job; 
and these were usually for officials where the cost was subsidised by payments from the LGB, 
such as the Medical Officer or Borough Analyst. These posts were usually advertised. Not all 
posts requiring expertise did specify a qualification, the pattern of employing officials to these 
posts was to promote men who had worked their way up the scales or had learned the required 
skills ‘on the job’, even if there were applicants available with appropriate professional 
qualifications.458 There were several possible explanations for this tendency. Qualified staff 
would have required higher salaries and be more likely to move on to advance their careers 
and might also have a more independent attitude to the how the duties of the post should be 
managed.  
During the Victorian period, the demand for specialised financial and technical services led to 
the need for a whole series of new institutions to define personnel who possessed particular 
expertise; this could be, for example, a new type of skill. The profession of ‘Gas Engineer’ 
became established because the engineering techniques required in the gas industry were 
sufficiently different from other areas of mechanical engineering and therefore required 
specialist expertise and experience. In accountancy, specialisation in fields such as auditing, 
led to separate professional organisations coming into being. Millerson, who traced the 
development of different professions, noted that the need for an organisation for people doing 
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the same kind of work was to ensure that the standards of entry to the organisation were 
defined, and in this way enhance the status and earning capacity of its members.459  These 
professionals could enjoy considerable prestige as a result of their expertise in a particular 
area; a professional career pattern could also provide some security about progress and 
success through life.  
The increasing complexity of local government services, the expansion of the financial 
responsibilities of municipalities and the particular requirements of municipal accounting led 
to a need to develop a specialised system to deal with municipal accounts. This was 
accompanied by a demand for improvements in status of local government treasurers and 
accountants. (both in social position and in financial terms), who suffered the indignity of 
having their returns certified by Town Clerks, because they were ineligible to become 
Chartered Accountants, unless they were also in private practice. 460 Tom Sowerby, writing 
about the development of the accountancy profession in municipal practice commented: 
For the most part, founder members were what were often commonly called self- made 
men, and a good job most of them made of it.  In their early days, professional 
education hardly existed and text books were few and of indifferent quality.  In effect, 
they had to write their own. Their practice outran their theory and later   developed out 
of their practice. They came into municipal government employment when finance and 
accountancy did not possess a recognised technique.461 
 
Although membership of the middle class could be gained by being a member of an 
appropriate profession, the recognition of status and esteem could only be obtained by also 
demonstrating respectability. This included behaviour; for example, displaying a high standard 
of moral rectitude by attendance at church or involvement in charitable activities.  Peter 
Shapely, who studied Manchester Victorian charities, noted how taking a leading role in a 
charity could be a way of enhancing status, and could lead to favourable publicity in the local 
press, or provide opportunities to be seen in the company of leaders of the locality at important 
social events; important for many who sought preferment.462  Respectability also needed to 
be demonstrated by an appropriate lifestyle, and ‘Keeping up with the Joneses’ became a 
major concern for many. The employment of a servant was an indicator of being middle class, 
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as distinct from working class, and having material wealth could be demonstrated by having a 
house in a desirable area. Perkin noted however that: 
The middle classes, ever more graduated in income and status, came to express the 
finer distinctions in prosperity and social position physically, both in outward 
appearance in dress, furnishings and habitations and even physique, and in their 
geographical segregation from one another and the rest of society in carefully 
differentiated suburbs, (but in) the midst of rising standards of comfort was the all-
pervading sense of insecurity…. most middle-class families knew how precarious that 
security was, and many lived in fear of bankruptcy or loss of a salaried position, of 
sickness of either partner or the children, the death of a breadwinner, any of which 
could plunge the family into debt or actual poverty. No amount of saving or 
insurance…could prevent the unexpected disaster, and there were endless stories of 
bankrupt, unemployed or widowed families falling into desperate poverty. 463   
 
Future financial insecurity could be a problem for many middle-class professionals; retirement 
could lead to hardship. Although Manchester Council established a contributory ‘thrift fund’ in 
1891, even this provided no long-term insurance against poverty.464 Because the amounts 
accumulated by individuals in the Thrift Fund were so small, retirement rarely took place at 
age 65, but service continued until breakdown in health had occurred. Heywood commented 
that the Fund was therefore more in the nature of a savings bank than a superannuation 
scheme. Even senior officials who had contributed to the scheme, postponed retirement until 
late in life, and continued to draw a salary to a great age. The Treasurer William Martin retired 
at the age of 83 when he was then appointed ‘Consulting Treasurer;’ William Talbot, the Town 
Clerk retired at the age of 79, to become ‘Consulting solicitor;’ a post he held for 9 years, and 
his predecessor Sir Joseph Heron, who had retired at the age of 64, became ‘Consulting Town 
Clerk’ until he died at the age of 80.465  
Many of the professional bodies found however that a necessary part of maintaining the status 
of a profession required the implementation of codes of professional conduct for members. 
Manchester and Salford Councils both had problems with contracts involving architects. 466 
This arose mainly because of a lack of professional standards for members of the profession 
involved in carrying out building work for a Council.467  Gloria C Clifton discussed 
professionalism amongst architects and the reforms to the profession after the scandal of the 
                                               
463    Harold Perkin, The Rise of the Professional Society, p.95. 
   464  Geoffrey Heywood, A History of Greater Manchester Pension Fund (Manchester: Manchester Council 
(undated)) The scheme provided that any employee of the Corporation earning a salary or wage at a rate of not 
less than 30 shillings a week should contribute to the Thrift Fund an amount of 3¾% of such salary or wage. The 
amounts contributed were invested in trust securities as then defined, which in the event were fixed interest, and 
the Corporation guaranteed an overall rate of interest of 4%. The retirement age was 65.  
465   Shena D Simon, A century of city government Manchester 1838-1938, p 410, noted that the practice continued 
into the twentieth century. In 1919, ‘Mr Rook’ who had been Superintendent of the Sanitary department for many 
years, was made Consultant Superintendent at the age of 84. 
466   Corruption by professional men was not confined to architects and surveyors. Corruption by Graves, a solicitor, 
and the ex-president of the Law Society, Benjamin Lake, is considered in the next section 6.3. 
467   Clifton, Professionalism Patronage and Public Service in Victorian London, p.154-6 & 167.   
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Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) in the 1880s. She commented that architects in private 
practice enjoyed the freedom to pursue the profitable opportunities which could present, for 
example involvement with land sales and leases; opportunities denied to architects in public 
employ. She noted that after the MBW scandal, caused mainly by the corrupt practices of 
architects and surveyors, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) campaigned in the 
late 1880s to promote greater integrity amongst members of the profession, particularly to get 
acceptance throughout the membership of a much-needed code of professional standards.468   
For many middle-class professionals employed by the Council, their expectation was to be 
able to enjoy the kind of financial rewards available in commerce and industry, but this was 
frustrated by the low salaries offered in Council employ. For these men, the attitude and 
practices of commerce were therefore attractive. Several authors have commented on the 
approach which had to be adopted to achieve success in commercial practice. G. R. Searle 
noted ‘Men will often sanction in their corporate capacity a procedure which in their private 
capacity they would utterly repudiate and condemn. ’469 He also noted that small acts of 
wrongdoing can accumulate, giving rise over time to commercial evils which no one really 
intended.  He also quoted Herbert Spencer, who stated that: 
the corporate conscience [was] for ever inferior to the individual conscience’ and a 
body of men [would] commit a joint act which each individual would shrink from, (but) 
did not feel personally responsible. ... the indirectness and remoteness of the evils 
produced weakened the restraints on wrong-doing.470 
 
Many Victorians made no distinction between misadventure and misfeasance especially when 
the alternative, failure, was anathema. 471 Robb noted that the high premium placed on 
achieving success in commerce by the Victorians may have made offences such as 
embezzlement, which could be used to obtain financial prosperity, seem less harrowing than 
the stigma of poverty or failure. He commented that the machinery of the criminal justice 
system was overwhelmingly directed against lower-class criminals, who were perceived as a 
threat to ‘the dominant social order, not ‘white- collar professionals.’ 472 He cited Herbert 
                                               
468   The term ‘professional standards’ is used in two different senses. The first deals the standard of conduct 
expected of a supplier of a professional service in his dealings with a customer. The wide-ranging definition about 
what constituted a misdemeanour in the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act (1889) allowed the inference to be 
drawn that any behaviour not specified as an offence in the Act was acceptable. The term can also be used to 
define the quality of the services expected from a professional contractor. As these services depended on the 
profession of the contractor, the usual statement of quality was simply defined as ‘best practice.’ Some professions 
did suggest what this meant, for example there was advice to solicitors about how they should deal with client 
monies. 
469   G. R. Searle, Morality and the Market Place in Victorian Britain. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998,) p.80, citing 
the introduction by R. Bickesteth to the book by Rev. H. A. Boardman. The Bible in the Counting House, a Course 
of Lectures to Merchants. (London 1854). 
470   Ibid., p.80, citing H. Spencer ‘Railway morals and Railway policy,’ Edinburgh Review, 100, 1854 426-7. 
471   Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern England p.135.  
472   Ibid., p.160. 
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Spencer, writing in 1891, who stated that many in the business community believed that 
business was incompatible with strict integrity, and concluded that ‘many persons in the 
business community developed patterns of behaviour which were at variance to the patterns 
of behaviour which were becoming accepted by the general public’.473   The result was that 
many men, who had pursued ‘uncertain’ ventures using aggressive risk, were respected and 
admired by many in the city as big men who took chances. In their downfall, they were not 
looked upon as ‘scoundrels’ by their fellow business men, but as ‘victims of unpredictability.’ 
474  Paul Johnson, studying attitudes to morality in the City, noted: 
What is striking about this nineteenth century experience is the ease with which the 
new commercial morality became accepted and adopted by middle-class society. 
Mammon became well civilised well before the century’s end. 475 
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that many officials in municipal employ accepted that to achieve 
financial success required acceptance that no price was too high to pay. The extent to which 
the behaviour of councillors or officials in municipal employ demonstrated by their behaviour 
that this philosophy was not unique to commerce is explored in the next section. The response 
of the two Councils to those guilty of corrupt behaviour is considered in Part Four of the thesis. 
 
6.3. Lifestyle choices, the aspirations of officials & members of the Council  
 
Municipal government was not exempt from acts of personal corruption committed by 
members of the Corporation. The extent to which the ambition of officials, senior officers in 
the employ of the two municipalities and members of the Council who were guilty of acts of 
criminality, was influenced by attitudes to integrity in commerce is examined in this section. 
Although commerce and industry were believed to provide opportunities to gain financial 
prosperity and status, employees of municipal corporations who were paid fixed salaries had 
no possibility of making similar gains. Many were therefore not immune from the temptation to 
try to emulate the lifestyles of those employed in commerce, by committing fraud or 
embezzlement. Despite the risk that exposure could lead to criminal prosecution, the likelihood 
of being found out was an acceptable risk for some members of staff and even senior officials 
succumbed to temptation. This section considers examples of some officials and members of 
the Council member of the Council whose lifestyles demonstrate these attitudes. 
                                               
473   Ibid., p.170. The quote is also from Herbert Spencer.  
444   Ibid., p.166 noted that ‘respectable persons’ guilty of malfeasance found it difficult to think of themselves as 
‘common criminals.’ The law courts and prisons of late Victorian England shared that view. 
475   Paul Johnson. ‘Civilising Mammon: Laws, Morals and the City in Nineteenth-Century England.’ Civil Histories, 
eds. Peter Burke, Brian Harrison & Paul Slack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.319.  
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John Graves, a solicitor who served as Town Clerk in Salford from 1882 to 1891, and Samuel 
Hunter, Salford’s gas engineer from 1875 to 1886, were both guilty of acts of criminality. 476 
Graves was personable and well regarded by members of the Council. An editorial recognised 
that he had worked hard since he had been appointed, and had gained the Council’s 
confidence, although he came to Salford from Peterborough with very little experience of the 
problems of an urban municipality.477  He was popular with his colleagues who defended him 
when he was criticised for claiming certain expenses. 478 The Chairman of the Finance 
Committee, Alderman Richard Husband, was aware that Graves had not paid over to the 
Treasurer money he had been received from the overseers for a number of years, but no 
action was taken until the Mayor was alerted to evidence that Graves had embezzled money 
from a trust fund which he had allegedly invested in a mortgage for a family in Peterborough. 
An editorial in Salford Chronicle noted that the situation was very unsatisfactory; the Town 
Clerk’s defaults stretched back over three years and the audits had been worthless. The 
editorial added, ‘When a glaring case of misdoing arises, everyone appears to be suddenly 
inoculated with a vigorous virtue’.479 The belief that Graves, a senior official and a colleague, 
would repay the money was shared by others who knew of the shortfall. This was the inference 
made in the letter from Edward Harrison, one of the two Salford Elective auditors, when 
discussing the Town Clerk’s indebtedness.480  He stated that it was ‘no great amount’ for a 
man whose salary was £1,200 per year, (Graves’ total debt to the Borough was £752/ 0/ 9). 
 
Graves was living beyond his means.  He was apparently in debt when he came to Salford; 
and he lived in a large house, ’Broomhurst’ in a desirable area of the Borough.  When he 
absconded, he left behind multiple debts, which showed that he had enjoyed a lavish lifestyle. 
The Council issued a ‘Writ of Summons’ which the Bailiff was unable to deliver;481 and in a 
letter to Arthur Holmes, acting Town Clerk of Salford, the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy 
enclosed a list of ‘creditors ‘who have ‘proved their debts.’ This showed that in addition to 
embezzling £1,200 from a client in Peterborough, he had embezzled £1,623/4/- from 3 other 
clients; had an overdraft of £237/04/08; and had borrowed and not repaid £308/12/07 to 
                                               
476   Graves’ embezzlement is discussed below.  Hunter’s offences are described in Section 4.3. 
477   Salford Chronicle, 25 August 1889, editorial, p.4.  
478  Salford Chronicle,16 June 1889, p.4. ‘Fents.’ The problem was about a claim for expenses for undertaking 
‘additional duties,’ in support of the school board elections’, which were not seen as a part of the duties which the 
Town Clerk of the municipality were required to undertake. Usually the Council was not supportive of this type of 
claim; but Graves was well-liked; His claim was accepted. 
479   Ibid.,1 September 1889, editorial p.4.  
480   Ibid., Letter: Edward Harrison dated 27 August 1888. 
481   The Graves papers, Reference No. L/CS/CL38D.  Salford Local History Library.  
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Alderman Sharpe.482  His smaller creditors, which included a wine merchant and his tailor, 
also included wages owing, and totalling £6/18/- for a servant, a cook, and a governess. 
 
 Solicitors, who often held monies on behalf of a client, interpreted this as recognition that they 
were entrusted to use their judgement to invest these monies on the client’s behalf, and 
presumably share any profit from their gain in value. In Graves’ case, he apparently made 
unwise investments in the property market.  He was a member of the Incorporated Law Society 
which sought to increase the status of solicitors, and hence their salaries.  On 15 July 1890, 
the Solicitors Journal commented on the number of cases involving solicitors managing trust 
funds who were investing in ‘improper securities.’483 Four months later the reproduced a paper, 
presented at a meeting of the Society, extolling the principle of separate bank accounts for 
monies held on trust, which had been advocated by a Special Committee of the Incorporated 
Law Society ‘last June;’ two pieces of advice that Graves had ignored; but he was not alone.484 
On 26 January 1901; Benjamin Green Lake, an ex- president of the Incorporated Law Society 
who had also chaired a Committee set up under the Solicitors Act of 1888 to investigate 
complaints about the conduct of solicitors, was found guilty of fraud on two sample charges of 
embezzlement, by diverting trust monies which he held. 485 The Solicitors Journal in its leading 
article, ‘Current topics,’ commenting on the outcome of the trial of Benjamin Lake, stated: 
This week, which has been a sad one for everybody, has been especially painful for 
solicitors.  A man at the forefront of the profession convicted by a scrupulously just 
judge of wilful and dishonest misappropriation of trust funds, sentenced to 12 years 
penal servitude. 486 
 
The Journal stated, ’the injury he has inflicted on the reputation of an honourable profession 
‘is incapable of estimation’. Not surprisingly, for a profession which prided itself on its 
independence, no correspondent suggested that there should be regular mandatory and 
independent audit of solicitor’s accounts. A suggestion from a letter writer ‘Attorney’ criticising 
the failure of the Law Society to accept the need for the audit, ironically suggested that the 
only way to prevent by embezzlement by a solicitor was to: 
Let the client not trust implicitly (the solicitor), he should make sure that he does not 
leave money in the solicitor’s hands and check that it has been invested. It is the 
lethargy and credulity of the clients that affords the golden opportunity to those tottering 
members of our profession to carry on their nefarious trade and so besmirch the 
honour of the whole profession in the eyes of the not too kind public.  487 
                                               
482   Alderman Sharpe, a sugar merchant, was Chairman of Salford Gas Committee from 1874 to 1886. 
483   Solicitors Journal, 15 July 1890.  ‘Current Topics’.   
484   Ibid., 3 November, 1900, p.2. 
485   Ibid., 26 January, 1901, p. 214,215. This was the week of Queen Victoria’s death. 
486   Ibid., 10 November 1900, p.33.  
487   Ibid., 9 February 1901, letter ‘Attorney’, p.249. 
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Whilst John Graves enjoyed status and respectability, and some influence, but had little power 
outside his post as Town Clerk, Samuel Hunter enjoyed all three. 488 He was a self-made man, 
who had started as a junior in the Gas industry and had worked his way up the scale to be 
appointed Gas Engineer in Salford, having previously been the manager in Rochdale.  He was 
a leading member of the Institute of Gas Engineers, which gave gas managers a distinct sense 
of ‘superiority’ when contemplating most councillors.  One aim of the Institute was to improve 
the status of its members and their salaries. Hunter certainly accepted their belief that Gas 
Engineers were underpaid. He had a strong sense of self-worth and felt that, as he was 
credited with turning a gas works which was loss-making, into a profitable enterprise. he was 
poorly paid for his services.  He was also an entrepreneur who had patented devices used in 
Gas manufacture, and had other business interests; as a result, he was accepted by the 
business men on the Council as an equal, and was consulted about possible business 
opportunities.489  A lay preacher at the Wesleyan Methodist church, and a Liberal, he regularly 
entertained members of the Council at his mansion in Pendleton, and was seen to be a friend 
by many. 490 He was acknowledged to be a member of the social and political elite in the 
borough; his carriage, with its liveried coachman was recognisable as one of the carriages of 
the leading business men and the senior officers of the borough, (the Town Clerk and the 
Officer of Health), and his attendance at civic events in the town was reported in the local 
press.  Hunter could therefore lay claim to be a gentleman who should enjoy the trappings of 
success, foremost of which was an opulent lifestyle. His vanity had been recognised.   The 
Salford Reporter commenting in 1887 on the Gas offices which he had commissioned, that 
the building had a totally useless clock tower, and masonry inscription ‘SH AD 1880.’ 491  The 
same paper also commented that ’in the end it was Hunter’s intimacy with members of the 
Council, which made it so difficult for the Council to accept the extent of Hunter’s 
malfeasance.492 Similar comments were made in the Graves case; echoing the concern that 
the belief that men employed by the Corporation in positions of trust always subscribed to high 
moral standards could no longer be sustained. 493 
 Manchester Council was to find out to its cost that even where an official was believed to 
behave with integrity, the opportunity to exploit a position for personal gain by profiting from a 
                                               
488   The information about the life and career of Samuel Hunter has been taken from John Garrard’s publications, 
The Great Salford Gas Scandal 1887 and Manchester Regional History Review, Volume 11 no.2 1988, p.12-20, 
and the Hunter papers - Ref. Parcel 1, Box no. 90.  Salford Local History Library.  
489   Garrard, Manchester Regional History Review, Volume 11 no.2 1988, p.14, noted that some prominent liberals 
on Salford Council had met with Hunter at his home to discuss the possibility of founding a new Liberal newspaper.  
490    Salford Reporter, 26 February 1887 p.8.  Alderman Davies, who was revered for the work he had accomplished 
within Salford to improve public health, was a Liberal, and lay preacher of the Wesleyan church, (as was Hunter). 
When Hunter was being attacked in a debate in 1880, Davies referred to Hunter as ‘one I count as a dear friend.’   
491   Ibid., 10 November 1887 p.3.  
492   Ibid., 17 November 1887 p.3. 
493   For example, Edward Harrison’s comment in a letter to Salford Chronicle, 27 August 1889. 
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situation which the Council had mismanaged, was irresistible. Joseph Heron who was 
appointed as Town Clerk of Manchester in 1838, was an acknowledged authority on English 
municipal law, and was recognized as one of the leading parliamentary lawyers of his day. 
Knighted by the Queen in 1869, Heron was very conscious of his status and the position he 
held in the municipality, which was acknowledged by Manchester Council, which passed a 
formal resolution testifying to the ‘high character, ability, and long services rendered that had 
earned him the honour.’ 494 Although he was never accused of misfeasance, his behaviour 
certainly involved ‘amassing money and gaining power.’ He liked power and was 
contemptuous of opposition. When challenged about his right to intervene in Council debates 
and asked which Ward he represented, he replied that he represented ‘the entire city.’ If asked 
for advice, this would be given in the form of an instruction ’to do;’ no objection to his advice 
was acceptable. 495 He loyally supported the Council’s policies, often defending the 
indefensible, 496 but despite his very considerable influence there is no evidence that he made 
any attempt to encourage the setting up of a more efficient administration in Manchester. 
Perhaps he saw that this was not attainable. and as an aim, was not therefore worth pursuing; 
the cynic might see the existing situation where he could exploit the divided Council 
administration to get his way, was more to his liking. 497  Even in retirement, his self-serving 
attitude was apparent. In 1877, at the age of 68, he accepted the Council’s offer to take an 
appointment of Consultant Town Clerk, his salary to remain at £2,500 per year. The offer had 
been made ‘upon the understanding that he would retain the office and continue to discharge 
the formal duties of Town Clerk until other and final arrangements were made by this 
Council’.498  The Council had the difficult task of persuading Heron that he was expected to be 
available for consultation. Matters came to a head when Heron retired to France, and the 
Council attempted to negotiate a reduction in the payments made to him. The whole episode 
caused great embarrassment to the Council, as Heron argued that the offer made in )1877 
when he became consultant Town Clerk, was binding on the Corporation.  An editorial in 
Manchester City News stated that  
Sir Joseph will be consulting his own dignity and the interests of the town he has served 
well, if he accepts the verdict of the council given very plain… and then brings to an 
end a controversy which everybody must regret.  He will be none the less well thought 
                                               
494   Manchester Faces & Places, Volume1 no 4, 10 January 1890. 
495   Manchester City News, 4 January 1890, Obituary. 
496   He supported the Council’s reluctance to cooperate in schemes to clean up the River Irwell and the refusal to 
adopt the advice of the Manchester and Salford Sanitary Association. 
497   Heron, who was a major player and one of the founders of the Municipal Corporations Association, seems to 
have concentrated his efforts on the drafting of Private Acts, a hugely important and time-consuming role. He was 
not a barrister; his appearances at parliamentary enquiries were as a witness. No evidence has been found 
however, that as Town Clerk, he made any attempt to intervene in the dispute between the Markets Committee 
and the Market traders which was in effect settled in favour of the Market traders by the Courts in 1876 at a large 
cost to the Council...The ‘Market traders ‘case is discussed in Section 9.1, p.170. 
498   This offer was ultra vires the powers of the Council, a fact that Heron must have known. 
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of by his townsmen if he retires in a manner that will show his regard for the office is 
not mercenary and the city’s welfare is for him the highest consideration. 499 
He eventually accepted the offer of a pension of £1,500 a year.  
Many men who served on the Council gave their services willingly, and without financial 
reward.500 There were however some members of the Council for whom the status and 
prestige that service on the Council could bring were important.  Alderman Grave, elected to 
Manchester Council in 1856, was elected alderman in 1862.  A calico printer by trade, he 
served as Mayor for three years (1869-1870, 1870-1871, and 1871-1872) and was very highly 
regarded in Council circles.  He became Chairman of the Waterworks Committee in 1869 
where he was an effective lobbyist for the need to take urgent steps to implement the Thirlmere 
reservoir scheme, in order to secure additional water supplies to meet Manchester’s demands 
for water.501 He was however implicated in the Hepton embezzlement in 1880 when it was 
found that he had been using Departmental monies as a private banking service.502 Although 
there was no suggestion that he was guilty of embezzlement, he had stated that he had no 
personal bank account and that the transactions using the Waterworks monies were few, both 
matters which proved to be untrue. He resigned from chairmanship of the Committee and the 
Council. The minutes of the proceedings of the Waterworks Committee on 28 October,1980 
which were tabled table for approval at the November meeting of the Council contained a 
resolution:  
That this committee, while regretting the circumstances which have led to the 
resignation of Alderman Grave, desire to place on record their appreciation for his long 
and efficient service as Chairman of this committee.503 
It is difficult to understand Grave’s behaviour, he did not attempt to defend himself, or explain 
his actions.  It appears that he regarded the availability of the monies held in the Waterworks 
Department as a facility which allowed him to deal with his private business, whilst he was 
discharging his duties as Chairman of the Committee. Redford noted that Grave continued to 
think of himself as Lord of the Manor of Legburthwaite and Wythburn. This was a title which 
the Corporation ‘acquired’ when it bought an estate in the Thirlmere area, which was held by 
the Chairman of the Waterworks Committee on behalf of the Corporation. Redford commented 
that Grave could be partially excused as  
                                               
499   Manchester City News, 6 June 1885. Editorial p.4.  
500   The potential that men joining the Council might have vested interests which might interfere with their objectivity 
in making decisions on the Council is considered in Section 5.2, p.102 
501   Sir John J. Harwood, History and Description of the Thirlmere Water Scheme (Manchester: Henry Blacklock 
& Co. 1895), p. 29-30. 
502   The Hepton embezzlement in the Waterworks Department is considered in Section 4.4, p.78. which considers 
Berrey’s role. 
503   Manchester City News, 20 November 1980, p.5. 
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under the contemporary system of quasi-permanent Chairmanships, it was not 
altogether surprising that he should come to consider his position as personal rather 
than one of public trust.504  
 
This was the attitude of other committee chairmen who saw that by their election they were 
empowered to act as the proprietor of a business with the right to conduct business as they 
saw fit. This led Beatrice Webb to comment about committee chairmen in general, ‘he resents 
mightily any criticism of his policy or methods.’ 505 
Alderman John King Jnr. was elected to Manchester Council in 1856, An article in Manchester 
Faces and Places published in 1891, noted that 
there is no member of the Council today whose record is more brilliant, or who is looked 
up to with greater respect by all ranks of citizens. By force of character penetrative 
insight, intellectual power, extraordinary energy, and a career of great integrity and 
activity, he has created for himself an important place in local history.506 
 
Five years after the publication of this encomium, the allegations of S. Norbury Williams, that 
King was guilty of insider trading, were published.507  Williams provided evidence that King, in 
the guise of ‘helping the Council out’ had been buying coke, a by- product of gas making which 
was said to be difficult to burn, for a reduced price, when this material could have been sold 
by tender for a higher price. King’s defenders were quick to point out that he had ‘erred but 
erred innocently.’ They also cited all the years of service which King had given to the Council, 
however on the facts he would have been found guilty of corruption under the Public Bodies 
Corrupt Practices Act 1889. The matter was not pursued when his accuser, Norbury Williams 
stated that there was no public support for the suggestion that he should be prosecuted under 
this legislation. 
The number of cases of officials or members of the Council found guilty of behaviour lacking 
integrity is small. The risk that offences committed by officials would be brought to light by the 
press or reported to the Council must have reduced the likelihood of offences being committed; 
nevertheless, the cases which have been found do suggest that officials in municipalities were 
not immune from ’that ambitious spirit, that low ambition which sets everyone on the lookout 
to succeed and to rise in life,’ and even senior officials could succumb to temptation. 508    
                                               
504   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, p.351. 
505   Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study, p.197. 
506   Manchester Faces and Places, March 10, 1891, Volume 2 no.6. p.117. 
507   The facts about Alderman King’s activities are given in Section 4.2, p.64. 
508   John Henry Newman, Parochial and Plain Essays 8 No 11 (1836), p159, quoted in Walter G. Houghton, The 
Victorian Frame of Mind (Yale: Yale University Press 1975), p.183.who was discussing attitudes to integrity in 
commercial practices. 
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6.4. The failure to develop an administrative structure. 
 
The appointment of the three officials, a Town clerk, Treasurer and the Borough 
surveyor/engineer, made in each municipality after receiving a Charter of Incorporation, were 
intended to provide the essential administrative and civil engineering expertise required by a 
new municipality.509 Each of these officials managed a department which answerable to the 
Council via the Mayor as first citizen. Although each of these appointments had a specific role, 
the expectation was that their expertise would be available to support any of the activities of 
the Council which required their skills. The failure to develop a management structure which 
facilitated this was the result of the attitude of the Council to the management of its business. 
The outcome of this attitude, which was that the various committees of the Council developed 
autonomous services, is considered below  
The practice in the early days of municipal government was that councillors who were serving 
on Council committees ‘helped the Council out’ by providing the Council services from their 
own resources. As the work-load increased, each committee started to appoint staff to take 
over this role.  This practice grew, with the result that Council committees such as the Health 
Committee and the Improvement Committee managed separate departments with staff 
dedicated to provide the services which came within the committee’s remit. The excuse for 
the continuation of this system was that with the increase in the complexity of the services 
provided by the Council, each department needed to develop the special expertise needed to 
support the services which came within the Committee’s brief. The result of this policy was 
however to ‘lock up’ expertise within the departments of the various committees rather than to 
provide an administrative structure which enabled the expertise available in the municipality 
to be readily accessible to any committee if required. This frustrated the development of a 
management system where the expertise within the Council was fully utilised.  
Many of the men who served on municipal councils had experience of commercial practices 
and in some cases had achieved financial success in trade and industry.  As a result, they 
came to service on the Council, with the confidence they had the ability to carry out the 
business of the Council with competence, and a belief that their methods were the appropriate 
methods to use to manage council services. To achieve this, the result was that instead of 
appointing project managers with appropriate expertise to undertake the supervision of each 
of the various projects remitted to it, the committee itself took over this task using the expertise 
of councillors on the particular committee, rather than using the expertise of officials employed 
by the municipality. This pattern of ‘management by committee’ which became a policy, was 
                                               
509   The role of the treasurer is considered in Section 7.1, p.141. 
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presumably intended so that the role of supervising building projects was a shared 
responsibility which would not a require a major time commitment from any one member of 
the Committee, as members had their own businesses to deal with.  In practice this meant 
that no one person was responsible for ensuring the role was carried out, and mismanagement 
was a frequent occurrence.510 The attitude that the committee, not officials should take all the 
decisions was strengthened by the fact that many councillors felt resentment against officials 
’because of the not unrealistic sense that their functions were being undermined.’ 511 Although 
councillors were prepared to accept that some officials like Town Clerk Heron in Manchester 
and Moorhouse in Salford did a difficult job efficiently, there was concern that the expertise of 
these officials might lead to their insinuation into decision-making, which could interfere with 
the prerogative of the committee to make the rulings about the conduct of projects or services. 
The advice of the Health and Improvement Committees, that Manchester Council should 
assemble a team of councillors with building experience who could advise any Committee 
charged with undertaking a building project and lacking building expertise, (rather than 
involving the Surveyors Department) provides confirmation of this attitude.  
 
 The idea of a project team to bring together the various skills necessary to undertake a project 
was also alien. The practice was however if absolutely necessary, specific specialist expertise 
could be obtained on a consultancy basis from departments such as the Town Clerks 
department which had legal expertise, or the Surveyors/Engineers Department. which had 
expertise in civil engineering. 512  This could result in a lack of continuous oversight by these 
specialists when more complex building or civil engineering schemes were undertaken by 
Council committees, and could lead to a failure to deal effectively with any ramifications with 
the scheme which could arise. This was one of the problems with the Victoria Hotel project 
undertaken by the Manchester Improvement Committee, where the Borough Surveyor was 
involved in only one or two specific issues and did not have a general remit to monitor the 
building aspects of the scheme.  513 The result of this policy was that liability for any problems 
arising could be blurred. Legally however although the mismanagement of the Committee was 
                                               
510   There were occasional reports of a visit by a Committee to inspect the progress of a particular scheme, but 
the findings of the Committee, which often lacked the relevant expertise did not prevent mismanagement occurring. 
The visit of the whole committee to inspect the site of the new Salford Technical College, described below, did not. 
prevent mismanagement of this scheme. 
511   Garrard, Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Cities, 1830-1880, p. 74. 
512   The evidence suggests that officials resented greatly both the attitude of councillors, that they did not need 
experts, and being asked to take on the role of a consultant on the terms defined by the Chairman of a Council 
committee. This was the attitude typified by De Courcy Meade the Borough Surveyor of Manchester. (p.138.below). 
513   Manchester City News, 20 March 1886 et sq. ‘Victoria Hotel; ‘The Spending of £100,000.’ The problems which 
resulted from this policy and the consequences for the reputation of the Council are discussed in Chapter Nine, 
p.176. 
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responsible for any problems whether of poor workmanship or overspending which occurred, 
the Council were responsible for all acts of the committees.  
 
Even when the practice was for a committee to employ a professional architect or engineer to 
draw up the plans, and a builder to carry out the necessary construction, the committee 
retained the role as project manager. 514  The only routine liaison between the architect /builder 
and the committee was usually provided by the appointment of a Clerk of Works, or by the 
infrequent visits of commissioning committee to the site. When problems arose, which could 
result in cost overruns or additional spending to make good poor workmanship, the failure of 
the committee to set up a robust system to manage the project meant that the Council could 
find itself blamed for any of the resultant problems and responsible for any additional costs. 
The consequence of these practices was that mismanagement of projects and services was 
frequent; with the result that overspending, time overruns or problems resulting from poor 
workmanship occurred. The system was also inefficient; resources were duplicated in the 
Committee departments with the result that the reputation of both Councils for competence 
was damaged. 
 
E. L. Hasluck noted that as far as the Councils were concerned, there was a strict line drawn 
between the functions of officials and those of councillors. 515  Although he was writing in 1936, 
he described a situation which had its origins in the Victorian period. Policy was dictated by 
the elected representatives of the ratepayers, the council; the official’s role was to provide 
advice on policy matters. The demarcation was maintained; officials did not attend council 
meetings; any influence which they were able to exert on council policy had usually to be 
exercised via one of the Committees, and that could be difficult.  Hasluck516  gives examples 
where the advice of an official could amount to a change in policy, the Medical Officer could 
advise on the need for desirable changes in sanitary practice or an official in a revenue-
producing department could advise on concerning methods of increasing revenue. James 
Niven, the Medical Officer of Health in Manchester, complained however that although he 
exercised control over his own department, he was excluded from discussions on matters 
which came before the Health Committee where his expertise would have been relevant. 517   
 
The refusal to accept the need to use expertise from outside the Committee also arose when 
attempts were made to cut down the size of the ‘deputations’; visits by councillors to other 
                                               
517   The exceptions to this were schemes which involved complex technical aspects; the usual practice was to 
appoint a consultant to undertake the design work.  
515   E. L. Hasluck, Local Government in England. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1936), p.88. 
516   Hasluck, Local Government in England, p.89. 
517   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, p.442. 
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centres to see equipment or techniques which might be purchased or used in the municipality.  
The stance taken by the Committees was that the size of a deputation should be sufficient to 
ensure that if a decision to purchase equipment was made on the basis of the visit, a sufficient 
number of members of the Committee should carry out the inspection so that there would be 
‘a fully representative opinion’ of the suitability of the equipment. This opinion was maintained 
even when the party included officers who were capable of carrying out a technical 
assessment of the equipment. The Journal of Gas Engineering noted that: 
The headstrong perversity of committee-men, who think that they know everything and 
can dispense with professional advice …The most conspicuous illustration of this error, 
is the propensity …to form themselves into deputations to which often visit gasworks 
in different parts of the country sometimes with, but often without their supposed 
technical directors...518  
Despite the attitude of councillors to officials, the increasing complexity of the work of the 
Council and the continuity of experience which officials could bring to the more technically 
complex projects meant that officials  did start playing a major part in getting their advice 
accepted by a committee The increasing workload of Committees meant that a project 
involving the need for special expertise was usually delegated to a subcommittee, where 
officials could be fully involved in the decision-making process. Officials were also prepared 
to use their influence via the press to gain support for a policy being considered by the 
Council.519 Salford’s Borough Engineer, A. M. Fowler, for example, who held a patent for the 
design of a water closet, the ‘Fowler flushing closet’, was able to lobby for the adoption of a 
policy to make the installation of water closets obligatory throughout the Borough.520  The 
advice of officials could in some cases be persuasive in determining the course of action to 
be taken by the Council, particularly if it involved defending the reputation of Council for 
competence and integrity. This was demonstrated when Norbury Williams, Chairman of the 
Ratepayers’ Association, wrote to the Manchester Examiner & Times alleging that there was 
‘bribery and corruption within the Departments of Manchester Corporation.’521 A letter signed 
by the senior officials of the Council expressing an ‘earnest desire’ for the Council to take such 
steps in this matter  ‘as will bring to light the truth,’ was accepted by the Council, which resolved 
that the Town Clerk ‘be instructed to require that Norbury Williams  prove the allegations in 
the letter in the Manchester Examiner & Times, or in default the Council may take proceedings 
in the matter  The Council complied with this request. 
                                               
518   Journal of Gas Engineering,12 June. 1889, p.1038. 
519   Garrard, Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Cities 1830-1880, p.74. 
520   Salford Chronicle, 17 October 1874, p.3. In this case, although there was evidence that the water closet would 
be a considerable improvement, the proposal was impractical whilst water supplies were limited. 
521   Manchester Examiner and Times, 12 April 1890. Letter: S. Norbury Williams. 
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John Garrard commented about the increasing reverence which was held by leading 
councillors about particular officials. 522 This was dependent on the relationship of the official 
with the committee, but he noted that the influence of an official could in some rare cases 
amount to the dictation of the policy of a Committee This occurred when a Committee itself 
recognised that some of the special expertise needed to undertake the Council’s duties was 
outside its experience. He made a detailed study of ‘the great Salford Gas scandal.’ The 
supply of gas which was a municipal trading activity in both Manchester and Salford, was of 
great technical complexity; the commercial side of the business also required special 
expertise. He cited Rochdale’s new mayor, who declared in 1868 that although he would 
attend some committees: 
but not, for instance, the Gas Committee – it would not be the least use of my attending 
…It would take me all my time to understand the question of gas …and to be any use 
…would be beyond my power. 523   
Evidence that the Salford Gas Committee were out of their depth in dealing with its business, 
was provided by a committee member who noted that the members of the Committee:  
went like automatons to meetings and sat and listened and voted and went away… 
they were more under the control of the officials than any other committee in the 
Council.  There were four aldermen ….and the Gas manager had them all under his 
thumb.524 
The relationship between the Gas Committee of Salford and Samuel Hunter the Gas Manager 
was examined in Court during the hearing of the libel case brought against Ellis Lever, a coal 
and cannel contractor and supplier to the Corporation. This confirmed that from his 
appointment as Gas manager in 1877, Hunter had dominated the Gas Committee, and had 
in-effect taken over the management of Gas Committee business and determined its 
policies.525   
For major schemes which were seen to be outside the expertise available in the Corporation, 
both municipalities did use external consultants. Before the Longdendale reservoir scheme 
was completed, which gave temporary relief to the rising demand for water in the Manchester 
locality, J. F Bateman, who was acting as consultant engineer to the Waterworks Committee, 
was already issuing warnings about the need to identify additional sources of supply. His 
advice, backed up by a detailed technical assessment of the options available, was not 
disputed, and although there were considerable delays in carrying out the scheme his 
proposals led to the successful implementation of the Thirlmere scheme.  Salford Council, 
which initially appointed an electrical engineer, C. L. Turner to provide the designs for the pipe 
                                               
522   Garrard, Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Cities, p.74.  
523   Ibid., p.71, citing the Rochdale Observer, 14 November 1868, p.6.   
524   Salford Weekly News, 7 September 1878 p.3.  
525   Ibid., 22 January.1887 p.6. 
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work in a new electrical generation station, rejected his designs and employed a firm of 
consulting engineers to carry out the design process. No reason was given for this decision, 
although it appears that it was Turner’s failure to accept this decision and his pursuit of a 
patent on his designs which led to the Council ‘losing confidence’ in him. 
There could occasionally be problems in delegating part of a project to a Department outside 
a committee’s control. Although the Borough Engineers Department in Salford and the 
Surveyors Department in Manchester were both competently managed in the period between 
1870 and 1890, problems arose in both municipalities in the 1890s. Salford Council had to 
cope with repeated complaints about the incompetence of Joseph Corbett, who was appointed 
as Borough Engineer in 1893. Manchester Council received complaints about problems 
experienced by committees requesting help from the Borough Surveyors Department, which 
had responsibility for the maintenance of drains and sewers within the municipality. The 
Department was necessarily involved in collaborating with departments such as the 
Improvement Department or the Health Committee undertaking building schemes which 
required connections to be made to the existing sewers.  Manchester Council set up a 
subcommittee to look into the reasons why a particular project carried out by the Surveyor’s 
Department at the Davyhulme sewage works was badly designed and poorly constructed. 
Their report concluded that the blame lay mainly with T. De Courcy Meade a professional 
engineer, who was appointed as Borough Surveyor in 1895.526 He did not exercise day-to day 
supervision of the work carried out by his staff. It seemed that the practice was that work 
referred from any committee to the Surveyors Department, was undertaken by one member 
of staff who was totally responsible for the work. Meade was not involved in any design work 
and did not monitor or supervise the progress of any project. He saw his role as a manager 
was to dispense advice but only become involved in a project if he was asked for specific help. 
This attitude was said to be mirrored at the end of the century by the attitude and management 
of departments such as Town Clerks Department which should have contributed their legal 
expertise to the services provided by other departments in municipality. E D. Simon 
commenting on the situation, identified the necessity of carrying out additional training of 
specialist managers. He suggested that Meade’s attitude to his role might be shared by other 
officials undertaking specialist services, who did not see that their remit included acting as 
consultants to other departments in the municipality. 527 528  
                                               
526   Manchester City News, 3 September 1898, p.5. Report of the subcommittee. 
527   Ernest D. Simon, 1st Baron Simon of Wythenshawe. was an industrialist, politician and public servant who 
served on Manchester Council between 1912 and 1925. He was Lord Mayor of Manchester in 1921–1922. He is 
chiefly remembered for the slum clearances and housing projects which he initiated in the city.  
528   E. D. Simon, A City Council from within. (London: Longmans Green & Co, 1926), p.142. He implied that these 
Departments resented the situation that their involvement was determine by a whim of the Chairman of a committee 
and not ‘as of right.'  
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P. J. Waller gave the real credit for the efficiency of local government to the permanent officials 
of Municipal Corporations. 529  Yet Salford had problems with a number of its senior officials, 
including Noar, its Treasurer; Graves, the Town Clerk and Hunter, the Gas engineer, all of 
whom were guilty of illegality, and Corbett the Borough engineer, who was incompetent.  
Beatrice Webb, in a report on her visit to Manchester in 1899, had harsh words to say about 
Manchester’s officials, who she described as ‘technicians.’530 She noted that neither the 
Borough Surveyor nor the Medical Officer were ‘markedly competent’ and that …’they have 
the status not of administrators but only as consultants, called in whenever the Chairman of 
one of the standing committees deems their advice necessary’. John Leigh, Medical Officer of 
Health until 1899, was accused of not pushing the agenda for improving the water supply in 
his early career as Medical Officer, although he did pursue a vigorous policy to improve privies 
and ash pits. He also used the Council’s powers to condemn or require improvements to slum 
property in the city; and as a result, he attracted the enmity of the property owners on the 
Council.   Although he could be called upon to advise on other matters; he did not become 
involved in policy decisions in areas which, he saw were perhaps more properly, the 
responsibility of the Borough Surveyor or the Waterworks Committee.  This was probably why 
Redford commented that Leigh was a competent departmental administrator, but ‘less 
effective as a director of policy.’ 531  
 
Findings and precis of -Chapter Six  
 
This chapter has examined the attitude of members of the two Councils and the officers and 
officials employed by the two municipalities, to the standards of integrity expected of men in 
public life. The skills required by a municipality ranged from clerical officers involved in routine 
tasks. who lacked job security, were low paid and had limited opportunities for advancement, 
to officials with special skills who enjoyed greater job security and higher salaries. The findings 
show that no staff were immune from the attraction of the looser attitudes of commerce to 
integrity and as a result were not exempt from the temptation to behave corruptly. A section 
on the lifestyles of some senior officials in the two municipalities confirmed that although the 
numbers of offenders was small, even senior staff could be guilty of corrupt or venial 
behaviour.  
The chapter has also examined the attitude of the two Councils to how council services were 
managed, and why both Councils failed to develop a management structure which provided 
                                               
529   P. J. Waller, Town, City and Nation. England 1850-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press.1983), p.282. 
530   Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Methods of Social Study, p.196.  
531   Arthur Redford, The History of Local government in Manchester, Volume II, p.290.   
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all committees with access to specialist services when needed. The identification of the difficult 
relationship between the Council and its officials supplies a possible explanation about why 
the system of ‘management by committee’ failed to provide competent management of 
projects being undertaken by a committee. The findings also show that the expertise of officials 
who were not members of departments managed by council committees was usually not fully 
utilised; similarly any skills or expertise developed by staff in Departments  managed by a 
Committee were not shared, and were  likely to be duplicated by other Departments managed 
by a committee. 
The next chapter considers the extent to which the inadequacy of some aspect of how the 
financial management system were implemented in the two municipalities played a part in the 
reason for allegations of mismanagement or inferences of corruption 
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Chapter Seven. The management of finances in Manchester and 
Salford. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the problems associated with accounting for municipal expenditure 
in Manchester and Salford and the extent to which the failure of both Councils to improve financial 
management systems and audit led to serious shortcomings in the way the financial performance of 
both municipalities was presented. It considers the possible consequences of this situation, and why 
the two Councils delayed making any improvement in the audit procedures used. It argues that as a 
result, allegations of misfeasance, or even Council corruption made by critics about incidents which 
were the result of mismanagement could be given credence because of the inadequacy of the audit 
procedures. 
 
7.1. Keeping the books.532 
 
Although the accounts of the borough fund dealt with the income and expenditure of all the 
standing committees, including both the costs of Council services and schemes of work being 
undertaken, it was the complex accounts of the municipal trading operations of the two 
Councils to supply gas and water which were the source of many of the allegations of 
mismanagement. Both of these services which had a large customer base, required a financial 
management system which dealt with two aspects of the service, the cost of producing and 
delivering the product to the customer, and the payments made by the customer for the 
service. This task of receiving the payments was carried out by the clerical staff employed by 
each of the authorities. The earliest payment system involved the issue of an invoice, and to 
ensure that cash payments received were traceable, many authorities had by the 1860s, 
introduced a system using a two-part receipt book. The numbered receipt itself, completed 
with the invoice number and the payment received was given to the customer. The second 
part of the receipt, the voucher, with the same number, and details of payment made, was 
retained for entry in a ‘receipts’ book. David Chadwick resigned his post as Salford’s Treasurer 
in 1860. 533 He had proposed changes to how the accounts were kept in the Treasurer’s 
Department, but these were not implemented, as he had spent the last years of his career 
‘acting up’ to cover the long illness of Charles Gibson, the Town Clerk. The result was that 
financial management system in the Treasurer’s Department was said to rely on the honesty 
                                               
532   MCA 1882, sections 25 to 28, set out the arrangements to be made for the accounts to be sent to the LGB and 
audited 
533   David Chadwick was appointed Salford Treasurer at the age of 23, He left in 1860 to become Superintendent 
of Globe Insurance Co. but kept links with the Council; serving as a councillor. He resigned in 1868 when he 
became MP for Macclesfield.  Whether Chadwick’s recommendation of Noar was made so that he would be able 
to carry out the changes which he had been proposed but not implemented, is not clear; but Noar took no action 
and his embezzlement started as soon as he took up the appointment. 
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of the Treasurer, William Noar.  He had previously been the Chief Clerk, taking over the post 
of Treasurer on Chadwick’s recommendation in1860. The method of embezzlement he used 
was simple. 534 The client was given a receipt for the full amount paid, the matching voucher 
which was used to enter the monies received in the records was made out for a lower amount, 
and Noar retained the difference. This simple system was capable of detecting cases of 
embezzlement, but the failure to set up a management system which provided routine 
checking of vouchers against the invoices for the services, a tedious process, meant that the 
system was vulnerable to embezzlement. Noar’s work was not checked. Although the Mayor, 
Alderman Wright Taylor, who was also Chairman of the Finance Committee admitted in 
Council that he had realised for some time ‘that the or some the treasurer’s accounts ‘were 
not in the form they ought to be’ but no action was taken until the Finance Committee wanted 
to change some procedures and Noar was asked to balance the accounts. When the shortfall 
of ‘moneys received’ came to light, William Warburton led the criticism of the Council’s failure 
to act. 535 He stated that he had been asked not to pursue the matter … ‘because it would 
…greatly damage the Council’s reputation for financial integrity.’ The Noar embezzlement 
finally led Salford Council to take action by appointing a professional auditor, Mr T Bowring in 
1866, ’To enquire into and investigate the particulars of the default on the part of a former 
Borough Treasurer (William Noar)’... He reported the difficulties he had in the arriving at a 
figure for the extent of the embezzlement because the absence of numbering on some of the 
vouchers made it difficult to link these to the receipt giving the actual payment made. Bowring 
was subsequently appointed to audit the Treasurer’s accounts, by carrying out an annual 
audit. 
The increasing diversification of the role of the two Councils meant that the type of simple 
system used in the Treasurer’s Department was not suitable for linking together different 
activities which could have a single endpoint. The result that that simple accounting mistakes 
could lead to criticism of mismanagement and incompetence.  Frank Hollins, for example, 
accused the Chairman of the Manchester Health Committee of withholding information about 
the true cost of a project which he had stated to be £7,500, when the actual cost was later 
found to be £12,500. 536  The explanation was that £5,000 of materials used in the building 
                                               
534   The success of the embezzlement was dependent on the fact that the job of the Chief Clerk who kept the 
books and the Cashier, who received the payments were held by the same person. 
535   Salford Weekly News, 8 September 1865 p.4.  William Warburton who was an elective auditor, reported that 
the elective auditors, (himself, & John Thorley) plus Henry Bowman the Mayor’s Auditor had sent a signed memo 
to the Mayor in February 1865 stating the accounts in the Treasurer’s departments were unsatisfactory. They had 
included a table pointing out where action was needed, ’otherwise the system would allow defalcations.’ The Mayor 
stated that the wording of the memo was ‘ambiguous’ and did not suggest that he needed to take action. The memo 
was not published. 
536   Manchester City News, 26 September 1885.  City Auditors Review:  Health Department Part 1. 
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scheme had been taken from a Council store and not cross-charged to the project. 537 The 
solution which could be adopted to overcome this problem was the double-entry bookkeeping 
system which enabled the accounts of different sections of an enterprise to be linked together. 
This system recognises that there are two aspects to each operation in the business; i.e. for 
every debt there is a credit, and as a result, the two entries are made for each transaction 
cancel out, giving a simple check for the correctness of data entry. The chronological record 
of the journals used to record income and expenditure on a daily basis could be reduced on 
(say) a monthly basis to a nominal ledger which gives the totals of the income and expenditure. 
These totals should balance to zero if the records are entered correctly. Progress in adopting 
the double entry system in Manchester was slow, and there were complaints in the press 
alleging mismanagement or corruption which could result from the way a double-entry system 
had been implemented. There was apparently no record of how the system had been set up 
in the Waterworks Department of Manchester Corporation. The result was that the auditor 
carrying out the audit of accounts, which was on an annual basis, was unaware of which 
account books should be audited.538  The auditor did not apparently see the need to visit the 
Department and talk to the Departmental staff responsible for implementing the financial 
system for charging and receiving monies. The result was that he failed to audit one part of 
the Waterworks Department’s accounts. It was the ‘discovery’ of these books which led to the 
identification of the Hepton embezzlement.  
Whilst the accounts of the Waterworks Department were more straightforward, the production 
and sale of gas was a complex operation. ‘Keeping the Books’ for the Gas Departments 
presented a greater challenge, requiring considerable development of the basic double-entry 
system, and clarity about how certain aspects of the costings and receipts involved in the 
production and sale of gas were to be represented in the accounts. The result was that the 
method of accounting used for the gas accounts particularly in Salford, was a source of 
recurrent criticism and challenge by critics.  Unlike the municipal operation of providing water, 
where the cost of maintaining the reservoirs and the water delivery systems could be budgeted 
as a fixed amount per year, the revenue costs for providing gas involved expensive plant, with 
high maintenance and renewal costs. The price of gas to the customer needed to take account 
of all the costs of producing the gas, including the costs involved in funding the large capital 
loans made by the LGB for the purchase of plant; the costs of maintaining the plant and the 
raw materials used to produce the gas. and costs of delivery systems used to supply gas to 
                                               
537   The omission was spotted by Councillor George Clay, a builder by trade who noticed that there was no charge 
in the accounts for some of the materials used in project. Clay who was elected to Manchester Council in 1882 
was elected Alderman in 1893. He chaired the Improvement Committee from 1886-1895. 
538   This was the reason that the Hepton embezzlement was not discovered, despite annual audits. 
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customers.539 To these charges were added the staff costs; the salaries and wages of the men 
involved in the Gasworks as stokers and labourers, and the managers and clerical staff dealing 
with the billing and receiving payment from customers. All these charges needed to be 
recovered by the payments received from customers for gas, allowing, if the information was 
properly recorded, a profit and loss account to be set up. The complexity of the Gas accounts 
was compounded by the absence of agreement about how upgrades to the plant were to be 
funded, what constituted maintenance and how these costings should appear in the accounts; 
matters which divided the opinion of accountants, and attracted debate in professional 
journals. Consumers of gas had a more limited interest, how the price of gas was determined; 
as a result, the presentation of the Gas accounts was given critical attention. The allegations 
of malfeasance, which led to the prosecution of Samuel Hunter, Salford’s gas manager, were 
considered earlier.540 Councillor Mandley, Hunter’s chief antagonist and critic, focussed his 
criticism and inferences of corruption in the Gas Department on the tendering procedures used 
to purchase coal, and the poor quality and price of the Gas produced. He also alleged that 
how the financial accounts provided by Hunter about the profitability of the gas enterprise were 
falsified to give an incorrect picture about the profitability of the enterprise, by using allowances 
made for plant maintenance to inflate the profits of the gasworks  
There was no ‘off the shelf’ package to provide a double-entry bookkeeping system capable 
of dealing with the particular features of municipal accounts, which did pose some special 
problems.  There is however evidence that problems were also caused by the lax attitude to 
how the available systems were managed. This was demonstrated in Salford when the annual 
‘Extract of accounts’ was published. A regular criticism was the way the account for loan 
monies, was presented. The propensity of the Council was to use revenue monies for capital 
purposes, resulting in the need to set a higher rate, a matter of concern to ratepayers, and the 
converse situation, where loan monies obtained for particular projects or services were used 
to supplement the rates, with the consequence that the implementation of a project could be 
delayed. An editorial in Salford Chronicle in 1881, which noted that the paper had challenged 
’recklessly incurred expenditure,’ and the ‘illegitimate employment of money obtained by 
means of loans,’ stated that the Pendleton District Finance Committee had used a loan to 
subsidise the rates, and information about this ‘had been suppressed.’ 541 There were further 
problems in 1885.  In ‘an exciting debate’, Councillor Mandley objected to a resolution of the 
General Purposes Committee, sent to the Salford Council for approval, asking for agreement 
                                               
539   The annual bill for coal and cannel was a six- figure sum; Manchester Gasworks employed 1,700 men. 
540   Section 4.3, p.78. 
541   Salford Chronicle, 8 January 1881, editorial p.2. went on to say …’It would have been far better if they had 
come clean and admitted that this had happened – but when loans sought vastly exceed need, the Ratepayers 
have to take on the repayments’. 
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that money should be transferred from the capital fund to revenue ‘to cover a deficit.’ 542  After 
a long debate this was agreed.  An editorial Salford Chronicle noted that:   
 
It was our painful duty years ago to deal with the incomprehensible muddle of figures 
dignified by the title ‘Annual abstract of accounts’. We stated and restated our 
objections to mixing capital and revenue items and our very decided conviction that an 
alteration in the method of bookkeeping… would be consonant with and conducive to 
a sounder system of finance.  The result vindicated prediction, and it has now become 
possible to adjust rates levied by actual expenditure incurred.…543 
 
The editorial reluctantly agreed that this particular transfer should be accepted because other 
accountancy failures had resulted in revenue monies being charged with spending which 
should have been paid from capital funds. There was however a suspicion that in some cases, 
capital monies had been used to top up revenue shortfalls. 
The situation did not change. The first sign of what became known as ‘The Great Salford 
Muddle’ came to the Council’s attention when a resolution of the Finance Committee 
recommended that the Council should instruct the Town Clerk to apply to the Local 
Government Board for a loan of £34,070, ‘needed because certain committees had overspent 
themselves.’ Secrecy remained paramount, and in order to discuss the matter in the absence 
of reporters, the Council agreed to reconvene at the end of the Council meeting as the General 
Purposes Committee.544 This discussion was not reported; however, a Special Committee was 
set up to look into the matter. Their report, which was published in the Council minutes, 
revealed ‘a disturbing level of financial incompetence’. The eight-man Special Committee 
which was chaired by the Mayor (W. H. Bailey), reported that there was a deficit of £76,761, 
of which £34,070 was for works which had been carried out using money from a bank 
overdraft; but should have been carried out using a loan sanctioned by the Local Government 
Board. 545 The Special Committee stated that ‘great carelessness has been shown….the main 
problem had been overestimating receipts from Exchequer and Gas, and over-spending by all 
committees.’ They added that quarterly reports of expenditure had not been prepared and no 
attempt was made to monitor the level of spending. There had been no regular checks to 
ensure that payments were confined to the funds provided to meet estimated costs, and there 
had been no consultation with the Treasurer when estimates were prepared for the following 
year. The Finance Department accountant failed to call the attention of the Treasurer to the 
large adverse balances in departmental accounts, with the result that ‘the matter has been 
allowed to drift in a manner totally inexcusable’. At the next Council meeting, attempts were 
                                               
542   Salford Chronicle, 10 January 1885, p.2.  
543   Salford Reporter, 8 September 1894, p. 8. 
544    Although reporters were allowed into Salford Council meetings, they were barred from all Committee meetings. 
In Manchester, reporters could attend General Purposes Committee, but they were barred from all other committee 
meetings. 
545   Salford Reporter, 29 October 1894. Proceedings of Salford Council. 
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made to allocate blame. 546  The failure of the Finance Committee to act on warnings of 
overspending from the Auditor’s report was identified as one cause, and there was criticism of 
the officials, particularly Joseph Corbett, the Borough Engineer, who had grossly 
underestimated the costs of some schemes, a factor in the overspending. Mandley 
commented that there was ‘a ‘want of cooperation...amongst all officials;’ although it felt that 
the Committee Chairmen and their officials should share the blame; as it was not feasible for 
the Corporation’s Treasurer and Accountant to go through all the accounts. A fairer summary 
would have been that the financial management system used to control of expenditure within 
the municipality was ‘not fit for purpose.’ Blame was finally attributed to George W Hall, 
Salford’s Treasurer, who had 30 years’ service with the Corporation. He was demoted to Chief 
Clerk.547 Critics of the Council had a field day.  John Hempsall a member of the ILP and 
Elective auditor referred to the scandal as ’a Tale which would bring a blush of shame to most 
of those who could feel shame for the humiliating history of the humiliating Corporation of 
Salford.’548 He used the incompetence of Salford Council to great effect in the campaign in 
support of an ILP candidate, a Mr Heaviside, who was not however elected. 549   After the 
‘Great Salford Muddle’, Salford Council kept to a program of austerity, and although some 
overspending by committees did occur; the Finance Department monitored spending more 
carefully; for example, in 1902, six committees, Health; Highways & Paving; Tramways; 
Lighting & Cleansing; Town Hall & Markets; and the Parliamentary & Public trust, were 
instructed to explain their overspending. There was no suggestion that any of the staff of the 
Treasurer’s Department behaved corruptly, but the demonstration of incompetence and the 
description of the behaviour by Hempsall was extremely damaging and left open the possibility 
that in this situation, had corruption actually occurred, it was unlikely to have been detected. 
 
Although the management of the accounts of Salford Council received considerable press 
interest, less press attention was given to the complaints about the mismanagement of 
Manchester’s finances. In the 1890s. the Manchester Finance Committee had noted that 
several committees were overdrawn;550 and the Elective auditors had drawn attention to the 
‘growing indebtedness of the Council.’  Despite these warnings, Redford, commenting about 
the situation in 1896, when eight additional aldermen were appointed to the Finance 
Committee, noted that there was no improvement to the civic finances as a whole. 551  In the 
                                               
546   Ibid., 3 November 1894, Report of the Council meeting .p.8.  
547   Hall was a soft target. Aged 70 he chose to resign rather than accept the demotion. The accountant employed 
by the Council was also sanctioned, his salary was reduced. 
548   Hempsall served as elective auditor with Harrison for the years 1895/6. 
549   Salford Reporter, 3 November 1894; article ‘The Great Financial Muddle – Who is to blame for it?’  
550   Manchester Council Proceedings, Epitome, Finance Committee, 6 February 1895.  
551   Ibid., 9 February 1896. The eight aldermen, appointed to improve the status of the Finance Committee, were 
senior members of other Council Committees, expected to use their experience and influence to curb expenditure 
by these committees. 
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following year, Redford commented that an Inspector of the Local Government Board 
protested that Manchester Corporation ’appeared to think that they were able to do just what 
they liked, money was spent first and then the Local Government Board was asked to sanction 
the scheme for which the money was required.’ 552  The Inspector added that ‘this habit was 
not peculiar to Manchester.’  
In addition to the problems of keeping the books of the Council itself, Joseph Scott had 
described the system in use in Manchester to order goods or services in ‘some of the 
departments of the Corporation;’ when he conducted his audit of the departmental account 
books.553  He noted that there was no standard method in use in all departments.554  He studied 
the procedure used in the Health Department, where he found that the ordering of goods was 
left to officials, which he refers to as ‘a very bad arrangement as it entrusts too great liberty in 
their hands’. According to Scott, when the goods were received, the invoice was checked, and 
if correct, entered onto a sheet, called ‘the authority’. This contained the name of the supplier, 
the ‘amount of the invoice’ (presumably cost) and the nature of the goods.  There was no 
record that the price of goods stated on the invoice was checked against the order, nor was 
the person for whom the goods were intended stated on the authority.  The authority, which 
would usually contain a number of items, had then to be signed as correct by three members 
of the Health Committee. As this often took place at the ‘end of a Committee meeting, this 
could lead to signings being done ‘indiscriminately or carelessly.’555 The authority plus the 
invoices was then sent to the Treasurer, who checked the invoices against the authority then 
sent both back to the Finance Committee. The Finance Committee had been given the power 
to. ’Make orders in writing for the payment of money, such orders signed by three or more 
members of the Town Council, being members of the Finance committee, and countersigned 
by the Town Clerk.’556 The attitude of Alderman Harwood, a member of the Finance 
Committee, that ’he signed hundreds (of invoices) and never read them,’ apparently 
exemplified the attitude of other members of the Committee. 557  After the three signatures 
from members of the Finance Committee, an instruction was then issued to the Treasurer to 
pay the invoices authorised on the authority. If Scott was correct in describing this method of 
ordering and paying for goods, this process made fraud straightforward.558  It would have been 
                                               
552   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, p.448. 
553   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.5. 
 554  Ibid.,p.6. He noted that in some departments, (which he did not name) orders had to be authorised by the 
Committee before being placed. The wording suggests that the procedure in the Health Committee where no 
authorisation was required, was more usual. 
555   Ibid., p.12. 
556   This was a requirement of the MCA 1882, section 141 (1). 
557   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.5. 
558   No member of the Health committee signed to agree to the order being placed; there was no check that the 
cost on the invoice was the cost at which the goods were ordered; and the ‘authority’ did not give the name of the 
person who had ordered the goods.  
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very easy for a corrupt official to order and receive the goods and pass the invoice for payment. 
As there were no stock checks, which could have revealed if goods had been ‘diverted’ for 
personal use, there was no method of distinguishing fraud from a perfectly legitimate 
transaction.  
 
7.2. Audit 
 
By the 1870s there was recognition in both Manchester and Salford Councils that the workload 
and complexity of the role of Elective auditors had increased. However, both authorities, as 
members of the Association of Municipal Corporations, (AMC) continued to oppose any 
attempts by central government to change the system of audit to the system of District Audit, 
used by the Local Government Board, (LGB) to audit Poor Law Accounts. 559  Manchester 
Council, wary of any threat to impose such a system asked the Finance Committee (Chairman 
Joseph Thompson), in 1874, …’ to consider and to report whether, if any, and if so what 
alterations in the audit of the corporation accounts are desirable.’ The Committee, which 
presented its findings to a Council meeting, focussed on the attempts of the Local Government 
Board to bring the audit of municipal corporations within the remit of District audit. 560 This idea 
was dismissed in the first paragraph of the report, which expressed satisfaction with the 
existing system. The Finance Committee described in outline the system used in Manchester, 
and the precautions which were to prevent unauthorised or improper expenditure were 
detailed. According to this account, each committee of the Council was responsible for 
expenses incurred ‘in relation to the business which it may have in charge.’ These had been 
approved by an audit subcommittee; the accounts had then to be approved by the main 
committee and only when this had been carried out were the accounts transmitted to the 
Finance Committee for payment. A resolution passed by the Finance Committee, stating the 
expenditure which had been approved for payment, was then sent to as authorisation to the 
Treasurer to make the necessary payments. The report concluded that:  
In the opinion of your Committee, the arrangements described are of equal if not 
greater importance in guarding against any improper or illegal expenditure than any 
formal system of audit……these arrangements have been found to be generally 
successful and satisfactory. 
 
                                               
559   The district audit system is described in footnote 155, p.45. 
560   Proceedings of Manchester Council, 3 December 1874.   
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This statement was not challenged. Scott’s later description of process of authorising 
payments carried out in the Health Committee of Manchester Corporation certainly did not 
‘guard against improper or illegal expenditure.’ 561.  
A Select Committee of Parliament set up to consider borough audit, interviewed the 
Manchester’s Town Clerk Joseph Heron, representing the AMC which opposed district audit. 
562 He was quoted as saying that in Manchester, ‘All payments came before the auditors who 
carefully carried out their duty to examine the authority for payments made. (The audit is) as 
complete and efficient as the Poor Law audit.’  Coombe & Edwards remarked that Heron’s 
statement was ‘quite possibly weighted to counter the case for replacement by district audit’. 
563   
The Select Committee report concluded:  
Your Committee …recommend that no alteration be made in the present mode of 
auditing borough accounts, believing that sufficient safeguards exist against 
extravagant or improper expenditure and that any audit of such accounts under the 
control of the government is undesirable, and would occasion an unnecessary 
interference with independent local self-government in the boroughs… 
The Manchester Finance Committee congratulated the AMC on its achievement of blocking 
the introduction of the bill to change the system. Coombe and Edwards, commenting on the 
conclusions of the Select Committee noted that:  
the overall impression gained from the evidence presented is that in 1874, the Elective audit 
was usually a fairly ineffective exercise, undertaken mainly by amateurs, with its continuance 
favoured by Council officials because it did not entail interferences from central government; it 
cost very little, and it did no harm…564. 
 The authors might have commented that   it did little good either. 
The need for an independent scrutiny of the accounts in the two ‘trading’ accounts had already 
been accepted in Manchester; the Waterworks Committee and the Gas Committee accounts 
were audited annually by professional auditors, paid for by the Council. The increase in 
workload of the Elective auditors was also recognised; the Manchester Finance Committee 
report had recommended the appointment of a professional auditor, who would be required to 
act under that direction of the Elective auditors and was not intended to lessen their 
responsibility. No action was taken until the Council meeting held in July 1880, when it was 
reported that the post had been advertised. 565 Councillor Windsor noted that the post gave 
this auditor restricted powers; i.e. only to assist in the examination of those books which had 
                                               
561   Scott’s account of the process of ordering goods and approving payment in Manchester is considered in 
Section 7.1, p.141, above. 
562   Report of the Select Committee on Borough Auditors and Assessors 1874 (321) vii 1. 
563   H. M. Coombe and J. R, Edwards, ‘The audit of municipal corporations - a quest for professional dominance.’  
Managerial Auditing Journal, Volume19, No.1 (2004), p.71.  
564   Coombe & Edwards, Ibid.p.72. 
565   Manchester City News, 10 July 1880.  Manchester City Council proceedings, p.6.   
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been submitted to the Elective auditors. He noted that some of the books of the municipality, 
for example the Consolidated Stock Department books, had never been audited, and asked 
whether this was the intention of the Finance Committee.  Alderman Harwood, a member of 
the Finance Committee commented: 
it was not necessary to go and spend money in auditing books which have been audited 
already simply to satisfy one or two members of the Council, who wished the public to 
believe that they are the only guardians of the public purse.  566 
Alderman Thompson, moving a motion for confirmation of the Finance Department minutes, 
reported that a Mr. Murray of Broome Murray & Co. had been appointed to assist the Elective 
auditors in auditing the Borough Fund account, and to suggest ‘such improvements in the 
mode of keeping the books as he may deem advisable.’ 567.  An editorial supported this move, 
noting that the duties of the Elective auditors were performed in a perfunctory manner with the 
assumption that the accounts were free from error; but in the current year, ’greater attention 
had been paid by the auditors to the accounts, and their report now shows that this assumption 
was wrong’. 568  
As concerns about central government interference in local affairs persisted, the 
arrangements for audit set out in the 1835 Act became the benchmark used by both 
Manchester and Salford for what constituted ‘acceptable’ audit; in particular, that it should 
remain a local responsibility, and there should be no provisions for sanction when there were 
findings of financial profligacy. At the end of the century both the Manchester and Salford 
Councils who presented evidence to the Joint Committee on Municipal Trading, (in 1900 & 
1903), were still maintaining this attitude; vehemently objecting to central audit, as ‘derogatory 
to their dignity and vexatious.’ 569  The reason given was partly because it would ‘disarrange 
their routine’ but the possibility that the terms of a Bill might include disallowance and 
surcharge, in the event of breaches of the powers given to the Council, was still a powerful 
incentive to oppose the proposed legislation. Finer 570 noted that the Joint Committee 
recognised the farcical nature of the existing local audit, but felt that, in the face of local 
opposition, it could not take action to change the situation.  Szreter commenting generally 
about local-central relations stated that  
                                               
566   Ibid., 10 July 1880. 
567   Ibid.,7 August 1880, Manchester City Council proceedings, p.6. 
568   Ibid.,6 September 1884. editorial, p.4. This editorial was published one week before the publication of the first 
episode of ‘Leaves’ (which was on September 13th 1884), hence the reference to ‘greater attention’ having been 
paid by the auditors.’  
569   Joint Select Committee on Municipal Trading, 1900 (305) & 1903 (270),1900. 
570   Herman Finer, English Local History p.316.  
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In the Local Government Board’s dealings with local authorities, Britain’s political, 
cultural, social, and economic history all meet the unwinnable war of mutual attrition 
between the centre and the peripheries…571 
From the 1870s the adequacy of audit by Elective auditors, and exactly what the powers an 
Elective auditor had to examine the accounts of a municipality, had come up for regular 
consideration at both Manchester and Salford Council meetings. The provisions for audit in 
the Municipal Corporation Act 1882, which adopted the same requirements for local audit as 
the earlier 1835 legislation, specified that the Treasurer of a municipality should make up his 
accounts half yearly, and one month before the due date, ‘should submit them with the 
necessary vouchers and papers ‘to the borough auditors.’572 Joseph Scott writing in 1884 
complained that in addition to the problems he had about gaining access to the books and 
papers to audit, there was ‘a strikingly anomalous feature’ in the election of auditors:  
 
They are elected annually on the first of October, but by this Act they are responsible 
for examining the accounts from April to April only.  When therefore they are elected, 
six months’ payments have already been passed, unaudited, while for the last six 
months of their term of office, they are precluded from seeing the accounts then current 
at all. 573 
 
When Scott examined the account books of the Consolidated Stock Office, he found that they 
had been ‘mutilated.’ In one invoice book, where he had found that invoices were missing; 
when he asked to see the book again, he found that it had been rewritten; an action taken so 
that it would contain only those invoices which he was ‘entitled’ to see i.e. for the six-month 
period from April to November 1883. There were also problems of access to many of the 
books; Scott was told that he needed a written order from the Chairman (presumably of the 
Finance Committee).  
In the aftermath of the Scott report, Manchester Council set up a subcommittee to consider 
audit and improvements in financial management within the Council. The report set out a 
number of improvements in the way the various Committees of the Council had to account for 
their spending.574 This included simple requirements such as the need for each department to 
have a requisition book for ordering goods and services, and a requirement that any orders 
for goods costing more than £50 had to be approved by the Council.  The collection of all 
monies owed to the Council (with the exception of gas and water accounts), was to be 
undertaken by the Treasurer’s Department; and all arrangements for borrowing money had to 
be consolidated under the Finance Department, which should take over banking 
arrangements. The report also suggested that Departmental estimates of spending had to be 
                                               
571   Simon Szreter, ‘Healthy Government? Britain 1850-1950’ in Historical Journal 34, 2 (1991) .295. 
572   Municipal Corporations Act 1835, chapter 76 (sec.37), were unchanged in the 1882 Act, (as s.27.)  
573   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.8, noted that this made a good case for continuous audit.  
574   Manchester City News, 16 May 1885, p.6. 
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published by April, and each Department had to ensure that capital properties owned by the 
Council were entered into a ‘capital assets’ register; in which all entries had to be certified by 
the Town Clerk.  It recommended that the Council should set up an audit Department, as a 
way of implementing continuous audit.  
Regular accounts of the failure of Elective audit received prominence in ‘The Accountant’, a 
magazine established in 1874 to cover accountancy issues. Eight leading articles on various 
aspects of municipal accounting between published between 20 September and 29 November 
1884 marked both the growing recognition of the role of accountancy in municipalities and the 
determination of the accountancy profession to obtain a share of audit work. The emphasis of 
the articles was to demonstrate the inadequacies of audit by Elective auditors. The first article 
which introduced the series, gave an account of a series of frauds which led to the Wigan 
Borough Treasurer and the borough auditor being committed for trial for fraud. Not surprisingly 
The Accountant criticised suggestions that municipalities should set up systems of continuous 
audit. In a short article, it argued that that this would be very expensive, and services to provide 
continuous audit could be supplied by professional auditors. 575 It also noted that because the 
staff of such a department would be employed by the municipality and ‘it would of necessity 
be under the influence and control of the Corporation.’ The objection was mainly prompted by 
the fear that the staff of the audit office would be employed by the Council, and this could 
remove the need for professional auditors.  Manchester did not pursue the proposal at that 
time. 
  
Scott and his co-auditor Hollins’ achievement in gaining access to the books of the various 
Departments of Manchester Council was not matched by their successors until 1893, when 
as there were two candidates, the election of the auditors had to be decided by a vote. Samuel 
Norbury Williams, who in a ‘spirited address’ stated when elected that he saw his duties would 
be carried out ‘as Joseph Scott.’ Scott had however experienced difficulties when he tried to 
challenge some items of expenditure by committees. He had been told by Councillor Windsor 
that ‘it was no part of the Auditor’s duty to challenge the mode in which the Council chooses 
to spend the funds which come into their hands’, a statement with which Scott strongly 
disagreed.576  Attitudes about the role of audit were changing.  With the increasing involvement 
of professional auditors in municipal audit, the editorial in Manchester City News in 1893, 
which was addressed to the newly appointed elective auditors, commented on the differing 
role which the Elective auditor should undertake compared with that of a professional auditor.  
The editorial stated that: 
                                               
575   The Accountant, 1 November 1884. No.517, p.5. 
576   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.4. 
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the idea of the Elective auditor is to be independent. His duties were not the same as 
the professional auditor which was to audit the accounts submitted to him.  It was no 
part of the professional auditor’s duty to express an opinion about whether the 
spending was properly incurred, however wrongful particular expenditure might be, if 
it has been properly set out in the books and vouched for.  The Citizens’ auditor is 
different.  His duty is to detect abuses and show them up, i.e. see money is spent 
legally and not recklessly and for the wrong purposes; that no officials dipping into our 
pockets to supply their own personal needs and that you will detect as far as possible, 
bribery and corruption in any quarter whether by paid officials or members of the 
Council, who sell their votes in committee at the price of a contract.  We expect you to 
be independent, and we expect our servants to give you assistance…577 
 
The MCA1882, which stated the requirement for the system of audit to be used in a 
municipality, describes the procedure for appointing the Elective auditors and the Mayor’s 
auditor. The only statement about the conduct of the audit refers ‘to the necessary vouchers 
and papers’ to be submitted to the auditors ‘and they shall audit them’. 578 579  Although the 
editor’s comments did not accord with the wording of the MCA, it did reflect the changing 
expectation of the ratepayers, that the role of the Elective auditors should also be to identify 
when the practices of the two Councils fell short of the standards of integrity which were seen 
to be appropriate in the late Victorian period. Their role should also be to identify the types of 
spending which could not be justified by the reasonable needs of the services provided by the 
Council. Samuel Norbury Williams kept to this brief. As an Elective auditor, he was selective 
in the issues he investigated; producing reports on matters where he inferred that there was 
corruption.580 He also took action to establish the legal right of an Elective auditor to examine 
all the account books of the municipality.581  This matter, which had been the subject of legal 
argument since the 1880s, revolved around the meaning of the phrase used in the wording of 
the phrase used to define the scope of the audit  ‘the necessary books and papers’. When this 
phrase was adopted in the MCA 1835, the single-entry methods used to keep the borough 
accounts relied mainly on a simple system of ‘Day books’ to record income and expenditure, 
so the meaning of the phrase was clear. With the extension of the role of the Corporation and 
the implementation of double-entry book keeping, the financial situation of a municipality could 
only be established from the additional account books used in the system, the borough 
ledgers.   
                                               
577   Manchester City News, 30 September 1893, editorial, p.4. 
578   MCA 1882, section 25. 
579   Ibid., section 27.  
580   For example, the report about what went wrong with the scheme to install an underground sewer to link to the 
Davyhulme sewage works; and how the sale of coke and tar was handled by Alderman King and the Gas 
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The consequences to the reputation of the Council as a result of the failure to provide Elective auditors access to 
all account books of the municipality is considered in Section 8.2. 
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Many of the critics of the system of audit by Elective auditors focused on the absence of any 
relevant qualification needed for the job. Episode Four of the series of articles in The 
Accountant concentrated on the fact that Elective auditors did not need an appropriate 
qualification commented:  
to assume that there could be anything worthy of a name of an audit performed by men 
who are not and who do not profess to be skilled in accounts is absurd. It is no reflection 
on the class of men who have usually filled that office to say that their acquaintanceship 
with accounts is, on average less than that required of a second-rate bookkeeper in a 
commercial counting house... 582  
The case for Elective auditors to take a prominent role in auditing the Borough accounts 
continued to have support.   As they were appointed by election, the Elective auditor had the 
advantage of independence, and freedom from the influence of officials and members of the 
Council. There were claims that ratepayers might find it easier to approach an Elective auditor 
rather than an official or paid employee of the Council when it was felt that a matter should be 
investigated. As ratepayers. Elective auditors would have the interests of other ratepayers at 
heart, particularly regarding the control of spending. 583 Coombs & Edwards noted this interest 
did not convert into enthusiasm to volunteer to take on the role of elective auditor, with the 
result that an election for the posts was rarely required.  
The ‘Elective auditor’ system had its critics in the Council.  One objection was that the post 
could provide pressure groups such as the Ratepayers’ Association, or political groups, such 
as the Independent Labour Party (ILP), with a platform to criticise Council policy rather than 
carry out the audit.  The very low turn-out at the elections for auditors could allow a determined 
faction of ratepayers such as the ILP, to get a particular candidate elected; to gain visibility 
and esteem for the organisation. Municipal officers were wary of influence that an Elective 
auditor could wield through publicity. Indeed, Salford suffered serious reputational damage 
because of publicity which followed the publication of letters from two of its Elective auditors, 
John Hempsall and William Hunt.584  Their presence in the Town Hall was also resented. 
Councillor Holland complained that they were walking in and out of Salford Town Hall ’when 
they liked. No person had the slightest control over them.’585  586 The consequences of the 
attitude of the Council to audit are considered in Chapter Eight in Part Four of this thesis. 
                                               
582   The Accountant,11 October 1884, no. 514, p.5.  
583   Coombs & Edwards, Managerial Auditing Journal, p.74, noted that this was also the thrust of the evidence 
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The embezzlement by William Noar, Salford’s Treasurer, had led to action by the Council to 
improve audit and reduce the risk of further embezzlement. Salford Weekly News 587 reported 
that on 1 March 1865, by resolution of the Council, funds were provided to appoint auditors 
who were empowered ‘to extend their examination and audit all details and matters of account 
according to their discretion and report half yearly to the Council via the General Finance 
Committee. The first appointment of a professional auditor, Mr T Bowring was made in 1866, 
initially to investigate the extent of the embezzlement of William Noar. but later he was 
appointed to carry out the audit of the accounts of the municipality.  It appears, however, that 
Bowring’s role as auditor was confined to auditing the records the General Committees of the 
Borough Council and did not extend to the accounts of the District Committees of Salford, 
Pendleton and Broughton. Speaking at the AGM of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales in November 1886, and describing the accounts in Salford, Bowring 
stated: 
I can speak with the most absolute confidence as to the principle on which the accounts 
are kept, their accuracy and their entirely satisfactory mode of rendering…. I believe, 
myself with regard to the principle of double entry they are perfect and leave little room 
for improvement. 588 
Thomas Bowring remained Professional Auditor of the Salford Corporation accounts for more 
than 20 years.  It is not clear on what basis he was appointed, although the money made 
available initially for the appointment, £100, would seem to have been sufficient for only an 
annual audit. The statements he makes about Salford accounts, and the checks which he said 
he undertook, suggest that he must have maintained regular contact with the accounts of the 
municipality. The Council also employed an audit clerk, whose role was redefined after a report 
was made to the General Finance Committee by Bowring, who stated that the audit clerk had 
made several unsuccessful requests to members of the General Purposes Committee for the 
books of account and petty cash books. The matter was referred to a subcommittee for 
consideration.  At a meeting of the Borough Council in August 1881589, a motion from 
Alderman Husband, which had been postponed for a month was agreed, this stated that: 
all contractor’s and tradesmen’s bills and wages lists shall, before presentation to the 
various committees for payment, be submitted to the audit clerk for verification as to 
quantities, prices, calculation and general accuracy.    
The extent of the role of the audit clerk was also considered when a resolution of the General 
Finance Committee was tabled for approval.  This noted that  
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under the supervision of the Audit Clerk, books (are) to be provided and kept in 
individual departments in which shall be entered all goods received. The audit clerk 
can require the production of any book of the Corporation, excepting cash books and 
other books of account held by the Treasurer and audited by a professional auditor. 
The resolution also sought the approval for funding an assistant audit clerk at a salary of £50 
per year and a youth to assist the audit clerk at a salary of £26 per year; both requests were 
rejected. 
The report of Mr W.J. Popplewell, a Chartered Accountant, appointed as auditor to the Salford 
Borough Funds under a resolution adopted by the Council on 5 January 1887, was presented 
to the Council on 17 October 1887. This covered the year ending 25 March 1887.590  The main 
problem he found was that:  
the accounts did not show concisely and clearly as (is) desirable, the liabilities and 
assets of the various funds; the balance sheet of the Borough Funds shows liabilities 
and assets as they appear in the books, regardless of any distinction between capital 
and revenue. 
He stated that in his report he had seen all the books of the authority, a total of 160 volumes.  
His report to the Council about the 1890 accounts of the Municipality confirmed that the 
accounts were in order, however 6 out of the 17 sets of books in use could be dispensed with, 
and 8 of the 10 Corporation Bank accounts could be closed.591 By 1898, the role of the 
professional auditor as the auditor of municipal accounts was accepted. Both Manchester and 
Salford had a section in their Standing Orders requiring the appointment of professional 
auditors to: 
examine and audit the entire accounts of the Corporation with respect legal 
enactments concerning the accounts especially as to sinking funds and other 
obligations and to report fully to the Council pointing out any objectionable items in the 
accounts and suggesting improvements and safeguards.  
 
 
7.3. The control of Council spending.  
 
This section examines the extent to which of the Treasurer and the Finance Committee played 
a part in controlling the spending of the Councils in the two municipalities. Despite the 
awareness that by the mid-nineteenth century the management of the accounts of a 
municipality was becoming more complex, by the 1870s both Manchester and Salford had 
                                               
590   Ibid.,17 October 1887. 
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appointed men to the post of Treasurer who had started their careers as clerical officers and 
had apparently little or no experience of the developing field of municipal accountancy. 
Whether this was another example of the Councils in both municipalities resisting an 
appointment of a key officer who did not come directly under Committee control and might 
therefore want to ‘interfere’ with Committee business, is not clear, but the result was that 
neither of the two Treasurer’s Departments were to play a major role in implementing improved 
methods of financial management in their respective boroughs.  
Both men who were appointed were to have long careers in Corporation employment. William 
Martin, appointed in 1859, served as Manchester’s Treasurer until 1899; George W. Hall, who 
succeeded William Noar, Salford’s embezzling Treasurer in 1866, remained in post until he 
resigned in 1896.592 At the time of their appointments, the role of the Treasurer was thought 
to be uncomplicated, and neither municipality apparently saw the lack of relevant accountancy 
experience as a disadvantage. 593 Martin had joined Manchester Corporation in 1838; he had 
served as a Committee clerk prior to his appointment as Treasurer.  He listed his duties in a 
letter to the Council dated 24th May 1873 when he applied for an increase in salary. He stated 
that the value of receipts and expenditure passing through the Treasurer’s Department had 
increased from £1,292,384 in 1859 to £2,935,003 in 1873, and the number of individual 
payments had risen from 9,253 to 19,744 over the same period. Martin had also negotiated 
991 loans on behalf of the Council over 3 years at an interest rate which at just over 4%, a 
lower rate of interest than paid by many other Councils, and he had made improvements both 
in the way loan information was notified to the Finance Committee, and also in the way the 
Council made payments, which had reduced the amount of labour, and hence the staffing 
level required.  The nature of these improvements and any saving made was not given. The 
Council agreed to an increase in salary from £750 to £900 a year.  
Both municipalities used the Treasurer’s Department mainly for book-keeping services, 
negotiating loans, checking authorisations to pay invoices and making the actual payments. 
Neither the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, nor the later 1882 Act imposed a specific 
requirement for a Council to establish a Finance committee, but both Manchester and Salford 
did set up a Finance Committee after incorporation.  As there was no legal requirement for 
such a committee, the role of the committee in both municipalities was defined by each Council 
at the first meeting in November, usually by citing the duties imposed by legislation which were 
                                               
592   Salford Reporter, 9 February 1896, Report of Council Meeting, p.7.  
593  By 1860, the amalgamation of several smaller organisations had led to the formation of local bodies 
representing accountants. The national ‘Institute of Chartered Accountants’ received a Royal warrant in 1880. The 
‘Corporate Treasurers and Accountants Association’, which provided recognition of the specialised nature of 
municipal accountancy, was not set up until 1886.  
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relevant to its function. The duties of the two finance committees were similar; there were a 
series of general statements which included: 
To consider and report what measures are necessary to confine the expenditure of 
committees in the borough within the estimates. 
To direct and superintend the keeping of all accounts relating to the Borough;’ and  
’To authorise payments of money owed by the Corporation, to be made by the 
Treasurer.  
 
Other duties included collecting and enforcing payment of the Borough rate, and negotiating 
loans which might be required from time to time. The Salford Finance Committee also had a 
‘catch all’ provision: 
to do all such acts matters and things as may be necessary or incident to the execution 
of the aforesaid powers.  
This section also included ’the management and direction of public clocks’!  
One reason why extravagance and overspending were allowed to continue without check was 
the failure of the two Councils to provide a mechanism for scrutinising how resources were 
allocated and spent by their various committees. This important task was one which a Finance 
Committee might be expected to undertake. In practice, the ability of a Finance Committee to 
rein in the spending of other committees was weak. This missed opportunity meant that 
extravagance and a waste of resources could be disguised in budget allocations.  The 
opportunity to look at this expenditure arose when the estimates of spending for the new 
‘Council year’ were drawn up.  A major part of this exercise was consideration of the previous 
year’s spending; information which was needed so the annual rate for the following financial 
year could be fixed. 594  The task of the Treasurer’s Department was merely to obtain from the 
Chairmen of the various committees their estimates of expenditure for the following year. This 
was to be based on the current year’s spending adjusted for any expected changes in service 
provision. These estimates were then submitted for consideration to the Finance Committee. 
Detailed comment on the individual Departmental estimates by the Finance Committees in the 
two boroughs was apparently not seen as a feasible role for a Finance committee. The task 
of carrying out an examination of all the estimates would have been very time consuming. 
When Finer, writing in 1936, examined the views of a number of senior officers in municipal 
employ about the role of the Finance Committee in controlling Council expenditure, he 
reported that a Town Clerk speaking in 1927 stated that  
                                               
594   There was scope for some errors; the final figure for the previous year’s expenditure was not known at the 
time the estimates had to be drawn up.  
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it was impracticable to allow a committee specially charged with looking into the 
finances of the Council to deal with the policy involved in the proposals of other 
committees and exercise a veto.  The members of the Finance committee cannot be 
experts in every branch of activity of a large modern local authority which may and 
generally does possess important public utility undertakings.595 
The attitude of members of both Council committees in the late Victorian period suggests that 
this statement would express the views of the various committees in the two municipalities. 
The attitude of each committee was to defend its own interests, particularly its spending 
estimates, without concern for the interests of other services. This was a situation which was 
fostered by the absence of any formal mechanism for the spending of a Committee to be 
scrutinised for reasonableness and the provision of value for money.  A Finance Committee 
would therefore have found it difficult to make an impact in controlling spending. The task of 
vetting the estimates of spending was therefore left to the meeting of the Council when the 
papers, with proposed rate for the following financial year were sent for approval. Both 
Councils were sensitive about the level of the rates; it was more likely that there would be 
queries in Council about an increase in spending if this resulted in a rise in the rates; although 
occasionally, a councillor with a particular interest might query some aspect of the proposed 
expenditure. There was an extra complication in Salford, where until 1891 the rates consisted 
of two parts; a borough and a district rate. Meetings of the Borough Council to approve the 
combined rate often degenerated into arguments about the differences in the district rates and 
the relative merits of the different services provided in the three districts.  
The impotence of the Manchester Finance Committee was substantiated by Beatrice Webb596, 
who commented that John King, who was chairman from 1886 to 1903, was ‘senile’. He was 
followed in post by Arthur Copeland who was also criticised for his management of the 
Committee.597  E. D. Simon, who joined Manchester Council in 1913, described his experience 
as a member of the Finance Committee in his first year on the Council. He noted that although 
‘Finance is the root of local government, …the Finance Committee did none of the things I 
expected. It was so ineffectual, for all the good it did it might as well have been non-existent.’  
598 He stated that the problem was of an old chairman who pushed business through the 
committee, without any real debate on the merit of a proposal; a situation which was 
apparently no different when Alderman King chaired the Committee. Simon described how in 
1913, the Committee conducted business, ’as a municipal committee gone wrong, or rather 
gone to sleep’.  Meetings started at 12 noon; 30 minutes were spent on audit, which was the 
                                               
595   The Town Clerk was Dr R. H. R. Tee, Town Clerk of Hackney, who was quoted in Public Administration, 
October 1923, p.445.  
596   Redford, The History of Local Government in Manchester, Volume II, p.436. 
597  Alderman A G. Copeland, who was elected in 1886, succeeded John King as Chairmen of the Finance 
Committee in 1903.  
598   E. D. Simon, A City Council from within (London: Longmans Green & Co, 1926), pp.58-64. 
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time when invoices which required the signature of three members of the Finance Committee 
were signed off for payment; and 30 minutes to consider items on the Agenda.  The meeting 
had to finish at 1pm. for lunch. Simon stated that any discussion was between the Chairman 
and the Committee Clerk; there was no discussion on the agenda items, and all business 
seemed to have been decided before the meeting. Resolutions were just ‘nodded through’. 
The Manchester Finance Committee accepted this procedure, despite having an experienced 
membership. In 1913, it comprised 8 aldermen and 13 councillors, four of whom, (2 aldermen 
and 2 councillors) had been knighted for their contributions to business. 
Although the Manchester Finance Committee was also responsible for holding all the account 
books on behalf of the Corporation, there is no evidence that the Committee made any attempt 
to check the bookkeeping practices in use in various departments of the Corporation. There 
seemed to be a tacit acceptance that despite the limitations of audit, if the books passed the 
scrutiny of the auditors there was no need to interfere.  It was also the practice in Manchester 
for major policy decisions about financial matters to be dealt with by the General Purposes 
Committee, a committee of the whole Council, or one of the standing Committees, not the 
Finance Committee.  After the 1885 extension of the boundaries of the municipality, which led 
to the incorporation of additional townships, the City rate varied across the municipality, and 
was not levied and collected by a single authority. It was a subcommittee of the General 
Purposes Committee chaired by Councillor James Hoy which produced the report on what 
was essentially a financial matter, and offered a solution to overcome the problem. 599 The 
issue of how to represent in the accounts the financial consequences of the purchase of large 
items of capital equipment which had been funded by loans from the LGB, was argued in the 
Gas committee. The protagonists were Alderman King, who was also the chairman of the Gas 
Committee and Councillor Murray, a member of the Committee and an accountant by 
profession. 600   
Findings and précis of Chapter Seven.  
 
This Chapter examines how and why the arrangements made by the two municipalities failed 
at almost every level to provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that financial 
management in the two municipalities was conducted with competence and integrity. The 
findings of this chapter do confirm the complexity of the accounts of the two municipalities by 
the late Victorian period. and the limitations of the expertise available to confirm their probity. 
                                               
601    James Hoy, a shirt manufacturer, was elected to Manchester Council in 1882. The report of the Subcommittee 
of the General Purposes Committee dealing with the equalisation of the rates was accepted at the meeting of the 
Council on 1 October 1884. 
600   Manchester Gas Committee had set up a Special Committee which met on several occasions in April 1889 to 
consider this matter. There was genuine disagreement about this issue should be resolved, with comments coming 
from both the Gas industry, and in professional accountancy journals.  
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It has identified however the consequences of the failure to take the basic step of checking 
the work of staff collecting payments for Council services such as Noar, Salford’s treasurer, 
which provided the opportunity for embezzlement. The chapter has examined the problem of 
‘keeping the books’ for the municipal trading operation to produce and sell gas. The analysis 
of the controversy in Manchester about how the account books of the Gas production 
operation should be kept, and the allegations that Samuel Hunter had been able to 
misrepresent the profitability of gas operation, provided evidence of the limitations of both 
financial expertise, but also the lack of agreement about how these accounts should be 
presented.  The discussion of the ‘history’ of audit in municipal government which examined 
why both Councils resisted the need to improve the systems of audit, noted that by the end of 
the nineteenth century both municipalities were employing professional auditors to assist 
elective auditors to carry out the audit of municipal accounts. The final section of the Chapter 
identified the absence of any mechanism for monitoring how resources were allocated and 
managed by the various Committees of the Councils in the two municipalities, noting that 
neither the Finance committee nor the Treasurer’s department had any part to play in carrying 
out this task.   
The final part of the thesis entitled ‘A reputation for corruption’ addresses the key question 
posed by this thesis. 
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Part Four-  A reputation for corruption? 
 
The aim of this part of the thesis to address the key question posed by this thesis: 
 
To what extent did the Councils of Manchester and Salford prove incapable of avoiding 
situations where both their competence and at times their morality were brought into 
question? 
 
The method employed in this part is to examine situations where critics identified that the 
behaviour of the Council, which had led to mismanagement, was not merely the result of 
incompetence or Council corruption. It argues this occurred when the language used by critics 
inferred or stated that the nature of an action taken by a Council was not in the interests of the 
community. This implied that the council were guilty of a breach of the compact between the 
governed and a government on which the system of governance of a municipality depended. 
In this situation the morality of the Councils was brought into question.  
 
Chapter Eight.  Morality and governance. 
 
Manchester and Salford councils were the arbiters of their own standards of conduct in 
discharging Council business. The aim of this chapter is to examine how the two Councils 
responded to a range of different situations which came to notice of critics where the behaviour 
of individuals lacked integrity or could be seen as corrupt, or the Council itself could be 
accused of misfeasance or even Council corruption. It argues that in these cases the 
maintenance of the reputation of the Council for integrity would only be possible if the Council 
took direct and open action to deal fully and ethically with these situations. The failure of the 
Councils to do this was seen by critics as bringing their morality into question. 
8.1 Condoning or covering up wrongdoing  
 
In the cases considered in this section, the allegations of the critics about the morality of the 
behaviour of the two Councils arose from the way the two Councils dealt with situations which 
were not necessarily of their own making. The first part of this section examines the extent to 
which the Councils were equivocal in sanctioning men who were guilty of behaviour which had 
previously been tolerated, but with the changing attitudes to the standards of integrity expected 
in public life, were guilty of veniality or corruption. It considers a number of examples of the 
fuzzy logic of the two councils where it appeared that the Council was sympathetic to their 
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situation. 601 The result was that the Councils either failed to implement any sanction; or, if 
they did, mitigated the severity of any penalty involved. It was this conduct, which was seen 
as a breach of trust by the Council, which led critics to infer that the Council was condoning 
corruption, and by failing to uphold the highest standards of behaviour, this was conduct which 
lacked morality. 
The prosecution of William Hepton for embezzlement revealed he had in effect been providing 
a private banking service for Alderman Grave, the Chairman of the Waterworks Committee 
and T.H.G Berrey, the Superintendent of the Department, for at least five years.602 He enabled 
both men to borrow money held in the Department which should have been banked.603 
Although there was  no evidence to suggest that either Grave or Berrey embezzled money 
belonging to the Corporation, no interest was charged or paid on these loans. Berrey’s duties 
included the supervision and weekly checking of Hepton’s accounts, which he had failed to 
do.604 Asked to comment on the findings of a Subcommittee looking into the embezzlement, 
he excused himself by stating he had placed too much confidence in Hepton and had ordered 
him to submit all the books, including the account books which recorded the unauthorised 
loans, to the auditor, but this had not happened. 605 An editorial in Manchester City News 
strongly criticised this defence, stating that it would require ‘an elastic morality’ to excuse his 
failure to check Hepton’s accounts because ‘he had confidence in him’. 606 The more serious 
offence alleged to have been committed by Berrey was ’that he allowed his own financial 
affairs to be mixed up with the funds of the department.  From May 1876 to December 1878, 
advances against salary made to him averaged £110 per month, (a sum which actually 
exceeded his salary.) The Subcommittee also noted that when he acted as a consultant to 
‘other authorities’ (who were not named), his expenses were paid, yet he had also claimed 
expenses from the Corporation.607 In 1879 he was found to have made several claims for 
expenses alleged to have been incurred in 1875, ‘long back-reckonings’ which were ‘most 
irregular.’ The Council meeting of 6 October 1880 received the recommendation from the 
Waterworks Committee that Berrey should continue in the post of ‘Indoor Superintendent’ and 
give up the outdoor superintendence which he undertook, with a salary reduced to £800 per 
                                               
601   ‘Fuzzy logic’ is used in the sense of accepting that there were different degrees of culpability. As a result, some 
breaches of the duty to act with competence and integrity when the offences involved had previously been tolerated 
were seen as more excusable, and therefore not deserving a penalty or a reduced penalty.  
602   An overview of the Hepton case is given in Section 4.4, p.78. 
603   The report of the auditor Mr Aldred was concerned with how the embezzlement was discovered and the 
Grave/Berrey involvement with Hepton. The Aldred report was presented to the Waterworks Committee on 27 April 
1880, was used as the basis for the subsequent report of the Subcommittee of the Waterworks Committee. 
604   Alderman Grave resigned from the Council with immediate effect. 
605   The Subcommittee of the Waterworks Committee, presented its report to the Council on 1 September 1880. 
606   Manchester City News, 17 July 1880, editorial p 4.  
607  Berrey had amassed detailed knowledge about water supply schemes. He had been a member of the 
Waterworks Department when the Longdendale reservoir scheme was being implemented by Manchester 
Corporation and was aware of the serious problems which had to be overcome during the implementation, and 
hence the subsequent management of the scheme.  
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annum.608 An amendment (by Councillor Lamb) that Berrey’s salary should not be reduced 
’because they must not look for absolute perfection in their older valued servants,’ also 
received little support. An editorial in Manchester City News on Saturday 9 October 1880, 
which noted the ‘not very creditable discussions on Mr Berrey’s future,’ strongly criticised the 
statement that if he were to be allowed to continue in the post of Indoor Superintendent at a 
reduced salary of £800, ‘he will have the satisfaction of feeling that his personal integrity is not 
called into question’. Berrey was also criticised by Councillor Walton Smith who pointed out 
that it was difficult to be sympathetic about an indiscretion which had lasted 5 years.609 Despite 
this, a motion by Councillor Harwood that the matter be referred back to the Waterworks 
Committee for further consideration, was passed on a vote of 28 for and 24 against. It was 
finally agreed at the Council meeting of 27 October 1880, that Berrey should continue in post 
with responsibilities limited to superintendence of the outdoor interests of the Waterworks 
Committee at a reduced salary of £800; an action which was seen as condoning wrongdoing. 
610  
The reports about two of the officers who were found guilty of corruption by using Council 
property for a private purpose show that the penalty of instant dismissal was mitigated by the 
action of the Council. 611. The Committee of the Manchester Cleansing Department asked the 
Council to pay W. D. Callison, who had been its Superintendent, but had been sacked for the 
offence, four months’ salary, ‘because of his long and satisfactory service.’ A motion in Council 
to dismiss C. L. Turner the Electrical Engineer of Salford, who was found guilty of have 
patenting and exploiting design work undertaken whilst he was in the employ of Salford 
Council, which the Council alleged he had stolen, was lost. He should have been dismissed, 
but was allowed to resign, giving three months’ notice. No further action was taken against 
Samuel Hunter for the additional offence of the unauthorised use of Council property. Despite 
the fact that he was serving a jail sentence for perjury and forgery, he attracted the sympathy 
of Salford Council. The sentence of a 5-year term of imprisonment with hard labour was said 
to be too severe for a matter which was his actual offence, commission-taking, which was not 
at that time a crime. 612 As Hunter had agreed to repay £10,000 to the Council in August 1889, 
                                               
608    This implausible proposal that he should continue in the role where he had been held responsible for the 
failure to supervise the financial dealings within the part of the Waterworks Department, and thereby failed to detect 
Hepton’s embezzlement, was rejected.  
609    Walton Smith, a pork butcher was elected to the Council in 1868. He was elected Alderman in 1883. 
610  His previous salary of £1,000 covered superintendence of both the indoor and outdoor interests of the 
Committee. Despite Berrey’s behaviour which clearly lacked integrity, he was good at his job, and this may have 
influenced the Council’s decision in mitigating the sanction which should have been dismissal. (See footnote 607). 
611  The allegations made about the behaviour of Hunter is considered in Section 4.3, p.69. Callison and Turner, 
and their use of Council property for a private purpose is discussed on p.74. Berrey’s behaviour is described in 
more detail above. (p.163). 
612   John Garrard, ‘The Salford Gas Scandal of 1887’, Manchester Regional History Review Volume II no 2 
(1988/9), pp.12-20 commented that in the Gas industry, the practice of paying commission to gas engineers was 
an accepted part of the contracting process.  
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the Council dropped all claims against him and any of his associates. A petition for his early 
release which was sent to the Home Secretary was signed by the Town Clerk and a majority 
of the Council. Although there was some support for this action in Salford, criticism, particularly 
in the Manchester press, was severe and was one of the main reasons the borough attracted 
the epithet of the ‘rotten borough.’ 613 614 
Berrey, Callison, Turner and Hunter shared a common background. All four had started as 
juniors, and had worked themselves up to positions of status, and were thought (before their 
offences came to light) to have carried out their jobs ‘to the great satisfaction of their 
employers.’ Their expertise meant that in general they had a free hand in carrying out their 
duties; using Council resources for private purposes seems to have been regarded as a ‘perk’ 
of their jobs.  As senior officials, all four expected a certain status, and the right to exploit their 
expertise and enjoy the privileges which they saw were due to their position, and which 
included membership of the ‘best Club’ in their respective towns.  By the late nineteenth 
century this latitude about how they carried out their duties was becoming unacceptable, and 
their actions were seen as veniality, or even corruption. It was clear from the reports that 
Callison and Hunter, as managers of large numbers of staff, saw no contradiction in diverting 
.one or two’ to undertake ‘private’ work and made no attempt to conceal their actions. Turner 
was apparently convinced of his right to protect what he saw as his design, but his attempt to 
conceal his action in patenting the design from the Electric Lighting Committee provided 
evidence that he knew he was acting corruptly. It is more difficult to understand the actions of 
Berrey and Grave who were experienced in Council procedures and should have realised that 
the existence of a large cash kitty in the Department pointed to irregularities in the 
management of the departmental finances. They both saw the use of the departmental ‘kitty’ 
as petty cash, available for any unexpected expenditure; but both must surely have realised 
that by their actions, they were in effect condoning the existence of unacceptable financial 
management practices. For critics the tenor of the criticism reflected the view that the Council, 
by effectively condoning this unacceptable conduct, was itself guilty of behaviour lacking 
morality.  
A further area which critics identified as an area where the Council condoned corrupt or venial 
practices, related to the failure to use the sanction of disqualification for Councillors guilty of 
                                               
613    For example, Salford Reporter, 24 August, 1889, editorial. The paper was a major critic of Councillor Mandley’s 
behaviour and his attitude to the conduct of Hunter. It supported the view that the punishment of Hunter was too 
severe. 
 614   Both Councils recognised embezzlement was corruption and there was no attempt to lessen the sanction of 
dismissal, or a punishment imposed by a Court. This is an exception. The sentence he had already received was 
seen to be too severe for what was seen actually seen to be actual Hunter’s offence, taking commission. It ignored 
the fact that he was actually sentenced for perjury and forgery. 
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insider trading.615 By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the defence against 
allegations of insider trading, ‘helping the Council out’ was increasingly seen as inappropriate. 
There was still a marked reluctance by the late Victorian period by both Manchester and 
Salford Councils to accept that insider trading did amount to corruption, but it was recognised 
that the actions were a breach of the provisions of section 12(1)(c) of the MCA1882. As a 
result, the attention of critics was directed towards why the sanction of disqualification set out 
in section12 was not applied.  As late as 1901, enquiry into the cases of three Salford 
councillors accused of insider trading, Corney, Haworth, and Huddart, had noted that all three 
had shown ‘a lack of scrupulous regard for their obligations as members of the Council,’616 
and were in breach of (1)(c) of the MCA 1882. The sanction of disqualification was not used.617  
Whilst there was a trend towards seeing insider trading as venial or even corrupt, the 
reputation of an offender could influence opinion about whether a sanction should be applied. 
Alderman King, who was allegedly ‘helping the Council out’. by purchasing from the Council, 
a by-product of the gas-making process, which could have been sold by tender for a higher 
price. This behaviour was illegal under the 1889 legislation.618 An editorial accepted that, 
although the transactions were ‘illegal,’ no one doubted Alderman King’s good faith, and most 
accepted that he had ‘erred but erred innocently,’ as he saw his actions were in the public 
interest. Because of his ‘long and laborious service to the Council’, shouldn’t it be sufficient for 
this to be acknowledged in open court? If this was done, it was argued the action should be 
abandoned and a regrettable incident brought to an ‘honourable and satisfactory close.’ The 
very considerable loss of income to the Corporation was not mentioned. Norbury Williams who 
made the original allegation of corruption, agreed. He stated that during the public meetings 
which he had arranged to gain support for his legal action to get access to the full accounts of 
the Council, there had been no support for the suggestion at Alderman King should be 
prosecuted. The matter was not discussed again.   
One factor which all the men who benefited from the Councils’ leniency had in common, and 
which was no doubt significant, was membership of the extended ‘family’ of the ‘best club in 
the Town’ in either Manchester or Salford.619  No councillors were disqualified from either 
Council for insider trading, and although those officials who were found guilty of using Council 
property for a private purpose usually lost their jobs, the mitigation of their punishment 
suggests that neither Council was willing to impose the full penalty on men who had been 
found guilty of behaviour which had been previously tolerated. The fact that the two Councils 
                                               
615   Insider trading and the use of the defence ’helping the Council out’ is considered in section 4.2, p.5. 
616  This statement inferred that whilst these men were clearly guilty under Section 12(1)(c) of the MCA, their 
offences which were committed under the aegis of the Council, brought the Council into disrepute  
617   The cases of the three councillors are. considered in Section 4.3, p.74. 
618   Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889.The main provision of the Act is given in Section 4.3, p.71. 
619   The ‘benefits’ of being a member of ‘the club’ are considered in Section 5.2, p.102. 
167 
were not using the full sanctions available to them in these cases was seen as condoning 
corruption, raising the inference that the morality of the two Councils was questionable.  
The second part of this section considers examples of behaviour where the committees of the 
two Councils or the Councils themselves withheld information from the public or 
misrepresented or underplayed the nature or significance of their actions. This situation 
usually occurred when a committee or the Council had embarked on a course of action or had 
taken a decision which was likely to lead to criticism.620 As most of these incidents were 
eventually reported, the lack of openness about what had happened, which was seen to be 
dishonest, intensified the criticism. There are a number of examples of this behaviour. Details 
of the Wilton House scheme undertaken by the Salford Health Committee which was to build 
an isolation facility, were withheld from the Council. The scheme went ahead without the 
agreement of the Council, both to the nature of the proposal and its costs.621 Joseph Scott’s. 
exposé of the behaviour of Manchester Council provided examples of this type of behaviour. 
When he examined the accounts of the Markets Committee, he found that payment had been 
for the printing of 10,000 leaflets with copies of a speech condemning the actions of the market 
traders, and their ‘unreasonable’ refusal to agree the tenancy contract offered to them by the 
Markets Committee, a contract which was not accepted even by the Council.622 Norbury 
Williams reported the cover-up of the gross mismanagement of a drainage scheme which 
badly carried out. 623  He stated that that the Rivers Committee were aware that there was a 
risk of a road collapsing, but had apparently taken no action to avert the possibility. The 
Council were not made aware of the problem until the road actually collapsed, 624 The 
dishonesty of attempting to withhold information from the public about mismanagement, a lack 
of openness, which was not challenged by the Councils, added to the perception that the 
morality of the Council was questionable. 
 
8.2. Attitudes to audit, - how the Council exercised their powers.625 
 
Chapter Seven gives the history of the slow progress of both municipalities in developing a 
more rigorous system of audit. By the late Victorian period, scrutiny of the accounts of the two 
municipalities was seen by critics as the most important method of assessing the probity of 
                                               
620   Section 5.3, p.106, discusses the problem of the dysfunctional relationship between the Council and its 
committees which could lead to this situation. 
621   The Wilton House scheme is considered in Section 9.2, p.173. 
622   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.45. Allegations of ’spying’ on the unemployed, behaviour 
lacking integrity, were also made about the Watch Committee. 
623   17 October 1886, p.5.  ‘An Elective Auditor’s notes.’ 
624   The matter was hushed up and not brought to the Council’s notice.  
625   The system of audit and the reasons why arguments about access to the full accounts of each municipality 
arose, are considered in Section 7.2, p.149. 
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the two Councils, and the attitude of the two Councils towards improving the rigour of the audit 
procedures was seen as a test of their intent to conduct Council business with integrity  
 A councillor in the late Victorian period saw himself as a part of the executive with powers as 
set out in the MCAs of 1835 and 1882. This legislation gave the Council the right to define and 
exercise the powers of the executive in accordance with the law. Many councillors believed 
that municipal Councils were a business, with the elected body of councillors having the role 
of Managing Directors, with the right to dictate the terms on which the business was 
conducted. This attitude was shown in the dealings of the two Councils with the auditors of 
the municipal accounts. Scott described the problems he had as an Elective auditor in gaining 
access to the account books of Manchester Council. He was required to obtain an order from 
the chairman of the relevant committee before he could inspect the account books.626 When 
he did inspect the invoice files he found that they had been edited to include only those 
invoices which were within the half yearly period when the Treasurer had to submit his 
accounts to the LGB; a totally unnecessary action, an example of Bumbledom 627  The 
commentary by Scott implied that this behaviour was behaviour lacking integrity. The probity 
of the accounts of a Council could only be established by an examination of all the account 
books including the ledgers of the various departments. Whether it was the result of the 
damning nature of Scott’s findings or a lack of enterprise by subsequent Elective auditors, 
both Councils refused to accept the need for the professional and the Elective auditors in both 
municipalities to see all the account books of the various departments of the Council. This led 
to the situation in the late 1880s, when there was a regular exchange between the Elective 
auditors in both Councils who asked to see all the account books of the municipality, and the 
Councils who refused. The attitude of Salford Council was expressed in Councillor Holland’s 
statement that he was not in favour of an Elective auditor being able to ’wade through every 
one of the private accounts of Council.’628 The frustration of William Hunt, Salford’s Elective 
auditor, who had made a request for access to these books led him to ask; ’What are the 
private accounts of a public body? What are its characteristics? 629 The attitude of both 
Councils was that the need to audit more than just receipts and vouchers was not a 
requirement of the 1882 MCA, and they had the right therefore to refuse access to these 
books, but critics inferred that the Councils must have ‘something to hide’ and their behaviour 
lacked integrity and brought their morality into question...630  For critics, compliance with the 
                                               
626   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’ Auditor, p.8. 
529   Ibid., p.3.This was the period prescribed by the MCA 1882 which Scott was to audit and technically the Council 
met the. requirements of the MCA s.27 but the action did smack of petty mindedness. 
628   Manchester City News, 5 February 1898, Proceedings of Salford Council, p.6.  
629   Ibid.,5 January 15th 1898. Letter, p.5. 
630   The matter was not settled until the Court decision in 1898. The ruling in the case of Thomas v Devonport, 
was reported in Manchester City News, on 3 December 1898.   
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requirement for improved standards of integrity involved greater openness about how 
municipal business was conducted. Whilst the Victorian Council did accept the need for 
accountability, the thesis has identified that there were limits to the extent to which Council 
saw it necessary to make fuller information available to the public about the conduct of Council 
business. Victorian Councils were not unique in trying to supress information which reflected 
badly on their reputation for competence. It was however inevitable that at a time when 
exposure in the local weekly press drew attention to the actions of the two Councils in 
condoning misfeasance or corruption and attempting to cover-up incidents of 
mismanagement, this behaviour was seen by critics as a deliberate policy to withhold 
information about the conduct of the Councils from the public, leading to inferences that the 
morality of the Councils was questionable. 
 Findings and précis of Chapter Eight 
 
The findings of this chapter identified a pattern of behaviour arising from the failure of the two 
Councils to deal with allegations made about how they had handled cases of misconduct by 
councillors or officials, or instances where the behaviour of an individual member of the 
Council or a committee of the Council itself was found to be unacceptable. The failure to take 
action against those guilty of this behaviour led to allegations that the Councils themselves 
were failing to uphold the high standards of integrity expected of a municipal Council, and this 
was behaviour which lacked morality. The first section of the chapter provided two examples 
where this allegation was valid, the condoning of the actions of councillors or officials who 
were guilty of venial or even corruption, and the failure to take action when there were 
deliberate attempts by councillors or officials to withhold information from the public which 
would reflect badly on the reputation of the Council. for competency and integrity. The second 
section of the chapter noted the way the Council dealt with allegations about the probity of 
accounts of the two municipalities. The failure of the two Councils to provide the Elective 
auditors access to all the account books of the Council inevitably raised the possibility that the 
Council must have something to hide. The findings of this research suggest that all this 
behaviour in this chapter was identified by critics as the means of covering up the 
consequences of corruption, rather than dealing with its causes for example by sanctioning 
wrong doing, or providing full access to the account books of the municipality. The result was 
that the conduct of the two councils was seen to lack morality. 
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Chapter Nine- The interests of the community. 
 
This chapter examines evidence which suggests that some the decisions of the two Councils 
were seen to run contra to the interests of the community, an implied duty which an elected 
Council had a responsibility to defend. This chapter argues that the evidence of these cases 
supports the view that the conduct of the council whether seen as misfeasance or council 
corruption not in the interests of the community was therefore conduct lacking morality. 
 
9.1. Mismanagement. The unquestionable right to make decisions. 
 
The difficult relationship between the Council and its committees could produce perverse 
decisions about the conduct and requirements of implementing or managing Council services 
or projects. The result was that reasonable proposals about the priority and conduct of 
important schemes made by a committee could be vetoed by the Council. Conversely, 
problems could arise from the pursuit of a project by a committee made without the agreement 
of the Council. The ultimate responsibility for all actions, whether by the council itself or by one 
of its committees was however vested in the Council The common ‘thread’ of the cases in this 
section is that critics, whether alleging misfeasance or Council corruption, implied or stated 
that the Council were not acting in the interests of the Community, an allegation which brought 
the morals of the Council into question. 
The first cases consider the situation where the Council effectively vetoed schemes planned 
by a Committee. Salford Council delegated to its General Baths Committee the task of 
developing a programme to implement the Council policy of increasing the provision of public 
baths in the municipality.  After discussions in Council, the Committee threatened to resign, 
claiming that their advice was continually ignored for no good reason, because of the ill-
founded objections about the location of the new facilities from members of the Council.631  In 
this case the Council was effectively vetoing the scheme. 632. A critical editorial in Salford 
Weekly News633  commented that the Committee should be able to count on the Council’s 
support in carrying out the remit, albeit accepting comment and criticism about the detail of 
any proposed scheme. The editorial concluded that the Council’s veto was unreasonable, and 
                                               
631   An example of ‘NIMBY’- -not in my back yard? 
632   Garrard, Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Towns, p.72, noted the very poor relationship between 
the Baths Committee and Salford Council. He cited the comment of Councillor W. H. Bailey, the vice-chairman of 
the Committee in 1878 who stated that he was ‘about as happy as a toad under a harrow.’ 
633   Salford Weekly News, 8 September 1877, editorial, p,2. 
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by delaying an important scheme (and possibly increasing costs), the Council was treating the 
Committee shamefully’, an inference that the Council was guilty of mismanagement and their 
behaviour lacked morality. 
There were however occasions where a scheme which had been properly planned by a 
Committee was delayed, because the Council prevaricated about making the final decision to 
set in motion the necessary programme of work, despite strong public support for the work to 
be undertaken. Manchester Waterworks Committee had used expert advice to produce a full 
specification of a scheme to increase the supply of water to the municipality by building a 
reservoir at Thirlmere in the Lake District. The Council initially accepted the strong advice from 
technical experts that implementation of the necessary work should not be delayed. 
Preliminary steps had been taken to obtain Parliamentary approval for the Thirlmere scheme 
and the necessary land purchases were undertaken in the late 1870s. The private ‘Thirlmere’ 
Act finally received the Royal assent in 1879, but the Committee’s advice, to set in motion the 
programme to start the building of the reservoir was ignored by the Council. This perverse 
decision was justified by arguments in Council led by Alderman King, that the programme of 
work needed was costly, and there was no immediate need for additional water.  The result 
was that Thirlmere reservoir scheme, which should have been seen as a priority for 
Manchester Corporation, suffered years of delay, even though a ratepayer’s ballot 
demonstrated overwhelming support for its early implementation. John Grave’s passionate 
arguments, supported by evidence about the need for the scheme, failed to carry weight in 
the Council.634  An editorial, which reflected the general feeling of the public, noted that, as the 
lead time for implementing such a project could be 10 years, there was a need for immediate 
decision by the Council to get the project underway.  The editorial stated that:  
There is no necessity of life and health which so imperatively demands, not merely 
constant watchfulness to prevent waste and augment storage capacities, but also 
promptitude and even daring, in the provision of enlarged sources of supply of water 
635         
 
Sir John Harwood, defending the delay, argued that as well as the cost of the scheme, there 
was a downturn in demand for water from industry as Manchester was suffering a trade 
depression during the early part of the 1880s, and in the early years of the decade there was 
plenty of rain.636 It is a moot point whether Alderman King and later Sir John Harwood, who 
                                               
634   John Grave, a calico printer by trade, was elected to Manchester Council in 1856 and was elected alderman 
in 1862.He served as Mayor for 3 years 1868-9,1869-70, and 1870-71. He was implicated in the 1880 Manchester 
Waterworks ‘Hepton’ scandal, (which is described in Section 4.4, p.78), and as a result resigned from the Council 
in 1880.His career is also considered in Section 6.3 p.126. 
635   Manchester City News, 19 December 1884, editorial, p.4.  The scheme was eventually started in 1886.   
636   Sir John J. Harwood, whose occupation was given as ‘Painter and decorator’ was elected to Manchester 
Council in 1866 and was elected Alderman in1881. He served as Mayor in 1884-5 and 1887-8. He was chairman 
of the Waterworks Committee and he was a major supporter of the Thirlmere scheme. He was knighted in 1889. 
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became Chairman of the Waterworks Committee were unduly influenced by business 
associates, who saw the scheme as necessitating large loans, with the result that there could 
be a consequent increase in expenditure by the Council, and increases in the rates.  The 
situation changed in 1886 when there was a drought, and water supplies had to be restricted; 
only then was agreement given by the Council to start the scheme.  There were more serious 
droughts in the years 1887 and 1888, when water supplies had to be rationed. Domestic 
supplies had to be cut off overnight, and water supplies to mills had to be restricted.  Attempts 
to expedite the completion of the scheme within five years were frustrated and as a result, 
water shortages persisted. 637 Thirlmere water was not available until 1894.  The Thirlmere 
scheme is rightly described as an engineering triumph and the increased availability of water 
enabled important sanitary reforms to be introduced.638 The criticism of the Council was 
however warranted; the failure of the Council to recognise the long lead time needed to 
complete the scheme and the delay in implementation, were clearly against the wishes of the 
public, and meant that progress in the public health field in Manchester and surrounding 
districts was put back. 639  Despite praise for the technical achievement of completing the 
Thirlmere project, an editorial in Manchester City News headed ‘Thirlmere at last’, commenting 
on the ‘wasted years,’ noted that it was 16 years since J.F. Bateman had advised the 
Corporation that the extension of the Waterworks was essential, and the increases in the 
Longdendale supply would not be sufficient.  The editorial stated that 'to place a town by 
neglect in danger of so great a calamity is something worse than a blunder– it is a reckless 
disregard of moral responsibility’.640 
The second situation where mismanagement could occur was when a committee claimed 
autonomy, and thus the right to determine when and how to carry out schemes referred to it 
by the Council.   A minor skirmish occurred when Manchester Council referred a scheme to 
provide a bridge over the River Medlock to its Improvement Committee. The Committee 
referred the matter back to the Council for reconsideration, on the grounds that the funds were 
not available to meet the estimated costs of the scheme. The Council sent the scheme back 
to the Committee, stating that this plea was not acceptable; if there was a money problem, the 
Council should be asked to provide the funds. Alderman Grundy, the Chairman of the 
                                               
In his book, History and Description of the Thirlmere Water Scheme (Manchester: Henry Blacklock & Co.,1895), 
p.167, he gives details of the battle to get the Thirlmere scheme approved, and the problems of undertaking the 
development. He explained why he felt it was correct to delay the scheme; he stated that it was not a good time to 
go forward with a very expensive scheme like Thirlmere at a time of a business recession.  
637    One of the builders became bankrupt and had to withdraw from the scheme; there were also problems with 
the quality of some of the early building work etc. 
638    For example, after Thirlmere water became available, it enabled the requirement that water closets should be 
installed in all new build properties to be introduced. 
639   Sheena D. Simon, A century of City Government, Manchester, p.353, who was not usually critical about 
Manchester municipal government, referred to the Council as ‘procrastinating for 10 years’ over starting the 
scheme. 
640   Manchester City News, 10 January,1894, editorial, p.4. 
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Improvement Committee, resigned, as he felt this showed a ‘want of confidence’ in his 
judgement and advice. The Manchester City News clearly saw this as a battle of wills between 
the Council and a Committee which considered itself to be autonomous.  It noted that:  
the chairman and committee members may have different opinions to the Council, but the 
committee are executive officers.  It may not be a pleasant thing to have to carry out the 
will of others in opposition to one’s own judgement but to have to do so is imperative in all 
representative executives. 641 
There were other schemes where there was little or no support for actions proposed by a 
committee. Salford Council delegated to its Health Committee in December 1875, the task of 
considering possible schemes to provide an isolation hospital.  An epidemic of smallpox had 
broken out in the borough, a disease where isolation of victims was already recognised as a 
way of controlling its spread. As the borough had no facilities for isolating sufferers, there was 
public pressure for a ‘quick fix’ to the problem. The Committee acted unilaterally. Without 
considering more cost effective and readily achievable solutions, and in the absence of any 
agreement with the Council, the Committee agreed to purchase a large empty property on 
Cross Lane, known as Wilton House, for the purpose of converting it into a permanent Hospital 
for infectious diseases. 642 The suggestion was greeted by critics with incredulity; the Cross 
Lane site, which  was near the Gasworks, the Cattle market and the main railway network, 
was noisy and polluted, and the property was condemned as unsuitable. 643  An editorial in 
Salford Chronicle on 25 March 1876 which hoped that common sense would prevail, referred 
to the Wilton Hospital project as:  
a ridiculous blunder and an extravagant and wasteful expense. In less time and less 
cost, a properly constructed and permanent isolation hospital could be completed.644 
Although Salford Chronicle kept up the pressure to get the scheme cancelled, the Council 
accepted the Committee’s proposal with great reluctance, stating it was committed to carrying 
out the project. 645  The scheme went ahead without a specification of the work to be 
undertaken and proper costings. Specialist expertise to examine the fabric of the building was 
not used; no provision was made for the remedial work necessary to remove the dry rot, which 
was discovered when the work to upgrade the building was started.  The result was that a 
project which had a budget of £10,000, actually cost £16,000.646  It was not completed until 
                                               
641   Ibid., March 26th 1881, editorial, p.4. 
642   The chairman of the Salford Health Committee, Alderman Walmesley, was a surgeon.  
643...Salford Chronicle,1 April 1876, editorial, p.2, described the scheme as ‘Hastily and crudely conceived, 
precipitately commenced …. whilst universally condemned’. 
644   Ibid., March 26th   1876, editorial, p.2.  
645...The Council were informed that the Committee had made a ‘commitment’ to purchase the building. No 
information was given about who owned the building or the purchase price. As the Council had not seen and 
approved the Committee minutes, there could have been no legal commitment to purchase the property. 
646   The LGB Inspector had refused to grant the loan of £10,000 requested by the Council as the budget for the 
scheme, approving instead a loan of £2,000 for the provision of ‘temporary accommodation’. Despite this, the 
Council went ahead with the full scheme.  
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the smallpox epidemic was well- past its peak.647  Although the role of the Committee was 
identified and criticised, it was Council itself which was blamed for mismanaging the project 
by its failure to control the actions of its committee.  In an editorial in Salford Chronicle about 
the Wilton House scheme, the editor had no doubt where the blame declaring that: 
the Council should state whether they consider themselves justified in spending 
several thousand pounds merely because the Health Committee had made a mistake. 
648 
Occasionally it was the policies of a committee which managed routine public services which 
were in conflict with the policy of the Council. This was the situation in a case involving the 
Markets Committee of Manchester Corporation. The exclusive rights of the Corporation to hold 
markets resulted in a series of legal challenges in the 1870s and 1880s, concerning the 
Committee and the market tenants over the charges payable for the use of a market stall. The 
Committee, represented by its Chairman J. Foulkes Roberts, wanted to charge a rent, and in 
addition a toll, which was based on the value of the goods sold and the number of days the 
goods were displayed. 649   These were the charges made when the market rights were held 
by the Mosley family as Lords of the Manor. There was no reason given for the Committee’s 
pursuit of this policy. The Council, which wanted to see an end to damaging publicity, tried to 
persuade the Committee to negotiate a settlement using a simpler ‘rent only’ system. It failed; 
an illustration of the degree of autonomy which the Markets Committee had, which allowed 
the Committee and specifically its chairman to pursue a reactionary policy without sanction.  It 
was left to the Courts in 1883 to agree with the traders that the Council had no powers to use 
the ‘old’ system. A final settlement of the dispute was not made until 1884. Joseph Scott was 
scathing about the affair. Noting that the Market Committee had ‘finally’ made peace with the 
traders, he stated that  
It may truly be said this committee went diametrically counter to the express wishes of 
the Council and the ratepayers. The total amount of money expended in this agitation 
will perhaps never be known.650   
Although the cases of mismanagement considered in this section are concerned with very 
different situations, they have features in common. All these cases were the result of the 
dysfunctional relationship between the Councils and their committees. The decisions which 
                                               
647   Salford Chronicle, 12 May 1877, p.2: Letter ‘JM,’ who stated that the final cost of the scheme was £16,000.  
648   Ibid., 4 March 1876, editorial p.2. 
649   Manchester Faces and Places, Volume 8, 1897, p.89. J. Foulkes Roberts was a merchant who founded a firm 
with headquarters in Portland Street. He was a deacon in the Congregational church, who took a particular interest 
in educational matters and Sunday school work He resigned as Chair of the Markets Committee in 1897 when he 
was elected Lord Mayor. He was referred to as ‘having a practical business-like mind,’ and ‘Never a showy 
speaker,’ or ‘one inclined to court popularity.’ He certainly courted publicity and opprobrium in the way he handled 
the ‘markets’ negotiations.  
650   Scott, Leaves from the Diary of a Citizens’, pp 45-6. Scott went on to list some of the major items of expenditure, 
including the refund to the tenants of £5,323 ‘illegally taken from them’; the costs of the Lawlor Brothers action; 
£509/14/02 and ‘Legal and other expenses’ of £1,582/18/10.  
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were made, whether by one of the Councils or by a Council committee, were random and bad 
decisions made without any thought of the consequences. This type of behaviour, 
misfeasance, was the result of incompetence or ignorance. A further feature in common is that 
these cases identified as a duty; the need for the actions of the Council to safeguard the 
interests of the community. The identification by critics of the failure to do this in the cases 
conduct described, suggests that critics regarded the behaviour of the two Councils as lacking 
morality. 
 
9.2.  Mismanagement by mismanagement  
 
 The failure of the municipalities of Manchester and Salford to develop an effective 
management structure was considered in Section 6.4. p.133. It noted that the commercial 
experience of many councillors fostered a belief that their business expertise was needed both 
by serving as a member of the Council in making policies about council services and 
developments but was also needed in Committees to ensure the delivery of Council services 
or projects was properly managed. This led de facto to a policy of ‘management by committee’ 
where the Committee itself took over the management of the services or projects remitted to 
it by the Council. This section examines a number of the building projects undertaken in 
Manchester and Salford where mismanagement occurred.  Many of these schemes were 
major schemes to provide increased facilities for public use and the progress (or otherwise) of 
the construction was open to public interest and inspection, and press comment. The cases 
described in this section which were all reported between 1886 and 1898, also bring out the 
importance that critics attached to the need for the behaviour of the Councils to protect the 
wider interest of the community. The inference to be drawn from the failure to do this is that 
the Councils were seen to lack morality  
An exposé by Manchester Ratepayers’ Association. published in 1886, revealed details of a 
scheme managed by Manchester Improvement Committee where the costs of a scheme 
exceeded the initial estimate of costs by a factor of four. The details of the how the project 
was carried out were given in six weekly reports. headed Victoria Hotel: The Spending of 
100,000. 651  At the time of this report, the final costs of the development were not known, but 
Norbury Williams in 1890 suggested that a more realistic costing of the scheme was £120,000. 
652 The Council’s decision to take on and manage the project to complete the partially built 
hotel, the ‘Victoria’ had been seen to be in the interest of ratepayers but was certainly beyond 
                                               
651   The six reports of the Manchester Ratepayer’s Association appeared in Manchester City News during April 
and May 1886. 
652   S. Norbury Williams, Manchester Examiner and Times, 12 April 1890. Letter. 
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the Council’s experience and competence.  653  The Ratepayers’ reports, which provide a 
‘blow-by-blow’ account of the conduct of this project, revealed that mismanagement occurred 
at every stage of the development, and showed that the Improvement Committee had lost 
control of the project, which was being largely driven by the demands for additional work made 
by the future tenant, a Mr McGregor. The initial estimated cost of the project (£25,000) which 
was taken from an unsigned letter from the architect, was not confirmed; and all negotiations 
relating to the rent to be paid by the tenant of the hotel were carried out by the Chairman of 
the Improvement Committee, Alderman Grundy.  He failed to use a formula which allowed for 
the full cost of additions to the scheme to be taken into account in fixing the rent. 654  The 
Ratepayers’ Association stated that the tendering process was not always used to purchase 
equipment, and that decisions on a large number of expensive additions to the scheme were 
approved retrospectively. Their report noted that although the Council were ultimately 
responsible for the overspending on the scheme, the Improvement Committee was 
responsible for: ‘all the works and expenditure’ in connection with the Victoria Hotel.…the 
gentlemen named in it are jointly and severally responsible for all errors committed during their 
period of office.’  
The legal documents prepared by the Town Clerk’s department, called in to deal with only 
certain aspects of the tenancy agreement, resulted in the meaning of some parts of the total 
documentation being ambiguous.655 The Borough Surveyor’s department was not given 
overall responsibility for managing the scheme, and was consulted only about a limited 
number of issues. As the Council did not appoint a Clerk of Works, it seemed that the 
Committee relied on the architect to provide progress reports, and any problems which had 
occurred. The main criticism of the Council was the failure to appoint a qualified manager for 
the project and to set up a system for monitoring and controlling the spending. It was reported 
that if the tenant required any additions to the scheme, he told the architect, who told the 
Improvement Committee who approved the spending. 656 The result was that the tenant 
outmanoeuvred Grundy and the Committee on a number of occasions by demanding and 
getting approval for costly additions to the contract, sometimes retrospectively.657  
                                               
653   Manchester City News,13 September 1884, editorial, p.4. stated that the Council had acted in a ‘straightforward 
and praiseworthy manner with the sole object of making desirable improvements for the city’.  
654   There is no record in the reports about the formula used to calculate the rent, which was apparently agreed by 
Alderman Grundy. The statement made by the Ratepayer’s Association report was not challenged. 
655   There was, for example confusion about what constituted furnishings which were not included in the contract, 
and fittings, which were.  
656   In the absence a project manager, with the necessary expertise to supervise the scheme, the architect had a 
free hand in determining the spending, and as his fees were determined by the spending, his fees increased.   The 
Victoria Hotel scheme was being undertaken at a time when the professional standards of architects were 
questioned. and criticised. (Clifton Professionalism in public service in Victorian London). 
657   Major additional features were added to the scheme, including the provision of a basement plant room for two 
boilers, the inclusion of electric lighting, fireplaces in rooms, (although the building was centrally heated), mosaic 
floors etc. The boiler scheme was a disaster. A duplicate order was placed for the pipe work; and the Corporation 
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The behaviour of the Council, and in particular the degree of overspending on the scheme, 
led to vigorous critical press comment.   A letter from ‘Sapresti’ which had appeared in the 
Manchester City News before the Ratepayers report, criticised the overspend on the Victoria 
Hotel scheme, and cited a dozen other schemes, where it was alleged that mismanagement 
by Council Committees had resulted in losses of ‘tens of thousands of pounds’, He went on to 
state that ‘it was the duty of each citizen to interest himself in how it, (the overspend), 
happened’. 658  Sapresti also commented that if there was illegality,’ someone must be to 
blame,’ and asked why, when the Corporation had a legal establishment costing £6,000 per 
annum, ‘these terrible blunders persisted.’ Whilst the critical attacks were directed at the 
mismanagement by the Council it was unusual for suggestions to be made that there should 
be a change to the constitution of the municipality when mismanagement occurred. ‘The ‘lack 
of information’ and ‘the reluctant and evasive replies to enquiries,’ led correspondent WM to 
comment, ‘I am for local government but doubt whether we can be any worse off in the matter 
if we were under the management of the Local Government Board’, a sign of real desperation 
about the lack of accountability of Council committees for their actions. 659   These were serious 
criticisms which recognised that the mismanagement of the Victoria Hotel project by 
Manchester Council was unacceptable, and by following a policy of taking over the 
management of Committee business by ‘knowingly and consistently using an unreasonable 
practice or policy in the conduct of Council business which did not conform to the implied duty 
to act with competence and integrity,’ the Council were guilty of Council corruption. Although 
the words ‘Council corruption’ were not used by critics, this is the inference of the criticism, 
which also suggested that by taking on the project which had been seen to be in the interests 
of the community and totally failing to provide proper management, (for example by appointing 
a project manager),and the catalogue of mismanagement, the Council were guilty of a breach 
of trust, with the inference that the behaviour lacked morality.  Four years after this exposé, 
Norbury Williams, in a letter to the press, noting on the lax way the Victoria Hotel scheme had 
been managed, also stated that’ bribery and corruption ‘prevailed to a large extent in two, if 
not three departments of the Corporation.’ 660 ’ It is not clear whether these two statements 
                                               
were sued by a wine merchant who alleged that the boilers, adjacent to his wine store, ruined his wine. To avoid 
future problems, the Council agreed to pay for the boilers to be lagged. The Borough Surveyor estimated the work 
undertaken was worth £353, but the Council paid £550 to the contractor for work, which the Ratepayers’ Association 
estimated could have been carried out for £200. 
658   Manchester City News, 27 June 1885, p.5: Letter. Sapresti. The letter writer, who was not identified, gave a 
list of the costs of schemes where he alleged Council monies had been wasted. Many were small and were carried 
out apparently from the 1820s onward. The knowledge that he had about Council schemes suggests that he must 
have served on the Council or been a senior officer in the municipality. 
659   Manchester City News, 27 June 1885 p.5: Letter WM.  Changing the constitution of the municipality was an 
extreme action!  
660   Manchester Examiner and Times, 12 April 1890. Letter: Samuel. Norbury Williams. The statement led the 
Council to sue Norbury Williams for libel. The outcome of this case is discussed in Section 3.1, p.33. 
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were connected; Norbury Williams provided no evidence to substantiate this allegation of 
corruption. 
Building schemes which were undertaken during the 1880s were carried out at a time when 
there were there were no agreed professional standards for either architects or builders, and 
corruption by architects had received national publicity. 661 Although there were hints that the 
architect in the Victoria Hotel scheme inflated the costs of the project by adding extra features 
to the specification of the work to be undertaken, there was no mention in the Ratepayers’ 
report about problems with the builder.   The evidence suggests of this research suggests that 
both Councils suffered problems because of the poor professional standards of architects and 
poor workmanship by the builders involved in Councils schemes.  
 
Publicity about the mismanagement of the ‘Victoria Hotel’ project and publication of the 
Ratepayers’ reports were given prominence in the press in both Manchester and Salford. 
Despite the clear conclusion that the failure to appoint a project manager was a major reason 
for the resulting mismanagement, neither Manchester nor Salford Councils learnt from this 
lesson. Problems arose with a project undertaken by Manchester Corporation in 1893 to build 
artisan accommodation in Ancoats, where the press reports revealed that no project manager 
had been appointed by the Council.662 An editorial in Manchester City News headed ‘The 
building mistakes of the City’ noted the ‘difficulties’ with the scheme, which were originally 
reported in a letter alleging that cheaper material was being used for the flooring of the 
building, instead of the material specified in the plans.  The report to the Council about the 
scheme from Alderman Walton Smith, who was supported by Alderman Clay, denied any 
substitution had been made. 663 Three months later, Walton Smith confessed to an ‘error’, and 
Alderman Clay stated he had been ‘labouring under a misapprehension;’ there had been a 
substitution of a different material, but as an architect was employed on the scheme, the 
substitution ‘was nothing to do with the committee.’ 664’ There was a long argument in Council 
about who was responsible for this situation; the discussion did recognise the City Surveyor’s 
department had not been fully involved in the scheme, and it emerged that the Clerk of 
                                               
661   Clifton, Professionalism, Patronage and Public Service in Victorian London: p.167.  
662   A belated response of the Council to the need to tackle the problems of dealing with the overcrowded slums 
of the City. This scheme was designed to meet the duties which the Artisans Dwelling Act, 1890.imposed on 
Council. 
663   Manchester City News, 8 July 1893, editorial, p.4.  Alderman Clay, who joined Manchester Council in 1882, 
was Chairman of the Improvement Committee and Alderman Walton Smith was Chairman of the Sanitary 
Committee. This project was a joint effort between the two committees. 
664   The failure of the two chairmen, whose committees were jointly responsible for managing this project, to provide 
the Council with accurate information about this issue, particularly as Alderman Clay was a builder, is an indication 
of the inadequacy of arrangements. made by the Committees to manage this scheme. 
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Works665 who had been appointed by the architect, did not know about the substitution either. 
Instead of addressing the need for Committees involved in building schemes to ensure that a 
qualified person was appointed to watch the Council’s interests, discussions centred on how 
to provide advice to Committees involved in building schemes which did not have any 
members with building expertise. There was no suggestion that the Borough Surveyor’s 
Department should be fully involved in building projects.  
In an 1893 scheme to build a technical school in Peel Park, a prestigious project for the Salford 
Technical Education Committee, the Council did not appoint a project manager, instead there 
is evidence that the commissioning Committee saw itself as having a very wide remit to 
manage and supervise the building scheme.666  A report which appeared in 1893, commented 
about the ‘difficulties’ which had delayed the completion of the building work. 667 One ‘minor’ 
problem with the standard of the brickwork, had been identified when members of the 
Committee visited the site. The report noted that Councillor Yearnshaw, (a baker and flour 
dealer by trade) had challenged the specification drawn up by the architect for the gaps 
between tiles on the vertical columns of the building which he said should be 3/16 ‘’ not 5/16, 
although it had been agreed that this would not affect stability of the columns. Yearnshaw’s 
intervention into a matter which was clearly within the province of the architect was not 
questioned. There had also been a delay in obtaining the Ruabon terra cotta blocks which 
were used in the building. The 1893 report did not allocate blame for this problem, but the 
scheme was delayed for several months. When an investigation of overspending by Salford 
Council was carried out in 1894, the cost of the Salford Technical College scheme was said 
to have exceeded budget by £20,000, a cost that had been met by the Council. 
The competence of the committees of Salford Council to undertake building and public health 
schemes was also attacked when dry rot was found in the Ladywell Sanatorium, which was 
opened in June 1892, a scheme which had been managed by the Health Committee. The 
problem was reported at the Council meeting held in July 1897, when it was stated that the 
Corporation were seeking ‘amicable’ arrangements to share the costs of making good the 
defects of the scheme with the architect and builder who had been appointed to carry out the 
development.668 Both denied responsibility by arguing that a Clerk of Works had been 
                                               
665...It was more usual for the ‘customer,’ the Council, to appoint the Clerk of Works, to ensure that the 
implementation of the scheme (including the materials used) complied with the contract. No reason was given for 
the departure from usual practice. 
.666   Manchester City News 8 July 1893, p.5. ‘Topics of the Week. The development of a Technical School, a 
prestigious project, had been criticised as costly and unnecessary This may account for why the Committee 
attempted to closely monitor this project. 
667   Manchester City News, 10 October 1894, p.5, ‘Topics of the Week, The article, written after the building had 
been completed and the 1894 overspend of the Salford Council budget had been identified, asked whether the 
Ratepayers would agree that the spending was sensible, ‘because the new building was less than three miles for 
the large Manchester Technical college, which could have provided the necessary facilities.’   
668    Salford Chronicle, 10 July 1897. Meeting of Salford Council, p.5.   
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employed by the Corporation to protect its interests. The Council reacted forcibly to these 
replies; the opinion expressed was that that the problem must have been the result of faulty 
workmanship. There was agreement in Council that it was not reasonable to suggest that the 
blame resulted from the failure of the Clerk of Works to detect a building problem which most 
likely resulted from the poor professional standards of the architect and/or the builder.  
Comments included that it was extraordinary it that ‘good’ firms should require an officer of 
the Council to watch that they did a satisfactory job. The Town Clerk brushed aside objections 
to his opinion that it was unlikely the Council would have an action for negligence against 
either party.  Not surprisingly, members of the Health Committee took the view that the 
responsibility did not lie with the Committee; poor workmanship was self-evident, and the 
decision of the Town Clerk not to take action was ‘monstrous.’ It is not clear why the Town 
Clerk failed to get an independent report from a professional architect and builder to provide 
an opinion about liability for the problem, but the five-year delay before the fault became 
apparent was thought to have weakened Salford’s case for compensation. The Town Clerk’s 
reluctance might also have been triggered by the fact that the problems had arisen because 
the Committee had undertaken the role of managing the scheme, and the Clerk of Works 
appointed by the Council had been sacked for dereliction of duties. The attitude of the Council, 
was that that the problem had arisen because of poor workmanship of the architect and the 
builder, but despite the committee’s protests the view of the Town Clerk was accepted by the 
Council which accepted the cost of the necessary repairs (£2,000).  
The précis of the findings of this Chapter will be considered as a part of the findings of the 
whole thesis in Chapter Ten. 
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Chapter Ten. Conclusions 
The thesis has been a contextualised study of government in the two urban municipalities of 
Manchester and Salford in the late-Victorian period when social problems of overpopulation 
and urban squalor were the major concern. It has analysed the conduct of municipal 
government during this period and the extent to which the services provided by the two 
Councils were seen to meet the needs of the public. The central focus has been on how far 
the two councils proved capable of avoiding situations where both their competence and even 
their morality were brought into question. 
 
10.1 Final thoughts  
Little substantial research has hitherto been carried out to investigate the extent to which, as 
a result of the increased demands on the resources of municipalities, and failures to meet 
local expectations of integrity, criticism which could be expressed as allegations or inferences 
of corruption, misfeasance or mismanagement, increased.  
The constitution of both authorities was based on the provisions of the Municipal Corporations 
Act 1835, (MCA1835), re adopted in the 1882 legislation. The purpose of the Act was to reform 
the constitutions of the 168 existing municipal corporations. Parliament clearly saw it expedient 
to include a provision to allow boroughs like Manchester and Salford the opportunity to obtain 
incorporation, and set up a system of governance using the template provided by the Act. The 
legislation was a compromise. Whilst it preserved the principle of local self-government by 
including arrangements for the powers delegated by Parliament to a municipality to be 
exercised by a democratically elected council, it neglected to provide adequate powers to deal 
with the problems of squalor in urban boroughs like Manchester and Salford. The research 
has shown that by the 1830s both boroughs were already undertaking schemes to improve 
the environment, and the need to massively expand this task was self-evident. The template 
for the constitution of a municipality included to implement the 1835 legislation, failed to 
recognise the enormous expansion both in the diversity of duties and the increased spending 
which municipal governments would need to undertake. As a result, there was no requirement 
to develop an administration which would oversee the management and coordination of 
Council services. The 1882 MCA made no changes to the terms for the constitution of a 
municipality contained in the earlier legislation. The provision in the Act for audit by amateur 
Elective auditors was also totally inadequate for enabling the probity of financial management 
systems used in the two municipalities. These failures had major consequences for how 
municipal services were managed, coordinated, and accountable for their performance. 
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The extent to which the manufacturers, merchants and business men, who put themselves 
forward for election to municipal Councils were ‘fit and proper’ to undertake this unpaid new 
role has been examined. The research has confirmed that many of these men had previously 
been involved in the management of township business pre-incorporation and some had 
successful careers in commerce. They were none-the-less amateurs, with little knowledge of 
the role of a municipal Council.  Despite this, the exploration of the attitudes and mindset which 
these men brought to their role, noted that being elected as a councillor was seen as evidence 
that they were qualified and had the ability take the correct decisions about Council business. 
It was evidence of being a success in life and a way of achieving status and membership of 
that small and exclusive group of members of the best club in town.’ Not surprisingly election 
also inculcated members of the Council with the belief that, as they had been elected, the 
decisions they took were the right decisions which should not be challenged. By the 1860s 
reports in the press suggested that there was an increase in the cases of mismanagement 
and this was attributable to a decline in the calibre of the men offering themselves for election 
to the Council. No evidence was provided to support this claim. An analysis of recruitment to 
the Council noted that there were a number of reasons why many able men did not seek 
election to the Council or had resigned. Councillors had to commit several days .to attend all 
the meetings of the Council and its committees, their own businesses made demands on their 
time. Many potential candidates had moved away from the towns to more salubrious areas 
and as a result were not qualified to stand for election as councillors. The few studies which 
examine how the power and effectiveness of the Council to take policy decisions was 
influenced by the changing composition of the Council, do not provide evidence to support the 
claim that the calibre of the men serving as councillors had declined. The research here, 
obtained by reading the reports of how the Council dealt with its business, suggests that the 
more likely reason for the increasing incidents of mismanagement was that that despite the 
increase in the volume and complexity of the workload, little attempt had been made to 
improve the efficiency with which Council business was conducted. There was no attempt to 
prioritise business or restrict the unfettered right of every councillor to speak during debates, 
or to ensure that members of the council were fully briefed about the technically complex 
schemes which came before them for consideration. Officials who could have provided the 
technical briefing, were not allowed to attend Council meetings. This could affect the ‘quality’ 
of the decisions made by the Council, and leave it open to allegations of mismanagement 
There was a further reason for any decline in the quality of decision making; the attitude of 
Council committees to the role the Council should play in discharging business. It was usual 
for aldermen, once elected, to remain on the Council until they resigned or died. The result 
was that, as experienced senior members of the Council, many aldermen were elected to chair 
a Committee where they may have gained expertise about committee business. This research 
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noted that as matters were referred to a committee for its expertise, aldermen, on behalf of 
the committee resented having to answer to the Council for the advice they had given. The 
solution taken by committees to avoid this situation was to seek autonomy.  The result was 
that the minimum of information was included in the Committee Minutes; in practice this meant 
downplaying, or omitting any problems which the Committee might have experienced.  
The thesis has discussed the administratively complex and lengthy procedure needed before 
any project requiring funding could be undertaken, a process which involved full consultation 
with the public. The failure of the constitution, based on the template provided by the 
MCA1882, to include powers for the setting up of an administration which would take over and 
implement ant resolutions passed by the Council was discussed earlier. The natural corollary 
to the mindset and attitude of councillors was that if, as members of committee they were 
qualified to advise the Council about council policy, they were also qualified to make the right 
decisions about carrying out the policy of the Council. This research confirmed that in the 
absence of any other solution, the practice was for the appropriate committee to take over the 
implementation and management of the projects and schemes of the Council which had been 
approved and funded, relying as far as possible on the committee’s expertise alone. The 
consequence was that each committee effectively developed its own works department, with 
the resources to implement projects and schemes which came within its remit. Any leaks about 
misconduct of the committee in conducting its business could appear in the press before the 
Council were aware that there was a problem. The result of the mutual mistrust between 
councillors, and officials, who were not managed by a Council Committee, was that officials 
who could offer specialist advice on matters which were outside the remit of a Committee 
department were used on a consultancy basis when requested by a Committee chairman. The 
outcome was the mismanagement of a number of important projects undertaken by the two 
Councils resulting in allegations both about the competence and the integrity of their 
behaviour.  
The exposure in the local press of ‘scandals,’ wrong-doing, whether by the Council itself, their 
officials or councillors, led to a demand for improved standards in conducting municipal 
business. The result was that criticism of Council behaviour became more severe. The thesis 
has explored how, as a result, attitudes to previously tolerated customary practices and 
practices such as insider trading, changed. Together with similar scandals elsewhere, this was 
seen to have implications throughout public life, leading to the implementation of the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act in 1889.  
A major section of this thesis has examined the factors which determined the ability of the 
Councils to manage and deliver services with competency and integrity. It noted the attitude 
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of many men in Victorian society to the pursuit of wealth and status, was encapsulated in the 
maxim of Samuel Smiles, ‘Heaven helps those who help themselves.’ This influenced attitudes 
to the integrity held by Council employees. It led some of those who had little or no opportunity 
for enhanced status and increased financial reward being tempted to use opportunities to 
benefit from the absence of supervision of their work and the lax standards of audit. The 
aspirations of officials and members of the Council who were guilty of offences lacking integrity 
have been examined. Although the number of reported cases of embezzlement by officials or 
councillors was small, some of these, which received detailed coverage in the press, drew 
attention to the inadequacy of the financial management systems and audit procedures used 
in the two municipalities. Whilst the thesis has argued that the two municipalities could 
certainly have reduced the risk of embezzlement, by improving audit and the supervision of 
staff involved in receiving money on behalf of the Council, it has also recognised the 
complexity of the system of financial management needed to deal with the activities of a 
municipality at a time when financial expertise was scarce, and the detail of how financial 
management systems should present the accounts of municipal trading operations, was still 
a matter of debate amongst accountancy professionals..  
The main source of information used to conduct this analysis is the evidence from the daily 
and weekly local press about the conduct of the two Councils. This has necessarily involved 
understanding how the terms used to describe this behaviour were understood in the late 
Victorian period. There was no problem in using as the definition of personal corruption ‘the 
abuse of power by a person in a position of trust for personal gain’ which clearly linked the 
corrupt behaviour of the corruptor to the gratuitous gain made; although the thesis noted that 
the nature of the offences which constituted ‘abuse’ did change as the standards of integrity 
expected in public life were interpreted more strictly. Offences such as embezzlement were 
always seen as corruption, a criminal offence for which there was a legal sanction. There was 
however reluctance both to use the term ‘corruption’ about councillors and officials found guilty 
of practices previously tolerated, like insider trading, which became illegal under the 1889 
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, and to use the sanctions provided by the legislation. The 
reasons for this attitude are discussed in the thesis.  
It is more difficult to define what the Victorian critic meant by Council corruption. There is no 
evidence that the two Councils were guilty of breaking statutory law. The court ruling in the 
case of Manchester Corporation v S. Norbury Williams, held that as corruption was seen to 
be the result of ‘spiritual and moral impurity’ therefore a Council lacked the capacity to be guilty 
of this offence. Despite this, the evidence shows that during the late Victorian period, 
mismanagement by the Council did form the causal underpinning of allegations that Councils 
were guilty of corrupt conduct, behaviour lacking integrity. There is no explanation about why 
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some incidents which were clearly mismanagement by the Council, were also seen by critics 
as corrupt conduct. The evidence from press reports about incidents of mismanagement 
tended to confirm that these could be divided into two categories. As a result, two working 
definitions have been adopted in the thesis. The term ‘misfeasance’ has been used where 
mismanagement arose from incompetence or ignorance by the Council. The term ‘Council 
corruption’ has been used for situations where mismanagement occurred because Councils 
used an unreasonable practice or system to manage council business not conforming to the 
duty to provide governance with competence and integrity.  
The thesis noted that the whilst the MCAs of 1835 and 1882 set down the powers to be 
exercised by a municipal government and the duties to be undertaken, the principles on which 
public services provided by the Councils should be based were not stated. The thesis has 
taken as the minimum requirements for 'the compact’ between the governed and the 
government that Council business should be carried out with competence and integrity, having 
regard to the interests of the Community. Whilst most allegations made against the Council 
were of misfeasance or council corruption, there were an increasing number which questioned 
the basis on which the Council decisions had been taken. These were reviewed in Part Four: 
‘A Reputation for corruption?’ The first group of cases in Chapter Eight involved situations 
where allegations made by critics related to Council failures to take effective action against 
incidents of wrong-doing committed by officers or councillors, thereby upholding the standards 
of integrity expected of a municipal Council. The cases included Council behaviour in covering 
up cases of embezzlement, failing to impose the full sanction on officers who were guilty of 
offences like insider trading or conflict of interest, and failures to take action in cases where 
information (usually about incidents which would reflect badly on a committee,) was 
misrepresented or withheld from the Council and thus from the public. A second group covered 
criticism of the Council for failing to take the correct action to open the account books of 
municipality to auditors. The common theme in all these cases is that the conduct of the 
Council, by failing to take the correct action which would preserve its reputation for integrity, 
appeared to be condoning wrongdoing, and was guilty of behaviour of questionable morality. 
The cases examined in Chapter Nine dealt with allegations of mismanagement where Council 
conduct, in carrying out municipal business, was failing to protect the interests of the 
community. In this case there are two different aspects in assessing the behaviour of the 
Council; whether the Council behaviour was misfeasance or constituted an abuse of power 
and additionally did critics specifically identify that the behaviour was not in the interests of the 
community inferring that the behaviour lacked morality. The first section comprised 
mismanagement alleged to result from a bad decision made by the Council or a committee. 
This was regarded as misfeasance, the result of incompetence or ignorance. The four cases, 
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all of which specified that the misfeasance was not in the interest of the community, resulted 
from a dysfunctional relationship between the Council and a committee. Three of the four 
covered situations where there was a delay in the provision of a service and an increase in 
the cost of the scheme. The fourth focussed on the costs of negotiations with market traders, 
which only marginally affected the services of the Councils. It is therefore unclear whether the 
allegation about ‘the interests of the community’ related to the more serious matter of a failure 
to abide by the compact between the Council and the community or was merely a statement 
of the practical consequences of the delay in accessing the new facilities provided by the two 
Councils and the increased costs to the ratepayers.   
The second section of Chapter Nine dealt with allegations where mismanagement arose 
because a Council ‘knowingly and consistently used an unreasonable practice or policy in 
conducting Council business, not conforming to the implied duty to act with competence and 
integrity;’ conduct which was not in the interests of the community. Whether the behaviour 
constituted misfeasance or corruption depends on the interpretation of the wording of this 
definition, which uses the words ‘unreasonable policy’. The problem is what was 
‘unreasonable’? The adoption of the policy of ‘management by committee’ might have been 
accepted as a means of controlling how decisions about the project were taken if the 
committees had access to the necessary expertise to undertake this role. This was not the 
case in either Manchester or Salford. In this situation the policy was, therefore, unreasonable, 
and the Councils were guilty of an arguably corrupt abuse of power. There is however, a 
paradox. Instead of stating or even inferring that Councils were guilty of corruption, the tenor 
of the criticism in these cases was that the behaviour which led to mismanagement was result 
of other factors, and was not a corrupt abuse of power. Throughout the late Victorian period, 
critics were reluctant to use the word ’corruption’ to describe the behaviour of councillors or 
officials guilty of practices such as insider trading, even when those practices had become 
statutory offences. This research has suggested that although the outcome of the practice of 
‘management by committee’ was clearly unacceptable and the behaviour was criticised as 
such, the Victorian critics were not prepared to use the phrase ’Council corruption’, because 
in the absence of any other feasible option for managing the implementation and management 
of Council schemes, the practice was acceptable, ‘it got the job done.’  
There is a problem in carrying out a contextualised study of a public body like a Council, when 
the prime sources of information concerning the conduct of Council business will often be 
found in local press.  As now, potentially scandalous news has always attracted more attention 
than the routine reporting of success. The result is that studies of public bodies using 
information from the press generally give a negative impression of the achievements of a 
Council by inevitably focussing what went wrong rather than the successes. This is true here, 
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given our central question has been ‘how far the two Councils prove incapable of avoiding 
situations where both their competence and at times their morality were brought into question’. 
This thesis argues that any study of municipal practice needs to be set within the context of 
the values of the time. Although many of the actions of the two Councils described above 
would now be regarded as acts of corruption, it was seen as acceptable behaviour having 
regard to the challenges of the time. It is more difficult to assess the extent to which critics did 
question the morality of the behaviour of the Councils. The findings of this thesis have 
demonstrated that the concept ‘in the interests of the community’ could be can be interpreted 
in a number of different ways.  The research has suggested that the more convincing evidence 
that critics did at times question the morality of the behaviour of the two Councils was the 
identification of evidence given in Chapter Eight.  This showed that critics attacked the 
attempts of the two Council to protect their reputation for integrity by covering up the 
consequences of corruption, rather than dealing with its causes for example by sanctioning 
wrong doing rather than at times condoning it. This would seem to provide evidence that this 
behaviour was seen as questionable and lacking morality. 
The late Victorian years saw public attitudes about the standards of integrity expected in 
municipalities changing, and improvements which were initially opposed were actually 
occurring. Action was taken leading to improvements in the probity of Council accounts: for 
example, acceptance by both Councils of the need to involve professional auditors in auditing 
borough accounts. By the end of the century, this was playing a part in deterring 
embezzlement. The system of ‘management by Committee’ still meant that the likelihood of 
mismanagement was high. However, the growing involvement of officials working in planning 
subcommittees with councillor members of the main committee did ensure that greater 
expertise was available to committees when projects were undertaken, reducing the risk of 
mismanagement. The findings of this thesis suggest personal corruption and veniality 
continued to be a problem, but this was partly because attitudes to integrity were changing in 
the wake of exposure of scandals; hence, more practices which had been tolerated were being 
seen as corruption. Many of the cases of mismanagement which were reported using the 
rhetoric of corruption were in fact misfeasance, but there was a core of cases where a twenty-
first century commentator would recognise that there was an abuse of power – and would see 
the behaviour of the Council as corrupt.  
Although both Councils had to contend with robust and often deserved criticism about their 
conduct in the last decades of the century, both could point to a long list of achievements. 
There were improvements in public health; public parks; baths and public libraries had been 
provided and progress been made in paving, and sewering and slum clearance by both 
municipalities. Manchester Council could point to the implementation of the Thirlmere scheme 
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to bring water supplies to both municipalities, and to providing the impetus for the completion 
of the Docks complex. Contemporaries in Salford, despite their robust and justified criticism of 
some of the actions of the Council, also recognised the work which it had undertaken. An 
editorial in Salford Chronicle, published on the occasion of the Jubilee of the municipality 
reflected this sentiment when it noted: 
On the whole no fault can be found with our local governing bodies in their respective 
administrative offices and particularly are the efforts of the Town Council 
commendable…...the vastly improved sanitation of the Town, the abolition of 
slumdom, the provision of parks and open spaces, the better lighted thoroughfares are 
all monuments to the work of the Corporation during the last 50 years.  
 
10.2. The contribution of this thesis to the historiography of corruption in  
municipal government in the late Victorian period 
 
E. P. Thompson in his seminal work, ‘The making of the English working class’ used the 
phrase ‘the enormous condescension of posterity’ to describe the patronising manner with 
which historians dealt with events or developments within working-class history. More 
generally his statement is interpreted to mean that future generations, which fail to understand 
actions in the context of their time, are likely to apply negative judgements to people’s actions 
in the past. Because Thompson concentrated on the contemporary evidence available about 
the culture and aims of the working class, and tried to set his interpretation within their world, 
he saw himself as building a different, less condescending, picture of working people. his 
This thesis has contributed to the debates surrounding corruption in the Councils of 
Manchester and Salford, viewing them through an examination of the contemporary reports of 
Council business which appeared in the contemporary local press. It has provided the 
opportunity to assess the competence of the two Councils and their approach to the standards 
of integrity adopted in conducting Council business. This thesis has argued that any study of 
municipal practice needs to be set within the context of the values of the time. In the late 
Victorian period these were certainly changing but they still ‘did things differently there.’ which 
were deemed to be appropriate at that time.  
The historiography reviewed in section 1.5 above highlighted the lack of academic interest in 
the subject of municipal corruption. Arthur Redford’s study of Manchester did address the 
problem of ensuring that the terms of reference of Council committees were able to deal the 
changing nature of business in the late-Victorian period. He accepted that the borough’s 
administrative machinery was not working smoothly, a situation he attributed to a failure of 
management both at Council and Committee level.  He did not elaborate further on the causes 
of this malfunction. E.P. Hennock’s. study of Birmingham and Leeds Councils focussed on the 
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extent to which the amateur Councils could meet the aim of municipal governments, which he 
saw as the promotion of community welfare. He recognised the important contribution that 
business men with commercial experience could bring to municipal governance with a minor 
caveat: businessmen attracted to Council service might also have had vested interests.  He 
did not develop this theme. Neither author looked at the problems of delivering government 
on a day-to-day basis, where the influence of commercial practices on Council conduct was 
demonstrable and flowed naturally from the occupational backgrounds of those elected. This 
thesis has examined this issue in more detail and has also explored the impact of membership 
of the ’Best club in Town’ on the conduct of council business. James Moore accepted the 
findings of Joseph Scott to support his assertion that Manchester Council in the mid-1880s 
was ‘a bye word for corruption.’ Scott did identify practices rightly criticised as extravagant and 
some behaviour which by the late-Victorian period was regarded as venial; and which in the 
present day would be regarded as corrupt. Moore however failed to take account of the fact 
that attitudes were different and changing. Many of the practices Scott criticised had been 
accepted as customary practices tolerated because they were seen to benefit the Council, 
and got things done. 
The question must be how far the findings of this study of Manchester and Salford are typical 
of other urban municipalities. Derek Fraser attributed the development of the policies of 
municipal government to the need to undertake schemes to improve the environment. Whilst 
the priorities of individual authorities might have differed, he noted that their needs were 
similar. For many municipalities, the men who served as councillors brought their experience 
of the commercial world.to their role, where ethical boundaries were less clearly defined. The 
work of authors like Searle, and Houghton suggest that there was a commonality of these 
attitudes across the commercial world. This would suggest that the pattern of behaviour of the 
Manchester and Salford Councils was likely to be replicated in other urban municipalities This 
represents a clear avenue for further research.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Applications for powers: Manchester and Salford 
during the Victorian Period 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
 
 
Manchester 
 
Private Acts 
 
Manchester 
Provisional orders 
confirmed, /Acts 
adopted 
 
Salford,  
 
Private Acts 
 
Salford, 
Provisional orders 
confirmed, /Acts 
adopted 
1840- 
to 
 
1850 
 
 
 
 
7 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
- 
1851- 
to 
 
o1860 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1861- 
to 
 
1870 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
2 
1871- 
to 
 
1880 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
1881- 
to 
 
1890 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
17 
 
 
1 
 
 
4 
1891- 
to 
 
1900 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
The information is taken from The Official Handbook of Manchester and 
Salford and surrounding district (Manchester: Taylor Garnett Evans & Co, for 
the year 1900, which lists previous orders/Acts applicable to the two 
municipalities. 
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Appendix 2 -  Occupational Analysis:  Manchester and 
Salford Councils. 
 
 
Occupational 
Grouping 
Manchester 
1866-70. 
Manchester 
1871- 1875. 
Salford 
1866-1870. 
Salford 
1871-1875. 
Total: - Large 
Proprietors:  
Manufacturers / 
Merchants. 
 
29.2% 
 
32.6% 
 
47.1% 
 
55.5% 
Total: - Named 
Merchants / 
Agents other 
Business men. 
 
24.0% 
 
22.5% 
 
13.7% 
 
9.9% 
 
Total: -Gentlemen/ 
Professionals/ 
Other. 
 
17.7% 
 
12.4% 
 
19.3% 
 
15.4% 
Total: - Small 
Proprietors:  shop-
keepers, dealers, 
etc + Building 
trade 
 
20.8% 
 
16.8% 
 
19.9% 
 
19.2% 
 
Not given 
 
 
8.3% 
 
15.7% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
     Garrard’s classification was used for both sets of figures: 
 
Large Proprietors: includes Manufacturers & Merchants: i.e.  those designated as manufacturers, cotton 
spinners, sizers, dyers, iron founders, machine makers brewers, quarry masters, colliery proprietors, mill 
furnishers, manufacturing chemists and those specially designated as ‘merchants’, plus bankers. 
 
Named Merchants: include those designated as iron, timber, wine & spirit, coal, tea merchants  
 
Professionals: - solicitors, barristers, doctors, surgeons, veterinary surgeons, surveyors, sheriff’s officers, 
engineers, journalists, editors. 
 
Small proprietors: includes Shopkeepers / Dealers etc  & Building trade : i.e. those designated as shopkeepers, 
dealers, tea dealers, drapers, grocers, corn merchants, pawnbrokers, stationers, bakers, chandler, chemist 
druggist, cordwainer, licensed victuallers, beer-sellers, and builders, joiners, carpenters and plumbers.  
 
 
* The figures for the Manchester Council were taken from the Introduction to (eds.)  A. J. Kidd & K.W Roberts 
City, Class and Culture, Studies of cultural production and Social Policy in Victorian Manchester.  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1985) which were originally given in the Chronicle of City Council 1838-79 (1880.)    
 
** The figures for Salford are taken from John Garrard, Leadership and power in Victorian Industrial Towns 
1830-1880 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983) pp 14,15. 
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Appendix   3 – Manchester Council- Committee structure 
 
 
 
 
 
*The number of committees excludes township committees which dealt with local issues 
only. These were abolished when the borough boundaries were extended. Any special 
committees set up to report on a particular issue, which were disbanded after reporting 
were also excluded. After 1892 some of the special committees were fully listed with named 
membership; for example the Technical Education Committee, these has been included in 
the table above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Year** 
 
No. of 
members 
of  
Manchester 
council  
 
Total * 
 Number of 
Committee
s 
 
Total 
Number of 
sub -
committee
s. 
 
Number of 
members of 
the 
Finance 
Committee  
 
1873 
 
64 
 
16 
 
50 
 
10 
 
1876 
 
64 
 
17 
 
77 
 
10 
 
1879 
 
64 
 
17 
 
81 
 
11 
 
1882 
 
64 
 
17 
 
84 
 
12 
 
1885 
 
64 
 
18 
 
87 
 
16 
 
1888 
 
76 
 
18 
 
74 
 
14 
 
1891 
 
76 
 
17 
 
79 
 
18 
 
1894 
76 
 
 
18 
 
85 
 
18 
 
1897 
 
104 
 
20 
 
97 
 
18 
 
1900 
 
104 
 
21 
 
118 
 
20 
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Appendix 4 -    Salford Council- Committee Structure 
 
 
 
In 1892, the separate District committees for Salford, Broughton and Pendleton were 
abolished, so that all committees were general committees. 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of 
General i.e. 
Salford 
borough 
Committees 
 
 
 
Number of 
General 
Sub-  
Committees 
 
 
 
Number of  
Salford  
District  
Committees 
 
 
Number of 
Salford  
District  
 Sub-  
Committees 
 
Number of 
Pendleton/ 
Broughton 
District  
Committees 
 
 
Number of 
Pendleton/ 
Broughton 
District Sub 
Committees 
Number of 
members 
on the  
Borough 
Finance 
Committee 
 
1873 
 
8 
 
16 
 
7 
 
15 
 
4 
 
6 
 
17 
 
1876 
 
10 
 
14 
 
7 
 
14 
 
4 
 
6 
 
17 
 
1879 
 
12 
 
24 
 
7 
 
14 
 
4 
 
7 
 
17 
 
1882 
 
12 
 
26 
 
7 
 
14 
 
4 
 
7 
 
18 
 
1885 
 
12 
 
30 
 
7 
 
12 
 
4 
 
12 
 
18 
 
1888 
 
12 
 
39 
 
7 
 
12 
 
4 
 
14 
 
18 
 
1891 
 
14 
 
34 
 
7 
 
13 
 
4 
 
14 
 
18 
 
1894 
 
16 
 
44 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
1897 
 
16 
 
60 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
1900 
 
18 
 
61 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
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